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NEW GROUPS AND OLD DOCTRINE: RETHINKING 
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO ENFORCE THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
WILLIAM D. ARAIZA*
ABSTRACT
This Article considers the Supreme Court’s current approach to judicial review of 
federal legislation enforcing the Equal Protection Clause. It starts from the assumption that 
the Court will not abandon the judicial supremacy principle it expressed in City of Boerne 
v. Flores; thus, any approach to congressional enforcement power must accommodate that 
supremacy. The Article begins by critiquing the Court’s current understanding of Boerne,
and explaining how new and pending enforcement legislation pose major challenges under 
that doctrine. It then sketches a theory of the enforcement power which requires Congress to 
abide by judicial statements of constitutional meaning, but where judicial opinions are read 
more carefully to distinguish between true statements of constitutional law and 
subconstitutional decision rules. Congressional enforcement power must not conflict with 
the former. In addition, to the extent those statements are vague or general, they nevertheless 
channel congressional enforcement discretion by pointing to follow-on inquiries that 
Congress must satisfactorily answer in order for the Court to uphold its legislation. The 
Article then applies this new approach to three new pieces of equality legislation that are 
either currently in force or under consideration: the Employment Non-Discrimination  
Act, employment protection for transgendered people, and the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act. This application illustrates the theory in action. It also allows us to 
draw more general conclusions about the theory’s workability and appropriateness as a tool 
for reviewing future enforcement legislation, both under the Equal Protection Clause and 
other components of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 Judicial doctrine concerning congressional power to enforce the 
Reconstruction Amendments1 has reached an impasse. A decade ago 
in City of Boerne v. Flores2 the Court reached a consensus that the 
enforcement power did not give Congress the power to impose its own 
interpretation of the Constitution.3 Asserting its supremacy in 
stating constitutional meaning, the Court authorized Congress only 
to enact legislation that is “congruent and proportional” to the 
relevant constitutional evil identified by the Court.4 Post-Boerne
cases revealed a sharp split on the application of this “congruence 
and proportionality” test, with a slim majority asserting the 
supremacy of essentially all judicial doctrine.5
 This aggressive reading of Boerne should be reexamined. It 
creates the anomaly of elevating to the level of supreme and 
authoritative constitutional interpretation judicial doctrine that rests 
on the Court’s confessed inability to discern what the Constitution 
truly requires in a given case. The problem is compounded when such 
doctrine confronts an enforcement statute that is supported by 
congressional fact-finding and normative judgments that provide a 
superior answer to the constitutional questions the Court has 
confessed an inability to answer precisely. In such cases, a majority 
of Justices has sought to defend the perceived attack on judicial 
supremacy by engaging in a fruitless and disrespectful nit-picking of 
the factual record compiled by Congress.6
 This problem is nearing a critical phase. Congress has either 
recently enacted, or is poised to enact, several antidiscrimination 
                                                                                                                                       
 1. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, & XV. 
 2. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 3. Id. at 519. 
 4. Id. at 520. 
 5. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 90-91 (2000) (concluding that 
because equal protection doctrine accorded age discrimination only rational basis review it 
would be harder for Congress to demonstrate the existence of a constitutional problem 
warranting enforcement legislation); see also Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356, 369 (2001) (expanding the effective reach of this approach by dismissing a sizable 
congressional record documenting discrimination against the disabled, largely due to the 
constitutional status of the type of discrimination targeted). 
 6. The best-known example of this proof skepticism is the Court’s opinion in Garrett,
where the Court went to pains to disqualify from relevance a large set of examples of 
disability discrimination, including examples that were known to Congress during its 
consideration of the ADA. See 531 U.S. at 369-72. 
2010]           RETHINKING CONGRESSIONAL POWER 453 
laws that will challenge the Court’s doctrinal supremacy approach to 
congressional enforcement power. The areas this legislation 
addresses—sexual orientation discrimination, transgender 
discrimination, and genetic make-up discrimination—do not enjoy 
the high-profile status or historical pedigree that mark the racial 
equality goal that most often comes to mind when thinking about the 
enforcement power.7 However, this legislation raises its own 
challenges to the Court’s post-Boerne approach to the enforcement 
power. Most importantly, the discrimination it targets implicates 
judicial doctrine whose rigidities, ambiguities, and holes create an 
inadequate constitutional baseline against which to judge these laws’ 
constitutionality. As a result, application of the current approach to 
this new legislation will present serious challenges to the Court.8
 In addition, the Court’s exceptionally strict test for the relevance 
of congressional fact findings supporting enforcement legislation9
casts doubt on congressional action when the truly relevant facts 
relate more to perceptions of social reality than to empirical data. For 
example, the cultural meaning society accords to physical or mental 
disability is surely relevant to the invidiousness of disability 
discrimination. Yet some of the Court’s post-Boerne cases indicate 
that a congressional finding to that effect would be irrelevant to its 
analysis of congressional enforcement power.10
 Unless the Court changes its approach to congruence and 
proportionality, these problems will only deepen as Congress 
responds to new groups’ demands for antidiscrimination laws. In this 
scenario, as a politically responsive Congress enacts new legislation 
protecting new groups, analogous judicial doctrine lags. It may lag 
simply because the lack of significant litigation hinders doctrinal 
                                                                                                                                       
 7. Indeed, the most recent enforcement power case, Northwest Austin Municipal 
Utility District Number One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508 (2009), considered whether 
the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) constituted appropriate 
congressional enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment. The Court avoided reaching that 
constitutional issue only by deciding the case on a statutory ground that many considered a 
stretch. See, e.g., Posting of Heather K. Gerken to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 
2009/06/supreme-court-punts-on-section-5.html (June 22, 2009, 10:42 EST). But see Holder,
129 S. Ct. at 2517 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(concluding that the provision exceeded congressional enforcement power). Similarly, the 
foundational modern cases construing the enforcement power involved the VRA. See
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966) (upholding Section 4(e) of the VRA as 
appropriate legislation enforcing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) (upholding other 
parts of the VRA as appropriate legislation enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 8. See infra Part III(B). 
 9. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369-71 (requiring Congress to make specific legislative 
findings that there is a substantial amount of unconstitutional state conduct that is more 
than “adverse, disparate treatment by state officials”).  
 10. See, e.g., id. at 371 (dismissing evidence of general societal discrimination against 
the disabled as irrelevant to the congruence and proportionality analysis). 
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development. It may also lag because the Court has apparently 
sworn off creating new suspect classes, preferring instead to resolve 
new equal protection problems by varying the actual scrutiny 
accorded under the rational basis test11 but thereby essentially 
freezing the current doctrinal status of all nonsuspect classes.12 Or it 
may lag because the issue presented by the discrimination is nuanced 
and difficult for generalist judges to evaluate—for example, whether 
differential treatment of a group actually benefits that group.13
Whatever the reason, this lag means that an enforcement power 
doctrine focusing nearly exclusively on judicial statements of 
constitutional meaning threatens to generate a growing disconnect 
between the Court’s formal equal protection doctrine and Congress’s 
evolving sense of which groups require statutory protection for their 
basic equality rights.  
 Unless the Court is content to block the recognition of new equality 
rights by the first national political regime in a decade unambiguously 
committed to civil rights, it should take the opportunity presented by 
these statutes to rethink its approach to congruence and 
proportionality. Such a rethinking need not require an abandonment 
of Boerne’s judicial supremacy principle. However, it does require a 
reconsideration of its scope. In particular, it requires a recognition that 
not every judicial pronouncement in a constitutional law case 
constitutes a statement of constitutional meaning.  
 In turn, this task requires grappling with a larger, more 
conceptual, point about courts and the enunciation of constitutional 
norms. Critiquing the Court’s application of Boerne necessarily raises 
the question whether judge-made doctrine differs from underlying 
constitutional meaning. This issue is not new: the argument for 
distinguishing between constitutional doctrine and constitutional law 
dates back at least as far as Professor Sager’s now-classic article on 
underenforced constitutional norms,14 and, as Professor Sager notes 
himself, in some ways well before that.15
                                                                                                                                       
 11. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (declining 
to make the mentally disabled a suspect class, but nevertheless employing de facto 
heightened scrutiny). 
 12. The Court has not created a new suspect class since it elevated gender and 
legitimacy to quasi-suspect class status in the 1970s. See id. at 445-46 (expressing 
reluctance to increase the number of suspect classes). But see United States v. Virginia, 
518 U.S. 515, 557-58 (1996) (arguably further heightening scrutiny for gender 
classifications); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509-11 (1989) 
(establishing strict scrutiny for all racial classifications, including those defended as benign 
or compensatory).
 13. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-44 (explaining that the treatment of the 
mentally retarded is often difficult and technical, and it is better suited for legislators and 
qualified professionals to make the determination, rather than the judiciary). 
 14. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (arguing for a 
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 This Article updates the arguments on this issue and applies them 
to new factual contexts.16 Professor Sager wrote during a period when 
congressional enforcement power was governed by the generous 
standard enunciated in Katzenbach v. Morgan.17 The debate his article 
helped engender played out in the shadow of the Court’s consideration 
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),18 which pressed 
congressional enforcement power to its limit by countermanding a 
Court decision interpreting the Free Exercise Clause.  
 Boerne’s rejection of RFRA and explicit embrace of judicial 
supremacy changed the doctrinal ground on which enforcement 
power issues would be debated. It did not, however, obviate the 
importance of the underlying distinction between constitutional law 
and constitutional doctrine. Thus, Boerne did not render obsolete the 
thesis this Article advances. Indeed, by requiring that enforcement 
legislation have some relationship to the Fourteenth Amendment 
right sought to be enforced, Boerne’s congruence and proportionality 
test reaffirmed the importance of accurately delineating the scope of 
the underlying right. It thus requires us to consider the degree to 
which judicial doctrine fully exhausts the content of constitutional 
rights. Conversely, it also requires us to consider the degree to which 
constitutional rights evade judicial application but nevertheless 
continue to exist, thus justifying congressional enforcement 
legislation. The likely appearance of new civil rights legislation 
therefore requires us to reexamine these issues in the context of the 
Court’s post-Boerne jurisprudence and to critique that jurisprudence 
to the extent it is mistaken. 
 This Article has modest aspirations. It does not challenge judicial 
supremacy19 or even the congruence and proportionality standard; 
rather, it takes the Court’s doctrine as it stands20 and argues only for 
                                                                                                                                       
distinction between judiciary enforcement of constitutional norms and the extent to which 
those norms are otherwise enforceable and valid). 
 15. See id. at 1222-24. 
 16. See William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of 
Equal Protection, 79 TUL. L. REV. 519 (2005) [hereinafter Araiza, The Section 5 Power];
William D. Araiza, Courts, Congress, and Equal Protection: What Brown Teaches Us About 
the Section 5 Power, 47 HOW. L.J. 199 (2004); William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power After 
Tennessee v. Lane, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 39 (2004); William D. Araiza, ENDA Before It Starts: 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Availability of Damages Awards to Gay 
State Employees Under the Proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 22 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 1 (2002). 
 17. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993). 
 19. This Article does not advocate what has become known as “popular 
constitutionalism,” in which citizens acting via day-to-day politics are said to have the 
authority effectively to amend the Constitution. Cf., e.g., LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
 20. See supra note 7 (noting the consensus that the Court is supreme in its 
interpretation of the Constitution). 
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a more sophisticated application. Because it takes the congruence 
and proportionality standard as a given, the Article also necessarily 
assumes both the existence of a distinction between the 
announcement and the enforcement of Fourteenth Amendment 
rights21 and the Court’s exclusive authority in the former. Scholars 
have mounted trenchant challenges to both of these positions.22
Again, though, the assumed continuation of the congruence and 
proportionality standard, which enjoyed broad support on the Court 
when announced in Boerne,23 means that progress in the project of 
allowing Congress a larger role in ensuring equality requires working 
within the framework of that standard.24
 The Article is also limited in its identification of the types of rights 
to which its analysis of congressional power may be useful. It applies 
its argument about the larger role for congressional enforcement of 
Fourteenth Amendment rights only to the equal protection right to 
be free of inappropriate classifications. The overall theory sketched 
by the Article should apply to congressional enforcement of other 
Fourteenth Amendment rights; to be credible, a theory of the 
enforcement power cannot be arbitrarily limited to one set of 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. However, the special character of 
equal protection makes that theory especially powerful with regard 
to those rights and renders equal protection the appropriate vehicle 
for introducing and defending it. 
 Finally, this Article does not directly speak to congressional power 
to enforce rights that judicial doctrine itself identifies with precision. 
As will become clear, this Article focuses on the situations—
exemplified by the equality legislation identified above—where 
judicial doctrine can only provide the broadest outlines of what equal 
protection requires. Other components of the equal protection 
guarantee—for example, the guarantee against racial 
discrimination—have been identified with relative precision (as 
                                                                                                                                       
 21. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). 
 22. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999) (critiquing the distinction); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, 
Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power,
78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003) (critiquing the exclusive judicial role).  
 23. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. But see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 
554-58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (abandoning the test). Justice Souter also implied  
an openness to considering the more generous Morgan standard for reviewing  
enforcement legislation. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003)  
(Souter, J., concurring). 
 24. The strong normative argument for ultimate judicial supremacy in the exposition 
of constitutional meaning focuses largely on the counter-majoritarian nature of judicial 
review as a positive way of protecting unpopular rights and minority groups. Evaluation of 
this argument is beyond the scope of this Article, which instead simply takes Boerne’s 
statement of judicial supremacy as an assumed starting point for considering congressional 
enforcement power. 
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controversial as the Court’s decision might be).25 In such situations 
enforcement legislation is best understood as more classically 
remedial in the sense that it takes as a given the shape of the right at 
issue and simply provides means for vindicating it. Such situations 
raise conceptually different questions about the proper scope of 
congressional power.26
 Despite these limitations, the consequences of this Article remain 
weighty. Equal protection is in many ways Americans’ favorite child 
among Fourteenth Amendment rights. Equality, perhaps even more 
than liberty, has been a defining feature of Americans’ perception of 
their contribution to the world’s heritage of democratic government. 
“Equality” captures better than any word the egalitarian, class-free 
aspirations underlying American political progress since the 
Revolution.27 As one commentator remarked, a concern that laws be 
general in application has been described as “the chief constitutional 
development of pre-Civil War America.”28 For most of the twentieth 
century it has been the least controversial engine of American 
constitutional progress, often compared favorably to the alternative of 
substantive rights protected under the banner of due process.29 Indeed, 
one canonical comparison of substantive and equality rights celebrates 
the latter as an ultimate recognition of democratic self-government.30
 Thus, congressional action targeting equality has played, and can 
be expected to play, an outsized role when Congress uses its 
enforcement power. Simply put, Americans understand equality 
arguments, and Congress translates that understanding into 
                                                                                                                                       
 25. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989) (requiring 
that race-based affirmative action plans be subject to strict scrutiny). 
 26. For example, this Article does not  directly address the controversy surrounding 
the constitutionality of the VRA. See Gerken, supra note 7. Aside from the VRA’s 
constitutional authority resting on the Fifteenth rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which may or may not call for a separate test, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 
301, 324 (1966) (concluding that congressional authority under both the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments is judged under the same test), the VRA was designed to remedy 
the continuing effects of intentional racial discrimination, which the Court itself would 
consider unconstitutional. See id. at 308. See also infra note 236. 
 27. See generally SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON 
TO LINCOLN (2005); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787 (1969).  
 28. Mark G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discrimination: One 
Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1375 (1990);
see also Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 245, 251-68 (1997). 
 29. See, e.g., Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300-01  
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our salvation is the Equal Protection Clause, which 
requires the democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones what they 
impose on you and me. This Court need not, and has no authority to, inject itself into every 
field of human activity where irrationality and oppression may theoretically occur, and if it 
tries to do so it will destroy itself.”). 
 30. Ry. Express Agency, v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1949) (Jackson,  
J., concurring). 
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legislation.31 This fact puts us on notice to expect aggressive 
congressional action enforcing equal protection. Thus the stage is set 
for an examination of the legitimacy of that congressional action 
within the confines of a doctrine that accords ultimate law stating 
power to the Court. 
 The importance of this project is not diminished by the fact that 
other congressional powers—most notably, the interstate commerce 
power and the spending power—may authorize equality-enforcing 
legislation.32 Even assuming the commerce power would authorize 
regulation of all areas in which Congress may wish to regulate to 
ensure equality,33 the Commerce Clause suffers from the well-known 
limitation that it does not allow imposition of retrospective relief on 
unwilling states.34 Since damages, back pay awards, and other types 
of retrospective relief may serve as the strongest deterrents to legal 
violations,35 their unavailability against state government violators 
significantly reduces the attractiveness of the commerce power as an 
alternative regulatory path.36
 For its part, the spending power may authorize Congress to 
require states to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity in return for 
federal grants on a related topic.37 However, some commentators 
have perceived a trend in which the federal courts, led by the 
                                                                                                                                       
 31. See Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrmination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 475-78 (2010). 
 32. Cf. Harper Jean Tobin, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008: A 
Case Study of the Need for Better Congressional Responses to Federalism Jurisprudence 40-
41 (May 7, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1375684 
(calling for Congress to use its spending power to ensure the constitutionality of the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act). 
 33. This assumption is by no means unassailable. See, e.g., Kevin Schwartz, Note, 
Applying Section 5: Tennessee v. Lane and Judicial Conditions on the Congressional 
Enforcement Power, 114 YALE L.J. 1133, 1171-72 (2005) (noting the doubts that application of 
the ADA to activities such as voting and accessing courthouses would fall within the 
commerce power). The VRA might also be vulnerable to a Commerce Clause attack in light of 
the limitation of deferential commerce power review to situations where Congress is 
regulating an economic activity. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). But see
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28-29 (2005) (adopting a broad definition of economic activity). 
 34. See generally Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (upholding 
states’ sovereign immunity). 
 35. This might especially be the case in civil rights statutes, where individual victims may 
have little incentive to sue if the only relief available is injunctive relief or job reinstatement. 
 36. By contrast, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows imposition of such 
relief. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
 37. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-08 (1987) (setting forth the 
constitutional test for conditional spending grants to states). The Dole test is quite lenient,  
and the spending power has become a fallback congressional power that can be used 
whenever another authority is questionable. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Listening to the 
‘Sounds of Sovereignty’ but Missing the Beat: Does the New Federalism Really Matter?, 32 
IND. L. REV. 11, 17 (1998) (“In sum, even in this brave new world of post-post New Deal 
federalism, there is really no doubt that South Dakota v. Dole permits Congress to use the 
spending power to accomplish indirectly that which it may not accomplish directly.” ). But 
see infra note 41. 
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Supreme Court, read such spending conditions narrowly.38 While 
formally only statutory interpretation opinions, they may well have 
the effect of constitutional decisions to the extent the legislative 
process is sufficiently daunting that Congress may never override 
them. Furthermore, aggressive override attempts could well prompt 
the Court to tighten constitutional limits on the spending power, a 
move that has been expected since the Court’s federalism revolution 
began in earnest nearly twenty years ago.39
 More fundamentally, congressional use of the commerce or 
spending power to enact equality legislation denigrates the symbolic 
value of the enforcement power and the Equal Protection Clause 
more generally. While the concrete effect of legislation does not turn 
on the authority on which it is based,40 the public’s understanding of 
and appreciation for the Equal Protection Clause is undermined 
when Congress is reduced to enforcing equality either by regulating 
the interstate movement of goods and services41 or as an incident to a 
decision to spend money. Quite literally, if Congress can reach such 
results without using the enforcement power and makes a habit of 
doing so, it necessarily raises the question of why the enforcement 
power matters at all.  
 This is not to denigrate the importance of Congress’s Article I 
powers or their authority for equality-enforcing legislation.42 The point 
is simply that there is a cost in public understanding of constitutional 
principles, and thus in their legitimacy, when Congress is forced to 
hide the ball. This is especially true with regard to equality legislation. 
If Americans appreciate nothing else about their governmental 
system, it is that it promises a regime marked by equality. When 
congressional attempts to enforce that promise are disguised as 
regulations of commerce or conditions attached to spending grants, an 
opportunity is lost for Congress and the people to engage in a dialogue 
                                                                                                                                       
 38. See generally, e..g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the 
Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345 (2008) (analyzing the Court’s interpretation of the 
spending power); Tobin, supra note 32
 39. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 38, at 346-47. 
 40. Some grants of authority may authorize different types of regulation or different 
types of remedies. Most notably for our purposes, the enforcement power authorizes Congress 
to make states liable for retrospective relief while the commerce power does not. Compare
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58-73 (1996) (denying relief in commerce 
regulation), with Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (authorizing relief in enforcement legislation). 
 41. E.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“I 
am of the opinion that the right of persons to move freely from State to State occupies a 
more protected position in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, 
fruit, steel and coal across state lines.”); cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241, 250, 252 (1964) (upholding the public accommodations provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 as appropriate regulation under the Commerce Clause and declining to 
consider its constitutionality as enforcement legislation). 
 42. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 255 (noting that Congress’ intent 
when regulating interstate commerce does not matter to the question of its authority). 
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about what equality means. To the extent such attempts circumvent, 
rather than engage, Supreme Court doctrine about equal protection, 
the lost opportunity is even more unfortunate.  
 In short, the enforcement power matters. Because it matters, it is 
important to get it right. 
 This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II examines the rise of 
new social groups demanding nondiscrimination protection. It then 
briefly sets forth how enforcement power review of new equality 
legislation may challenge the Court, given its current approach to the 
congruence and proportionality standard. 
 Part III engages this difficulty. It begins with a brief tour of how 
the Court has applied the congruence and proportionality test. While 
it reached broad consensus in Boerne that the Court is supreme in 
the interpretation of the Constitution, and that enforcement 
legislation must conform to that interpretation, since then it has split 
badly on what that interpretive supremacy really means. As 
explained in Part III (A), in post-Boerne cases a narrow majority of 
Justices has essentially required that enforcement legislation be 
congruent and proportional to the Court’s own equal protection 
doctrine, even when that doctrine is explicitly based on institutional 
limitations and not an understanding of true constitutional meaning. 
Part III (B) explains how this approach to congruence and 
proportionality creates problems for judicial review of the three 
examples of nondiscrimination legislation discussed here, given the 
incompleteness and ambiguity of the Court’s doctrine on these issues. 
 In light of these difficulties, Part IV critiques the Court’s current 
doctrinal supremacy approach to enforcement legislation. It criticizes 
that approach as illogical, since it privileges judicial doctrine even 
when that doctrine explicitly rests on judicial confessions of inability 
to discern the true constitutional requirement in a given case. It also 
argues that it is unworkable, given the problems discussed in  
Part III (B). 
 Part V builds on this critique to suggest a new approach to the 
enforcement power. This approach retains Boerne’s concept of judicial 
supremacy but limits its scope by adopting a more modest 
understanding of what counts as constitutional interpretation enjoying 
that supreme status. In particular, Part V (A) explains that the Court 
should approach legislation enforcing the Equal Protection Clause by 
first examining the degree to which its own equal protection doctrine 
states true constitutional principles and, conversely, the extent to 
which it rests on judicially workable decision rules that do not 
themselves fully exhaust the constitutional rule. It argues that the 
Court’s doctrine should furnish the baseline against which legislation 
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is tested for congruence and proportionality only to the extent that the 
doctrine reflects true constitutional principles.  
 The fact that much of the constitutional principle discernable in 
equal protection doctrine is couched at a general level means that the 
equal protection decisions, properly understood, impose relatively few 
concrete limits on congressional enforcement authority. However, 
Part V (A) argues that such broad principles serve a second, more 
significant, limiting function on congressional power. Those 
principles channel congressional authority by pointing to inquiries 
that would reveal more of the true constitutional rule. Thus, judicial 
doctrine points to the proper questions to be answered by Congress 
when it writes enforcement legislation. In the context of equal 
protection, those questions deal not just with the state of empirical 
reality but also the normative status of certain classifications in light 
of American society’s consensus about which inequalities are 
fundamentally fair and which are not. Congress’s answers to those 
questions are properly reviewable by courts, with the caveat that 
courts must keep in mind the fact that these questions are primarily 
within Congress’s institutional competence to answer. Thus, judicial 
review of Congress’s answers, while real, must be limited.  
 Part V (B) then examines the Court’s modern equal protection 
doctrine to determine what constitutional principles can be gleaned. 
It concludes—perhaps unsurprisingly—that judicial doctrine states a 
significant amount of true constitutional principle. However, many of 
those statements are couched at a high level of generality and, thus, 
do not furnish strict limits on congressional enforcement power. This 
fact highlights the importance of the second, channeling, function 
played by those judicial statements. Part V (C) applies this analysis 
to the current and proposed enforcement legislation discussed earlier 
in the Article. Part V (D) explains how this Article’s approach affects 
the appropriate breadth of enforcement legislation. 
 Part VI summarizes the approach worked out and applied in Part 
V. It concludes the Article by defending it as an appropriate 
harmonization of judicial supremacy in the enunciation of 
constitutional principle and congressional authority and competence 
to participate in the project of enforcing constitutional rights. 
II.   NEW GROUPS AND NEW CHALLENGES
 In recent decades America has become an increasingly pluralistic 
society, marked by individuals coalescing into groups and demanding 
protection for their rights as members of those groups. Such groups, 
as varied as the disabled and gays and lesbians, used the civil rights 
model pioneered by African Americans as the template for their 
organizing and their self-perception as a social group subject to 
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discrimination.43 Legislative bodies, including Congress, have 
responded by enacting nondiscrimination legislation protecting them. 
As a result, the civil rights landscape that in the 1960s focused 
nearly exclusively on race now acknowledges concerns based on 
membership in a wide variety of groups.44
 Federal protection for these groups has generally taken the form 
of legislation that treats the issue as one of discrimination,45 and thus 
susceptible to a nondiscrimination mandate along the lines of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act. For example, Congress has enacted the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)46 and the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA),47 and is considering the Employment 
Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which would protect gays, lesbians, 
and, potentially, transgendered people from employment 
discrimination.48 Such legislation generally enjoys a strong 
constitutional foundation in the Commerce Clause, even after the 
                                                                                                                                       
 43. See, e.g., JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993); Stephen Reinhardt, Legal and Political Perspectives on 
the Battle over Same-Sex Marriage, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y Rev. 11, 16 (2005). 
 44. Indeed, even with the race category, concerns have expanded beyond African 
Americans and Caucasians to include Latinos, Asian Americans, Native Americans, and 
others. The rise in these groups’ consciousness reflects the same increasing pluralism that 
has led to the rise of consciousness of membership in other groups. See, e.g., Hernandez v. 
Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-80 (1954) (discussing the existence of Mexican Americans as a 
recognizable social group in Texas). 
 45. As might be expected, this legislation varies based on political conditions and each 
group’s distinctive needs. For example, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
focuses on insurance and employment discrimination, while the Americans with 
Disabilities Act includes public accommodation provisions. Political realities also matter. 
For example, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act does not allow employees to bring 
claims based on disparate treatment. See H.R. 2981, 111th Cong. § 4(g) (2009); compare
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (recognizing disparate treatment 
claims in the context of the Civil Right Act of 1964’s prohibitions on race and sex 
discrimination in employment). 
 46. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300 (2006). 
 47. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff (2008). 
 48. See, e.g., Patricia Nemeth & Terry W. Bonnette, Genetic Discrimination in 
Employment, 88 MICH. BAR J. 42, 42 (2009) (describing the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act modeled on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964);  Michael A. 
Schwartz, Deaf Patients, Doctors, and the Law: Compelling a Conversation About 
Communication, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 947, 970 (2008) (noting that the ADA was modeled 
after the Civil Rights Act).  
 This Article does not examine the detail of the legislation it considers, except as 
necessary to the broad constitutional analysis that is its focus. First, except for GINA, such 
legislation remains un-enacted; thus, detailed examination of any bill’s provisions may be 
rendered obsolete. More importantly, the fundamental issue this Article considers is the 
constitutional status of the discrimination targeted by legislation, rather than the 
legislation itself. This larger status question is key to the Court’s current enforcement 
power analysis. See generally infra Part III. Concededly, the scope of the given piece of 
enforcement legislation is also relevant to this analysis. See id. However, the latter 
analysis cannot be performed until the preliminary inquiry reveals how much enforcement 
discretion Congress enjoys. This means that opportunities exist for applying this approach 
to particular pieces of actual enforcement legislation. 
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recent cutbacks on this power.49 However, the Commerce Clause has 
an important limitation as a source of regulatory authority: it does 
not authorize Congress to make states liable for retrospective relief 
such as damages or back pay awards.50 Moreover, substantive 
cutbacks in that clause raise the possibility that certain applications 
of these statutes might exceed congressional authority.51 For these 
reasons, if not also for the symbolic importance of identifying these 
statutes as civil rights protections rather than regulations of 
commerce,52 it matters whether these laws can be upheld as 
legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 New and prospective civil rights legislation raise difficult issues. 
The Court’s modern Enforcement Clause jurisprudence, announced 
in City of Boerne v. Flores, rests on the idea of ultimate judicial 
supremacy in the enunciation of constitutional principles.53 To the 
extent that enforcement legislation conflicts with court-announced 
constitutional meaning, as in Boerne itself, this principle requires  
the Court to strike down the legislation as “inappropriate” 
enforcement legislation.54
 Boerne’s judicial supremacy principle challenges legislation 
addressing discrimination that has only recently become known. 
Judicial doctrine may well lag behind the social perceptions that give 
rise, in turn, to group consciousness, demands for legislation, and 
legislation itself.55 Time lags aside, courts may also experience 
particular difficulties in determining when unequal treatment truly 
constitutes invidious discrimination. Courts have come to understand 
that race discrimination is always problematic, even if not always 
unconstitutional; its understanding of gender discrimination has 
evolved as well,56 even if it recognizes that gender classifications 
sometimes present harder constitutional questions. However, other 
categories of discrimination are not so clear cut. For example, certain 
                                                                                                                                       
 49. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking down the 
Violence Against Women Act as beyond the Commerce Clause power); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act as beyond 
the Commerce Clause). 
 50. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58-73 (1996). 
 51. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 33, at 1171-72  (noting the doubts that application 
of the ADA to activities such as voting and accessing courthouses would fall within the 
Commerce Clause power). 
 52. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 291 (1964) 
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a 
mechanism for protecting human dignity and considering whether the statute could be 
upheld as enforcement legislation). 
 53. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997). 
 54. Id. at 532-36. 
 55. See, e.g., Stephen Reinhardt, supra note 43, at 14-15 (noting this dynamic in the 
history of the racial and gender equality movements). 
 56. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); Nguyen v. INS, 533 
U.S. 53, 62-64 (2001). 
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classifications may in fact reflect real differences or redound to the 
benefit of the group in question.57 Other classifications may rest on 
perceptions of social reality that are not easily reducible to the 
standard “fit” analysis that is the staple of conventional equal 
protection review.58
 These and other complications make it harder for courts to 
perform principled equal protection review of new types of 
discrimination. While one might expect some of these problems to 
abate over time in a learning process perhaps parallel to the Court’s 
learning about gender discrimination,59 others may be more 
resistant. At any rate, in the meantime judicial doctrine remains 
unclear even as Congress moves ahead and addresses new forms of 
discrimination.60 To the extent doctrine influences how the Court 
perceives these laws’ Section 5 bona fides, this doctrinal confusion 
poses a real challenge for enforcement legislation. 
 The next Part addresses both sides of this challenge. First, it sets 
forth the Court’s current approach to the congruence and 
proportionality standard.61 It explains that approach privileges not 
just constitutional meaning, but constitutional meaning as expressed 
in judicial doctrine. It then considers judicial doctrine concerning 
three types of discrimination addressed by new or pending 
legislation—sexual orientation, transgendered status, and genetics.62
That discussion notes the ambiguities and confusions of those 
doctrines. When combined, the Court’s elevation of its own doctrine 
as supreme constitutional meaning and the ambiguity of some of that 
doctrine creates a significant problem for judicial review of 
enforcement legislation. 
                                                                                                                                       
 57. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 444 (1985) (noting 
these doubts in the context of mental retardation classifications). 
 58. See infra Part III(B)(1) (discussing  lower courts’ sexual orientation  
discrimination jurisprudence). 
 59. Compare, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (upholding a Michigan 
law limiting the ability of women to work in taverns unless related to the owner), overruled 
on other grounds by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 (1991),  with Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973) (plurality opinion) (arguing that sex 
discrimination should receive strict scrutiny). 
 60. Moreover, a decision rejecting an equal protection claim becomes an obstacle to 
further judicial learning via stare decisis. Obviously, stare decisis is not absolute; 
moreover, a narrower ruling would present less of an obstacle than a broad one, such as a 
holding that a particular group is undeserving of suspect class status. Still, under  
the Court’s current application of Boerne, a court decision rejecting an equal protection 
claim may pose obstacles for subsequent enforcement legislation addressing that  
same discrimination. 
 61. See infra Part III(A). 
 62. See infra Part III(B). 
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III.   CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT POWER: ITS SIGNIFICANCE,
SCOPE, AND LIMITATIONS
A.   The Congruence and Proportionality Test 
 The recent evolution of the enforcement power is a well-known 
and often-told story. This Article therefore provides only a summary 
of that evolution.63
 The modern story begins with Katzenbach v. Morgan, which upheld 
a portion of the Voting Rights Act that prohibited the use of English 
literacy tests to exclude voters educated in Puerto Rico.64 The case 
presented a complex issue, since seven years earlier the Court rejected 
a facial constitutional attack on such tests.65 Nevertheless, the Morgan
Court upheld the law, concluding that the statute, by protecting the 
voting power of Puerto Rican communities, constituted an appropriate 
means to ensure their fair treatment by government.66 More 
controversially, the Court also said that Congress could have 
rationally concluded that a proper interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment condemns literacy requirements.67 This latter 
conclusion—that Congress could substitute its own constitutional 
interpretation for the Court’s—generated a dissent from Justice 
Harlan68 and much scholarly commentary.69 However, it remained 
formally undisturbed for thirty years. 
 City of Boerne v. Flores changed that by striking down, as 
inappropriate enforcement legislation, the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).70 RFRA represented Congress’s 
response to the Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith 
that the Free Exercise Clause was not violated by neutral, generally 
applicable laws that only incidentally burdened religious conduct.71
RFRA prohibited imposition of such incidental burdens unless the 
government action was narrowly tailored to promote a compelling 
government interest. 
The Boerne Court found RFRA to exceed Congress’s enforcement 
power. According to Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, the drafting 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment reflected an intention to limit 
                                                                                                                                       
 63. For longer discussions of the Court’s enforcement power jurisprudence, see William 
D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power After Tennessee v. Lane, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 39 (2004). 
 64. 384 U.S. 641, 657-58. 
 65. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959). 
 66. 384 U.S. at 652-53. 
 67. Id. at 653-54. 
 68. Id. at 659, 667-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 69. See Robin-Vergeer, infra note 340, at 697 n.438 (discussing commentary  
about Morgan).
 70. See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 5 (authorizing Congress to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment by “appropriate” legislation); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb1-4 (1993); 521 U.S. 507, at 
532-36 (1997). 
 71. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-86 (1990). 
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Congress to enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than 
independently interpreting it.72 While the Court acknowledged that 
the line between enforcement and interpretation “is not easy to 
discern,”73 it concluded that RFRA crossed that line by not exhibiting 
a “congruence and proportionality” between its provisions and the 
targeted constitutional evil.74 The Court first concluded that “RFRA’s 
legislative record lacks examples of modern instances of generally 
applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry,”75 thus rejecting 
RFRA’s defenders’ claim that the law was aimed at preventing 
intentional religious discrimination by dispensing with plaintiffs’ 
need to prove intentional conduct. Second, the Court concluded that 
RFRA’s wide sweep and stringent liability rule swept too much 
constitutionally innocent conduct within its ambit for it to satisfy the 
Court’s new “congruence and proportionality” test.76
 Six Justices, running the ideological gamut of the current Court, 
joined the majority opinion in Boerne.77 Since then, however, the 
Court has split sharply on the application of Boerne. In Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings 
Bank, a five Justice majority held that Congress exceeded its 
enforcement power when it abrogated state sovereign immunity to 
federal law patent infringement suits.78 Defenders of the statute 
argued that Congress acted to prevent states from depriving patent 
holders of property without due process.79 However, the Court 
concluded that Congress had insufficient evidence to conclude that 
states often infringed patents and that state law remedies provided 
inadequate remedies for actual violations.80 Justice Stevens, 
dissenting, took issue with this claim of inadequate fact finding, 
arguing that Congress heard testimony of such infringements and 
found that they were likely to increase in the future.81 He also argued 
                                                                                                                                       
 72. See 521 U.S. at 516-24. 
 73. Id. at 519. 
 74. Id. at 520. 
 75. Id. at 530. 
 76. See id. at 531-36. 
 77. See id. at 509. This number undercounts the Court’s consensus, as Justice 
O’Connor would have joined the majority had she agreed with the Court’s resolution of the 
underlying Free Exercise analysis in Smith. See id. at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
part) (“I agree with much of the reasoning set forth [in the majority’s development of the 
congruence and proportionality test]. Indeed, if I agreed with the Court’s standard in 
Smith, I would join the opinion.”). Justices Souter and Breyer both expressed doubt about 
Smith, and for that reason expressed no opinion on the underlying enforcement power 
issue. See id. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Thus, none 
of the Justices in Boerne expressed disagreement with the congruence and proportionality 
standard. But see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 558 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(abandoning this test). 
 78. 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999). 
 79. Id. at 641-42. 
 80. Id. at 640-48. 
 81. Id. at 648, 655-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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that Congress could have found that state law remedies were 
inadequate, given exclusive federal court jurisdiction over patent 
claims.82 In his view, this feature of patent law made it likely that 
such remedies would not exist and would be inconsistently applied.83
 Florida Prepaid’s focus on the adequacy of congressional fact 
finding set the stage for subsequent enforcement power decisions.84
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the same five Justice majority 
as in Florida Prepaid held that the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA)85 was not valid enforcement legislation. 86
Paralleling Boerne and Florida Prepaid, the Court faulted the ADEA 
for not including sufficient fact finding about the prevalence of the 
underlying constitutional problem and for imposing a liability rule 
that outstripped the constitutional evil.87 Importantly, though, the 
Court identified the constitutional evil as age discrimination that 
failed the Court’s own rational basis test.88 Thus, the Court concluded 
that the prohibition on such discrimination constituted the full scope 
of the constitutional requirement.89
 Both components of Kimel’s reasoning faced difficult challenges in 
the next case, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett.90 In Garrett, the same five Justice majority held that the 
employment provisions of the ADA exceeded congressional 
enforcement power. The Court traced Kimel’s analysis, faulting 
congressional fact finding and expressing concern about the statute’s 
sweep in relation to the underlying constitutional evil. Nevertheless, 
Garrett presented the Court with a harder case on both points. First, 
Congress engaged in extensive fact finding in enacting the ADA, 
which led it to find numerous examples of disability discrimination 
by state and local governments.91 Second, the Court’s identification of 
the right at issue was complicated by the fact that in City of Cleburne 
                                                                                                                                       
 82. Id. at 658. 
 83. Id. at 659. 
 84. But see, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that the 
Violence Against Women Act exceeds the enforcement power because it regulated private 
conduct rather than state government conduct). The question of the enforcement power’s 
applicability to private conduct is interesting and difficult but beyond the scope of  
this Article. 
 85. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006). 
 86. 528 U.S. 62, 62 (2000). 
 87. See id. at 82-91. 
 88. See id. at 83-84. 
 89. Id. at 84. Justice Stevens, writing again for the same dissenters as in Florida 
Prepaid, did not focus on the enforcement power issue. Instead, he argued that Congress 
should have the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity when legislating under the 
Commerce Clause. See id. at 92-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 90. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 91. See id. at App. C (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89 (describing the 
evidence of states discriminating on the basis of age as consisting “almost entirely of 
isolated sentences clipped from floor debates and legislative reports”). 
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v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court had struck down an instance of 
disability discrimination as violating equal protection.92 This fact 
made it harder for the Court to dismiss the right at issue as a narrow 
one that justified only narrow enforcement legislation. 
 The Court’s responses to these challenges reflected its 
determination to limit congressional enforcement authority. First, it 
rejected the relevance of any facts except for those illustrating action 
by state governments that would have risen to the level of 
unconstitutional discrimination had they been litigated in court.93
Second, it characterized Cleburne as a rare but straightforward case 
of government action failing rational basis review.94 In particular, it 
failed to consider whether Cleburne’s institutional competence-based 
reason for not formally applying heightened scrutiny,95 and its de 
facto heightened scrutiny96 suggested a potentially deeper problem 
with disability discrimination. Justice Breyer, writing for the four 
dissenters, protested both the Court’s refusal to credit the relevance 
of much of Congress’s fact finding and its failure to allow Congress 
more latitude to determine when discrimination becomes arbitrary 
and, hence, unconstitutional.97
 In cases from 2003 and 2004, the Court’s enforcement power 
jurisprudence took a different turn. In Nevada Department of Human 
Resources v. Hibbs, a six Justice majority upheld the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) against an enforcement power 
challenge.98 The Court described the FMLA, which mandates gender-
neutral access to medical and family leave, as aiming to counteract 
employers’ stereotypes that women were less reliable employees 
because of their family care duties.99 The Court’s enforcement power 
analysis then commenced with its observation that gender 
classifications received heightened judicial scrutiny.100 After 
describing the facts Congress found, using a much more generous 
standard than in Garrett,101 the majority explicitly concluded that 
                                                                                                                                       
 92. 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985). 
 93. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-72. Indeed, the Court did not include as relevant 
evidence about conduct performed by local government on the ground that local 
governments did not enjoy Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See infra note 169 
(critiquing this component of the Court’s analysis). 
 94. Id. at 366 n.4, 367. 
 95. See Araiza, “The Section 5 Power, supra note 16, at 559-64. 
 96. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 456-57 (Marshall, J., concurring in part) (noting the 
rigor of the majority’s ostensible rational basis analysis). 
 97. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 378-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 98. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006); 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003). 
 99. See 538 U.S. at 728-29. 
 100. Id.
 101. For example, the Court cited evidence of private employer conduct and conduct 
not on the precise issue as that addressed by the FMLA. See id. at 744, 746-49 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s treatment of evidence was inconsistent with its 
treatment of the evidence in Garrett).
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“[b]ecause the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of a 
gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than our 
rational-basis test . . . it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of 
state constitutional violations.”102 Thus, Hibbs both reflected a more 
generous evidentiary standard and made the congruence and 
proportionality standard easier to satisfy by describing the 
constitutional evil as more serious and thus appropriately attacked 
with broad enforcement legislation. 
 The next year, in Tennessee v. Lane, the Court again gave a more 
hospitable reception to enforcement legislation.103 Lane upheld 
against an enforcement power challenge the public accommodations 
provisions of the ADA as applied to access to courtrooms.104 As in 
Hibbs, the Court gave a generous reading to the congressional factual 
record.105 As in Hibbs, this evidentiary generosity was paired with an 
observation that the right at issue—here, court access—had been 
held by the Court to enjoy special judicial protection.106 Indeed, the 
Court explicitly concluded that the ADA’s “reasonable 
accommodation” requirement was congruent and proportional to the 
constitutional evil it targeted because that standard tracked the 
constitutional requirement for judicial access.107
 Taken together, these cases illustrate the Court’s attempt to 
maintain its interpretive supremacy by enshrining judicial doctrine as 
the baseline to which enforcement legislation must be congruent and 
proportional. 108 Boerne established the basic idea of judicial supremacy 
when it identified Smith as the constitutional rule to which RFRA had 
to be congruent and proportional. Later cases featured disagreement 
                                                                                                                                       
 102. Id. at 736. 
 103. 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
 104. Id. at 531. 
 105. Indeed, the Court even credited facts included in a disability rights task force 
whose findings were excluded in Garrett. See id. at 542-46 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 106. See id. at 522-23. 
 107. See id. at 531-33. 
 108. In United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006), the Court was able to avoid a 
difficult enforcement power issue by reaching the uncontroversial conclusion that the ADA 
was valid enforcement legislation to the extent the plaintiff used the ADA to seek remedies 
for alleged actual violations of court-declared constitutional rights. 
 Last year in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, 129 
S. Ct. 2504 (2009), the Roberts Court had its first real opportunity to consider the 
enforcement power. Northwest Austin considered the constitutionality of Congress’s 2006 
extension of the VRA’s preclearance requirement. The Court did not decide that issue, 
resolving the case instead on a statutory ground. Id. at 2514-15. However, in dicta it 
questioned the appropriateness of the statute, in particular its coverage formula based on 
decades-old voting data. Id. at 2510. The VRA is based on congressional power to enforce 
the Fifteenth, rather than the Fourteenth, Amendment. Id. at 2523-24. Moreover, it 
combats discrimination explicitly addressed by the Amendment. Id. For these reasons—
especially the latter—it is tangential to the arguments made in this Article. Still, the 
Court’s doubts about the VRA’s constitutionality suggest the importance of rethinking the 
Court’s approach to ensuring the supremacy of its constitutional interpretations. 
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over the precise nature of the baseline constitutional rule. For 
example, in Garrett the Justices disagreed over whether Cleburne
suggested that disability discrimination presented a more significant 
problem than suggested by its formally nonsuspect status. Similarly, 
in Lane they disagreed over whether to analyze the ADA’s public 
accommodation provisions as a whole or as applied to the fundamental 
right to judicial access. Post-Boerne precedent suggests that the 
Court’s determination of the constitutional status of the right at issue 
in turn determines the leniency of its review of Congress’s fact finding. 
Thus, that doctrinal determination largely seals the fate of 
enforcement legislation, by both establishing the denominator of the 
fraction that roughly comprises the congruence and proportionality 
test and determining the generosity with which the Court will review 
Congress’s fact finding. 
B.   First Cuts at Applying the Standard: Sexual Orientation, 
Transgendered People, and Genetics Under Current Doctrine 
 This Article argues that that the Court has seriously misapplied 
the congruence and proportionality test by reflexively treating its 
own equal protection jurisprudence as a baseline for performing 
congruence and proportionality analysis. It begins the argument by 
explaining how the Court’s current approach will raise serious logical 
difficulties when it considers recent and pending legislation 
responding to new groups’ demands for equality.109
1.   Sexual Orientation 
 The Court’s sexual orientation jurisprudence is evolving.110 After 
denying review in a case that presented the question whether sexual 
orientation was a suspect class,111 the Court in the very next term 
decided Bowers v. Hardwick,112 rejecting a claim that same-sex 
intimacy was protected by the privacy guarantee of the Due Process 
Clause. Hardwick largely froze development of equal protection 
                                                                                                                                       
 109. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
 110. This Article begins its review of this jurisprudence with the first instance of the 
question being directly posed to the Court. Earlier discussions of homosexuality generally 
assumed the validity of legislative discrimination against gays and lesbians. See generally, 
e.g., Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (rejecting vagueness challenge to congressional 
law mandating the exclusion of homosexuals without considering whether the 
discrimination itself violated the equality component of the Fifth Amendment); see also
Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1080-86 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari) (arguing for the Court to hear a case challenging a state university’s refusal to 
fund a campus gay rights organization on the ground that the organization would incite 
violations of the state’s sodomy law and assuming without discussion that the sodomy law 
itself was valid). 
 111. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1009 (1985) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 112. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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doctrine with regard to sexual orientation. While not ostensibly an 
equal protection case, courts after Hardwick often rejected claims of 
sexual orientation discrimination based on the rationale (however 
faulty) that such discrimination could not present a constitutional 
problem since the conduct that supposedly distinguishes the group 
could be criminalized.113 While Romer v. Evans destabilized this 
reasoning, Romer’s description of Amendment 2 as nearly unique, 
and its unconventional constitutional analysis, effectively left in 
place the preexisting doctrinal structure unfriendly to claims of 
sexual orientation discrimination.114
 Lawrence v. Texas raised the possibility of a thaw.115 By overruling 
Hardwick, the Court removed the “we can discriminate against the 
sinner if we can punish the sin” argument. Indeed, in an inversion of 
that argument, the Court suggested that the continued existence of 
sodomy laws was problematic because it invited more general 
stigmatization of gays and lesbians “both in the public and in the 
private spheres.”116 Justice O’Connor concurred on explicitly equal 
protection grounds.117 Importantly, she suggested that she was 
applying heightened equal protection scrutiny, given the Texas 
statute’s apparent grounding in simple animus and its impact on 
personal relationships.118 Together with Romer, these facets of 
Lawrence have raised the possibility of new equal protection 
evolution for gays and lesbians. 
 Lower court precedent would also presumably influence the 
Court’s congruence and proportionality analysis of ENDA. Given that 
the Supreme Court has not determined the constitutional status of 
sexual orientation discrimination, and in the last forty years has 
decided only one, unusual, sexual orientation claim,119 lower court 
decisions would surely be relevant to the Court’s evaluation of the 
constitutional problem posed by sexual orientation discrimination, 
and thus its conclusion about the constitutionality of federal 
enforcement legislation on the topic.120
                                                                                                                                       
 113. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640-41 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that a state ought to be able to disfavor homosexual status if it could constitutionally 
prohibit sodomy, which he described as the conduct that defined that status); see also Janet
E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 
VA. L. REV. 1721, 1734-35 (1993).. 
 114. See, e.g., Equality Foundation v. Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(noting that Romer did not analyze sexual orientation under strict scrutiny or intermediate 
scrutiny, but instead applied the deferential “rational relationship” test). 
 115. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 116. Id. at 575. 
 117. See id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 118. See id. at 579-80. 
 119. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  
 120. Indeed, the very existence of these claims would help establish the existence of a 
constitutional issue appropriately subject to enforcement legislation. See Bd. of Trs. of 
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 That precedent, however, speaks with an uncertain voice. While 
no circuit currently views sexual orientation as a suspect class,121
claims of unconstitutional sexual orientation discrimination have not 
fared as poorly as one might expect in light of courts’ decisions to 
apply only rational basis scrutiny. Outside of claims relating to 
custodial environments (namely, prisons and the military), marriage, 
child rearing, and family, gay plaintiffs have often succeeded in 
challenging discriminatory state government actions.122 Strikingly, 
these successes are won via rational basis review, because either the 
court concludes that rational basis is the appropriate level of 
scrutiny,123 or the court declines to decide the level of scrutiny 
question given its conclusion that the government action lacks even a 
rational basis.124
 The success of these rational basis claims presents at least a 
potential conundrum for the Court’s consideration of the congruence 
and proportionality of a statute such as ENDA. On the one hand, the 
lower courts’ determinations that rational basis is the appropriate 
standard would suggest, according to the Court’s own Section 5 
doctrine, that sexual orientation classifications are generally 
constitutional.125 In turn, that conclusion would require more 
skeptical review of enforcement legislation. On the other hand, the 
existence of cases where government action fails the rational basis 
test suggests that some nontrivial percentage of sexual orientation 
discrimination is simply irrational. Ironically, that presumed 
irrationality would logically support extensive congressional 
enforcement legislation under the congruence and proportionality 
standard. After all, if much sexual orientation discrimination is 
unconstitutional regardless of the scrutiny it receives, then sexual 
                                                                                                                                       
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 375-76 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding 
support for the ADA’s lack of congruence and proportionality in the lack of claims brought 
in lower courts alleging unconstitutional discrimination based on disability). 
 121. However, in recent years a number of state courts have begun to recognize gays 
and lesbians as suspect classes under those states’ own constitutional equal protection 
provisions. E.g., Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29  (Or. Ct. App. 2009); Varnum v. Brien, 
763 N.W.2d 862, 896 (Iowa 2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 
(Conn. 2008); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441-42 (Cal. 2008). But see Conaway v. 
Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 608 (Md. 2007); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 975 (Wash. 
2006) (rejecting such claims).  
 122. See, e.g., Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding  
discriminatory nonenforcement of a protective order); Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. 
Dist., 324 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding discriminatory school harassment); Stemler v. 
City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding discriminatory arrest); see also infra
note 268. 
 123. E.g., Pugliese v. Long Island R.R., No 01 CV 7174(NGG), 2006 WL 2689600, at *8 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2006). 
 124. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 457-58 (7th Cir. 1996); Stemler, 126 F.3d at 874. 
 125. See e.g. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000). 
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orientation discrimination presumably constitutes a significant 
constitutional problem. 
 Beyond this mild irony lies a deeper point about how judicial equal 
protection doctrine corresponds to constitutional reality. Underlying 
gay plaintiffs’ relative success in equal protection claims is courts’ 
implicit conclusion that, except in very limited areas, sexual 
orientation is simply a constitutional irrelevancy. These cases do not 
turn on the fit between the classification and a legitimate government 
purpose; courts considering the issue have simply concluded that no 
good reason justifies using sexual orientation as a tool for deciding 
which students should be protected at school,126 which drunk drivers 
arrested,127 or which protective orders enforced.128
 However, this case law coexists only tenuously with the cases 
where gay plaintiffs have lost. Those cases, especially the military 
and child rearing cases,129 usually involve the most deferential 
rational basis review, which results in a government win based on 
debatable findings that the legislature either did make (as in the 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy) or might have made (as is often the 
case with regard to restrictions on parental rights).130 The deference 
these courts apply stands in tension with the skepticism inherent in 
courts’ conclusions in other sexual orientation cases where the court 
is unable to perceive even the hint of a rational basis for the 
government action. The tension lies not as much in the differing 
results as in the entirely different nature of the court’s inquiry. In 
particular, the military and child rearing cases suggest that sexual 
orientation is a fundamentally nonproblematic classification tool. By 
contrast, the other cases suggest that many sexual orientation 
classifications fail even the most basic requirement that government 
act rationally.131
 The upshot of this equivocal and confused lower court case law is 
that sexual orientation simply does not fit into the Court’s existing 
equal protection jurisprudence. That jurisprudence suggests that as 
one rises from rational basis review to intermediate and finally strict 
scrutiny one finds classification tools that generally are less and less 
                                                                                                                                       
 126. Nabozny, 92 F.3d  at 458. 
 127. Stemler, 126 F.3d at 873. 
 128. See Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1114 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 129. The marriage cases are somewhat sui generis given the government’s usual 
argument that bans on same-sex marriage either encourage procreation or simply reflect 
traditional definitions of a term. See generally, e.g., David B. Cruz, “Just Don’t Call It 
Marriage”: The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L.
REV. 925 (2001) (analyzing these and other arguments opposing same-sex marriage). 
 130. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children and Family Serv., 358 F.3d 804, 
824-25 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 131. E.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 61 (2001) (“[T]he 
American constitutional tradition has long recognized a judicial authority, not necessarily 
linked to any specifically enumerated guarantee, to invalidate truly arbitrary legislation.”). 
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constitutionally acceptable, regardless of the factual context.132 By 
contrast, sexual orientation discrimination claims resemble 
Superman: so strong that courts can find no conceivable reason for 
government discrimination except in certain (Kryptonite) cases, 
where the claims suddenly become powerless against exceptionally 
deferential rational basis review. At the very least, such dichotomous 
results render far more challenging what has up to now been the 
relatively straightforward nature of the Court’s post-Boerne case law: 
legislation benefitting suspect classes gets upheld while legislation 
benefitting nonsuspect classes gets struck down.133
 It is anything but clear how such jurisprudence could guide the 
Court’s analysis of whether ENDA is congruent and proportional to 
the Court’s own view of the constitutional problem presented by 
sexual orientation discrimination. Not only is the equal protection 
status of sexual orientation unclear, as noted above, but Lawrence’s
statements about the stigma sodomy laws impose on gays and the 
inappropriateness of morality-based rationales for regulation 
undermine the constitutionality of much sexual orientation 
discrimination, given its basis in moral objections, constituent dislike 
of the targeted group, or “tradition.” 
 This confused jurisprudence is worlds apart from the 
straightforward Murgia/Bradley/Gregory trilogy of age discrimination 
cases the Court deployed so confidently in Kimel to cast doubt on 
Congress’s use of its Section 5 power to legislate against age 
discrimination. It is also quite distinct from the Court’s statement in 
Hibbs that the suspectness of gender discrimination made it easier 
for Congress to show a serious risk of unconstitutional conduct 
warranting a response via the FMLA. The situation with regard to 
sexual orientation discrimination is at least slightly closer to that of 
the disabled as set forth in Garrett. The only case the Garrett Court 
could cite to establish the constitutional status of the equal 
protection right Congress was seeking to enforce was its ambivalent 
decision in Cleburne, where the Court, despite rejecting heightened 
                                                                                                                                       
 132. For example, in Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005), only two members of 
the Court dissented from the proposition that, even with regard to prisoners, the right to 
be free of racial classifications is such that even temporary racial segregation is subject to 
strict scrutiny. See id. at 507-15. 
 133. See supra Part III(A). The Court’s recent critique of the VRA, see United States v. 
Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006), does not fit this pattern, perhaps due to the reach of the VRA 
into the heart of states’ prerogatives to conduct their own elections, and, perhaps ironically 
given the history of the VRA, the statute’s imposition of these burdens on only some states, 
based on now decades-old criteria. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 
S. Ct. 2504, 2512 (2009) (“The statute’s coverage formula is based on data that is now more 
than 35 years old, and there is considerable evidence that it fails to account for current 
political conditions.”); cf. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding the 
original VRA in part because of its application only to certain states shown to have violated 
voting rights). 
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scrutiny for the mentally retarded, nevertheless performed relatively 
careful judicial review. However, Garrett simply ignored this 
ambivalence, instead describing Cleburne as a straightforward case 
where standard rational basis review resulted in the government 
action being struck down.  
 As illustrated above, the Court’s gay rights jurisprudence is more 
extensive than its constitutional disability jurisprudence, with 
multiple statements pointing in different directions. It is certainly 
possible that the Court in its review of ENDA could simply repeat its 
performance in Garrett and distinguish away the combination of 
Romer, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence, and the Lawrence
majority’s statements about moral disapproval and the stigmatization 
of gays. However, such a bravura performance would surely harm the 
Court’s credibility. As a practical matter it is open to question how 
likely such a performance would be, given the fact that a majority 
decision to do so would undoubtedly require the concurrence of Justice 
Kennedy, the author of both Romer and Lawrence.134
 Alternatively, the Court could use the occasion of a Section 5 
challenge to ENDA to settle the equal protection status of sexual 
orientation. However, such a move would be perilous for a 
moderately conservative Court. As noted above, denying suspect class 
status to sexual orientation discrimination would require it to 
dismiss or distinguish away more than a trivial set of holdings and 
dicta from Romer and Lawrence, including Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence which not only recognized some degree of heightened 
scrutiny for gays, but found support for that scrutiny in prior case 
law. A formal holding that sexual orientation was not suspect would 
also stand in some tension with lower court decisions, holding in a 
number of instances that sexual orientation discrimination was 
unconstitutional. Of course, these holdings were themselves based on 
application of rational basis review. However, officially sanctioned 
rational basis review that generated multiple holdings of 
unconstitutionality could not stand long as a serious standard; at 
some point, a palpable tension would arise between these holdings 
and the officially nonsuspect status of sexual orientation 
discrimination.135 Conversely, explicitly granting suspect class status 
to sexual orientation at this point in history would unleash a specter 
that undoubtedly many on the Court would prefer to avoid: the claim 
                                                                                                                                       
 134. We are assuming that the Court looks only to federal courts’ constitutional 
doctrine when determining the degree of constitutional protection accorded gays and 
lesbians. The addition of other players’ opinions—such as those of state supreme courts—
may make a casual, Garrett-style dismissal of gays’ constitutional status even more 
difficult to justify. See infra Part IV. 
 135. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-84 (1973) (plurality opinion) (recounting 
the Court’s purportedly rational-basis decision in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and 
concluding that the Court must have been actually performing heightened review). 
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that marriage discrimination, currently enshrined in the state 
constitutions of over half the states, many in recent referenda, 
violated equal protection.136
 Given these concerns, it is perhaps not surprising that the Court 
has avoided conventional equal protection analysis of sexual 
orientation classifications. In Lawrence, the Court majority avoided 
the question nearly entirely and in Romer the Court described 
Amendment 2 as a rare, per se violation of equal protection. Even its 
alternate holding, that Amendment 2 was the product of illegitimate 
animus, avoided the larger question by casting the case as involving 
a bizarrely broad statute that simply could not be justified by any 
rational explanation. 
 Thus, the Court would probably find it difficult to reach a coherent 
result about the suspect class status of sexual orientation discrimination 
with which it could be comfortable. Yet, under the current version of its 
congruence and proportionality test, it would have to do just that in 
order to evaluate ENDA as enforcement legislation. 
2.   Transgender Discrimination 
 If sexual orientation discrimination presents a problem of a 
contradictory jurisprudence then discrimination against the 
transgendered presents the problem of a jurisprudence that cannot 
even settle on its proper focus. Discrimination against transgendered 
people has been described and analyzed as a species of both gender 
discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination, as well as a 
type of discrimination in its own right.137 This multiplicity is not 
necessarily surprising. Since transgender discrimination is rooted in 
social discomfort with the failure of people to conform to gender 
expectations, it can be described as a variant of gender or sexual 
orientation discrimination.   
                                                                                                                                       
 136. It would also raise questions about the constitutionality of sexual orientation-
based restrictions on child rearing and military service, as well as sexual orientation 
classifications in the prison setting. Military and prison discrimination may survive 
heightened scrutiny due to the deference traditionally accorded the administrators of those 
institutions. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986) (upholding 
military restriction on the wearing of visible religious symbols, based largely on deference 
to military judgment). But see Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 507 (2005) (requiring 
strict scrutiny of state penal policy housing new inmates based on race until they are 
investigated for possible violence factors, despite argument that prison administrators 
need the discretion to act to prevent race-based gang violence). However, child rearing 
restrictions may be more vulnerable. Cf., e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) 
(striking down the argument that the children will be impacted by others’ racial prejudice 
as a basis for child custody awards). 
 137. Most of the cases to have considered transgender discrimination have occurred in 
the Title VII context, though a number of cases directly raise Fourteenth Amendment 
issues. At any rate, courts are beginning to hold that at least some Title VII theories apply 
in the Fourteenth Amendment context as well. See infra note 295. 
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 Judicial decisions reflect this ambivalence, with courts evaluating 
transgendered plaintiffs’ claims under all three rubrics. According to 
some commentators, however, the multiplicity of theories has, 
ironically, redounded to these plaintiffs’ detriments. These 
commentators argue that the multiple ways of construing a 
transgendered plaintiff’s claim allows an unsympathetic court to 
conclude that the claim is really of a disfavored type. Thus,   
[i]n jurisdictions that do not prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, courts have emphasized the similarity of gay 
and transgender people, relying upon decisions that have excluded 
lesbians and gay men from protection under Title VII as a 
rationale for excluding transsexual people. At the same time, 
courts in jurisdictions that protect lesbians and gay men have 
concluded that transsexualism is distinct from sexual orientation 
and have dismissed sexual orientation claims by transsexual 
plaintiffs on that basis.138
Similarly, courts have often rejected transgender discrimination 
claims brought on a gender discrimination theory by concluding that 
the two types of discrimination are distinct.139 These results illustrate 
that a primary problem with transgender discrimination is the 
instability of the very concept. 
 This naming problem carries implications for congruence and 
proportionality analysis of a federal law restricting transgender 
discrimination. As explained earlier, a foundational part of that 
analysis requires a court to identify the right Congress sought to 
protect.140 In the case of transgender discrimination this step of the 
analysis is even more crucial, given the variety of possibilities and 
their different constitutional implications. If the Court identifies 
transgender discrimination as sex discrimination then presumably it 
will find it easier to uphold transgender discrimination legislation on 
the authority of Hibbs.141 Understanding transgender discrimination 
as sexual orientation discrimination presumably ties its enforcement 
power fate to that of gays and lesbians. Finally, identifying it as a 
distinct category raises a question similar to that in Kimel and 
Garrett, where an enforcement power statute was struck down 
because the protected group had never succeeded in convincing 
                                                                                                                                       
 138. Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to 
Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 37, 43 (2000); see also Richard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the 
“Nascent Jurisprudence of Transsexualism,” 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 285-332 (1997). 
 139. See Currah & Minter, supra note 138, at 39-42. 
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 84-107. 
 141. Indeed, such a move by the Court would lead to the ironic result that enforcement 
legislation would be more likely to be upheld when it benefitted transgendered people than 
when it benefitted gays and lesbians, despite the fact that the inclusion of transgendered 
protection in ENDA has cost that bill political support in the past.  
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courts that discrimination against it presented a significant 
constitutional problem.  
 These “merely” doctrinal stakes conceal the fundamental nature of 
the naming decision. Gender discrimination has been and remains a 
highly contested concept. From early assumptions that it included 
only discrimination based on the biological status of being male or 
female, courts’ understanding of gender discrimination has 
progressed, often under pressure from legislatures,142 to encompass 
discrimination on the basis of sexual stereotypes and gender 
performance. On the other hand, this evolution is not complete. As 
scholars of transgender discrimination have noted, after Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins143 held that enforcement of stereotypical 
gender expectations constitutes sex discrimination, one might have 
expected courts to understand all types of gender-expectations 
discrimination to come within the ambit of “sex discrimination.”144
However, courts have largely rejected the application of this 
argument to the transgendered.145 Lower courts’ sharply mixed 
answer to the categorization question for transgendered plaintiffs 
suggests that enforcement legislation benefitting them would require 
the Court to make a preliminary categorization decision that would 
likely determine that statute’s fate.146
3.   Genetics 
 If sexual orientation discrimination presents the Court with too 
many precedents and transgender discrimination with fundamentally 
ambivalent ones, then genetics presents the Court with too few. The 
                                                                                                                                       
 142. For example, it was Congress that compelled courts to view pregnancy 
discrimination as sex discrimination. Compare Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) 
(concluding that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination under the Equal 
Protection Clause), and Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (finding that an 
employer’s failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities in the disability plan did not 
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination). 
 143. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 144. See also Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 528 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding the 
FMLA as appropriate legislation enforcing sex equality after describing that statute as 
designed to combat the stereotype of women as less reliable employees in light of their 
assumed primary responsibility for child and family care). 
 145. See, e.g., Melinda Chow, Comment, Smith v. City of Salem: Transgendered 
Jurisprudence and an Expanding Meaning of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 28 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 207, 210 (2005) (citing cases). 
 146. The way Congress chooses to identify this discrimination would presumably be 
relevant to the Court’s enforcement power analysis. Thus, if Congress chooses to protect 
transgendered people by expanding Title VII’s definition of sex to include transgendered 
status, the Court would analyze the statute as legislation enforcing gender equality. The 
Court should give significant deference to these types of normative judgments embedded in 
enforcement legislation, subject to review for reasonableness. See infra text accompanying 
notes 293-95. However, such deference is not necessarily a sure thing under the Court’s 
doctrinal supremacy approach to the enforcement power. 
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Court’s acceptance of genetic discrimination in Buck v. Bell147 soon 
came under pressure in Skinner v. Oklahoma,148 where Chief Justice 
Stone’s concurrence expressed doubt about arbitrary state conclusions 
concerning the heritability of criminal tendencies.149   
 By the time Skinner was decided, eugenics-driven disability 
discrimination was already falling into disrepute, largely due to its 
association with Nazism. However, post-war advances in genetics 
increased the feasibility of sorting employees based on their genes.150
By the 1970s, African Americans were claiming that the discovery of 
the gene for sickle cell anemia had led to employment discrimination 
based on fears that they were especially susceptible to falling ill.151
Claims have also arisen where the genetic discrimination was not 
tied to race or another established equal protection classification. In 
at least one case the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
sued an employer that had tested its employees without informing 
them, alleging a violation of the ADA.152 The claim was settled, thus 
leaving unanswered the question whether discrimination based 
solely on genetic makeup, without the employee manifesting any 
symptoms of a disease, violated the ADA.153
 As a matter of standard enforcement power jurisprudence, this 
history provides inadequate support for GINA as “appropriate” 
enforcement legislation. Cases such as Garrett require the existence 
of a history of discrimination that would be remedied or deterred by 
enforcement legislation. Under Garrett, such history must be of cases 
where a state, not a private party or even a substate entity, has 
engaged in discrimination that a court would find to violate equal 
protection. Even as modified by Hibbs and Lane, the basic 
requirement remains that constitutionally significant discriminations 
have occurred. The history recounted above, of predominantly 
private-party conduct challenged, if at all, on statutory rather than 
                                                                                                                                       
 147. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 148. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
149. Id. at 543 (Stone, C.J., concurring). 
 150. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, Genetic Monitoring and 
Screening in the Workplace, OTA-BA-455, at 6 (Oct. 1990), available at http://www.fas.org/ 
ota/reports/9020.pdf. 
 151. Id. at 11 (noting that sickle-cell anemia, among other diseases, heightens 
carcinogenic or toxic susceptibility to environmental agents); see also id. at 42. 
 152. See Genome.gov, Cases of Genetic Discrimination, http://www.genome.gov/ 
12513976 (last visited July 30, 2010). 
 153. Whether this interpretation of the ADA is correct is an open question. See, e.g.,
Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections 
for a Brave New Workplace, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1514-32 (2002) (noting Supreme Court 
Justices’ reluctance to read the ADA in this manner and suggesting conceptual and 
practical problems with applying a discrimination framework to genetic issues). 
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constitutional grounds154 and not resolved by an authoritative court 
opinion, appears to fall far short of this standard.155
IV.   THE CRITIQUE OF A DOCTRINE-BASED ENFORCEMENT POWER
 The above analysis illustrates the problems the Court might face 
if it applied its current approach to the congruence and 
proportionality test to new antidiscrimination legislation. The 
problems flow from the Court’s uncritical use of judicial doctrine to 
furnish the constitutional rule against which this enforcement 
legislation is tested. To the extent such doctrine is ambivalent (as 
with sexual orientation), unsettled as to the basic identification of the 
discrimination (as with transgender discrimination), or nonexistent 
(as with genetics) it furnishes an unstable constitutional foundation 
against which to analyze such legislation. 
 Commentators and dissenting judges have made a similar point 
when critiquing previous applications of the congruence and 
proportionality test. They criticize the Court’s use of equal protection 
doctrine, in particular the rational basis standard, to conclude that 
the discrimination targeted by the legislation does not present a 
serious constitutional problem.156 They note that the rational basis 
standard, far from being a mechanism for ferreting out equal 
protection violations, is a tool of judicial restraint, driven by concerns 
about courts’ authority and ability to second-guess legislative 
classification judgments.157 According to these critics, such self-
restraint may be appropriate, and even laudable; however, the 
doctrinal test expressing that restraint should not be understood as 
the constitutional baseline against which to judge enforcement 
legislation. This Part of the Article summarizes and extends these 
criticisms, and sets up the argument in the next Part for a 
reconceptualization of the congruence and proportionality test. 
 Under current enforcement power doctrine, the Court’s own 
denomination of a group as a suspect class plays a major role in 
determining the scope of congressional enforcement power. Hibbs
made this explicit with its statement that the suspect class status of 
gender made it easier for Congress to show a pattern of equal 
protection violations that thereby justified congressional legislation.158
                                                                                                                                       
 154. But see Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 
1998) (considering, constitutional Title VII and ADA claims against a laboratory jointly 
administered by the federal government and a state government based on collection of 
genetic information). 
 155. See infra note 305. 
 156. See, e.g.,  Post & Siegal, supra note 22, at 8; Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356, 382-85 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 157. See infra notes 162-68. 
 158. 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003). 
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Garrett made this connection even more clearly through its dismissal 
of the importance of its decision in Cleburne.159 In Garrett the Court 
insisted that Cleburne simply reflected a government action failing the 
standard rational basis test. The Court refused to consider the 
possibility that its unusual holding—not to mention its explicitly 
institutional competence-based rationale for refusing to accord higher 
scrutiny to the mentally retarded—reflected a potentially deeper 
constitutional problem with disability discrimination.  
 Garrett’s treatment of Cleburne reveals the extreme juricentric 
nature of the Court’s application of the congruence and 
proportionality test.160 Rather than reading Cleburne as teaching that 
disability discrimination sometimes exists even to the point where a 
court can recognize it through the normal litigation process, and thus 
concluding that congressional action on the topic ought perhaps be 
given special respect, the Court instead focused on its doctrine—the 
fact that the Cleburne Court applied only rational basis review. It 
was that latter feature of the case—the doctrinal category into which 
the discrimination fit rather than the Court’s reasoning or result—
that governed how the Garrett Court read Cleburne and thus how 
much leeway Congress would have applying the employment 
provisions of the ADA to the states. 
 This sort of privileging of doctrine over underlying constitutional 
meaning is inevitable when the court acts without the benefit of an 
enforcement statute. In such a case, all a court can do is apply its 
doctrine unless some analytical breakthrough allows it to discern 
more clearly the true meaning of a provision.161 Nevertheless, judicial 
doctrine may well reflect that true meaning only imperfectly. This is 
often the case when doctrine accords only rational basis scrutiny to 
equal protection review of a given classification. Denial of suspect 
class status and its attendant heightened scrutiny, when based on 
the political process approach of United States v. Carolene 
Products,162 does not flow directly from a court’s estimation that 
classifications burdening that group are likely constitutional. 
Instead, it rests on an implicit conclusion that the affected group 
suffers no special political disabilities preventing it from rectifying its 
poor treatment on its own, without judicial assistance.163 The group’s 
                                                                                                                                       
 159. See supra notes 94-96. 
 160. See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 22 (criticizing the Court’s juricentric 
conception of constitutional interpretation). 
 161. Compare, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2584-88 (2008) 
(applying Sixth Amendment precedent to decide issue of when right to counsel attaches in 
a given context), with id. at 2595 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the original 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment required overruling of that precedent). 
 162. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 163. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns Comm’n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (“The 
Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident 
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presumed political clout may well allow it to resist unfair burdens, 
but any conclusion that it enjoys fair treatment flows only indirectly, 
as an inference from that presumed influence. Still, as indirect as the 
Carolene approach is, it provides at least a theoretically plausible 
way for a court to implement the otherwise vacuous command that 
government treat people equally.164 In other words, in the absence of 
other guideposts, Carolene provides a plausible, if imperfect,165
approach to equal protection review that is consistent with limited 
judicial competence in this area.166
 However, in Garrett the Court privileged judicial doctrine over 
underlying meaning in a very different context—the authority of 
Congress to craft rules enforcing the underlying meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause. Faced with a constitutional rule the Court 
could only partially demarcate via suspect class analysis167 and a 
federal statute that sought to demarcate it more precisely, the Court 
tested that statute not against the rule itself, but instead against the 
Court’s own institutionally limited reading of that rule.168 Garrett’s
failure to recognize that Cleburne did more than simply apply the 
rational basis standard for judicial review of disability classifications 
suggests a simplistic, overly rigid, application of the congruence and 
proportionality test. 
 Garrett’s treatment of Cleburne reflects one facet of the 
phenomenon in which judicial evaluations of equal protection claims, 
with all the limitations that flow from courts’ institutional 
characteristics, furnish the baseline for application of the congruence 
                                                                                                                                       
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial 
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political 
branch has acted.”) (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)). 
 164. See Westen, infra note 198 (discussing the vacuous nature of the equal  
protection command). 
 165. For compelling criticisms of Carolene’s real-world coherence, see Ackerman, infra
note 240; Tribe, infra note 277 
 166. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v.  Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376-89 (2001) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the institutional-competence and institutional-role bases for 
rational basis review). 
 167. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-46 (denying 
suspect class status to the mentally disabled in large part because of concerns over judicial 
inability to distinguish between invidious and benign singling-out of that group, and 
because the concern that other groups might also demand suspect class status). 
 168. Similarly in Kimel, the Court tested the ADEA against a very narrow 
constitutional right to be free from age discrimination. See 528 U.S. 62, 82-88 (2000). 
However, of the three cases Kimel relied on to establish the narrowness of that right, two of 
them relied on the plaintiff’s concession that age was not a suspect class. See Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470-71 (1991); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96-97 (1979). In the 
third case, the Court rejected a claim that age was a suspect classification based on a 
Carolene political process analysis. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-16 
(1976). Thus, in the only case relied on by Kimel in which the Court actively considered the 
constitutional status of age discrimination, it reached a conclusion not based on an analysis 
of true constitutional meaning, but instead based on Carolene’s mediated political  
process approach. 
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and proportionality test. Another facet emerges in Garrett’s 
insistence that proof of constitutional violations had to take the form 
of evidence that would hold up in court. Thus, the Court demanded 
proof that disability discrimination had been performed by states, 
rather than private actors or even subunits of state government.169
Moreover, the relevant conduct was not just disability discrimination, 
but disability discrimination that a court would likely have adjudged 
to violate equal protection.  
 The Court’s outright rejection, as irrelevant, of evidence that 
private parties or nonstate government entities had discriminated, 
and that states had discriminated in ways whose unconstitutionality 
was not obvious, amounts to a rejection of circumstantial evidence 
tending to prove, even if only indirectly, the existence of 
unconstitutional state discrimination.170 In essence, rather than 
requiring evidence tending to prove the existence of unconstitutional 
state action,171 the Court required actual examples of such action. 
Thus it rejected evidence that might prove the existence of a 
constitutional problem as a more general matter, such as evidence 
that certain types of workplaces often feature certain types of 
discrimination. It fits within Garrett’s litigation-centric approach to 
evidence that this latter type of evidence is the type normally found 
by nonjudicial bodies such as legislatures. 
 This component of Garrett reveals not just the juricentric, but the 
litigation-centric nature of the Court’s Section 5 doctrine. This same 
feature is revealed by Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion. Justice 
Kennedy rejected the ADA as appropriate enforcement legislation 
based in part on the lack of any significant history of litigation 
                                                                                                                                       
 169. See 531 U.S. at 368-72. Even assuming Garrett’s crabbed reading of the type of 
evidence revealing the existence of a constitutional problem, it is difficult to understand 
the sense behind the Court’s use of the availability of Eleventh Amendment immunity to 
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant evidence that states are engaged in 
unconstitutional conduct. See id. at 368-69. Eleventh Amendment immunity may in fact 
distinguish states from counties for purposes of amenability to lawsuits, but it does not 
distinguish them for purposes of determining constitutional violations, unless Enforcement 
Clause legislation plays no role other than simply defeating an otherwise-available 
sovereign immunity defense. But Enforcement Clause legislation should play a greater role 
than that: it should serve as a limit on and remedy for all Fourteenth Amendment 
violations, regardless of whether they are committed by an entity that enjoys Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. The Court’s analysis here reduces the Enforcement Clause power 
to an unprincipled litigation tool rather than a principled grant of power to Congress to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against all entities to which it applies. Cf. Pennhurst 
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (justifying the Ex parte Young
doctrine as an unprincipled compromise between state sovereign immunity and the need 
for a federal forum to vindicate federal rights). 
 170. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-72; see also id. at 376-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
 171. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 595 (8th ed. 2004) (defining evidence as 
“[s]omething (including testimony, documents, and tangible objects) that tends to prove or 
disprove the existence of an alleged fact”). 
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alleging unconstitutional disability discrimination.172 For Justice 
Kennedy, the lack of such litigation indicated the lack of likely 
constitutional violations. While this is not implausible, he failed even 
to consider the possibility that this absence may have resulted from 
the limitations of litigation as a vehicle for vindicating such rights, 
rather than a lack of constitutional violations.  
 As explained earlier,173 the harshness of the evidentiary approach 
was somewhat mitigated in Hibbs and Lane. It is doubtful, though, 
whether their evidentiary generosity would persist into cases testing 
the statutes discussed in this Article. Hibbs and Lane considered 
legislation protecting rights that enjoy heightened judicial protection. 
Harmonizing them with Garrett and Kimel, it appears that the greater 
judicial protection enjoyed by those rights is what led the Court to take 
a more generous evidentiary approach. Given the uncertain 
constitutional status of the rights at issue, the legislation examined in 
the Article would probably face the tougher evidentiary approach from 
Garrett, rather than Hibbs’ and Lane’s more lenient approaches.174
 As commentators have correctly argued, the aspects of Garrett’s 
analysis discussed above reflect a seriously mistaken application of 
the congruence and proportionality test. Congress should not be 
required to calibrate the scope of its enforcement legislation to the 
doctrinal categories the Court has constructed to guide its own 
decisions. Nor should its factual conclusions be deemed irrelevant 
because they do not satisfy the particularity required of evidence 
admissible in trials.175 Rather, even assuming the correctness of the 
congruence and proportionality test, the baseline to which the 
enforcement legislation has to be congruent and proportional is not 
the court-created doctrine, but underlying constitutional meaning. 
After all, Section 5 authorizes Congress to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment, not the Court’s own, institutionally constrained, 
reading of the Amendment. If judicial statements about the 
Amendment’s meaning should matter at all to the question of 
Congress’s enforcement authority (and of course they should) then 
this underlying meaning should be the lodestar guiding the Court’s 
                                                                                                                                       
 172. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 173. See supra Part III(A). 
 174. It is also worth noting that the swing votes in Hibbs and Lane—Justice O’Connor 
and (in Hibbs only) Chief Justice Rehnquist—have been replaced by Justice Alito and Chief 
Justice Roberts, respectively. While Chief Justice Roberts did not have occasion while on 
the Court of Appeals to consider the scope of the Enforcement Clause power, Justice Alito 
did, holding that the Family and Medical Leave Act exceeded congressional power. See
Chittister v. Dep’t of Cmty. &  Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223 (3rd Cir. 2000). Hibbs superseded 
this holding; nevertheless, it provides at least one indicator that Justice Alito may take a 
harder line on congressional power than Justice O’Connor did. 
 175. See Araiza, Courts, Congress, and Equal Protection: What Brown Teaches Us 
About the Section 5 Power, supra note 16, at 229-30.  
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congruence and proportionality analysis, rather than the 
presumptions and deference inherent in the rational basis standard. 
V.   A LAW-BASED RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CONGRUENCE AND 
PROPORTIONALITY STANDARD
 Much of the argument sketched out in Part IV has been made before, 
both in critiques of the Court’s Section 5 jurisprudence and more general 
analyses of the relationship between constitutional meaning and 
constitutional doctrine.176 Implicit in this analysis is the idea that the 
Court’s equal protection opinions often state less meaning than is 
commonly assumed. This idea flows from Professor Sager’s 1978 article 
on underenforced constitutional norms, and from subsequent 
scholarship debating the existence and implications of a meaningful gap 
between judicial doctrine and constitutional meaning.177
 This Article argues that a better approach to the congruence and 
proportionality standard starts with a recognition that judicial 
doctrine does not necessarily exhaust constitutional meaning. Under 
this approach, a court dealing with a Section 5 challenge would first 
determine the extent to which the relevant judicial doctrine reflects 
true constitutional meaning with regard to the subject area covered by 
the statute. That meaning would then provide the baseline against 
which the statute could be tested for congruence and proportionality. 
 This approach is especially useful for considering legislation 
designed to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. As explained 
later,178 equal protection is unique among Fourteenth Amendment 
rights in the degree to which judicial doctrine does not fully reflect 
constitutional meaning. For the time being, assuming this assertion 
is true, it is especially inappropriate to use this doctrine as the source 
of strict limits on equality-enforcing legislation. This is not to say 
that equal protection doctrine is completely devoid of statements of 
core constitutional meaning. Those statements do in fact limit 
congressional power, though not to the degree suggested by the post-
Boerne case law.  
 In addition to demarcating the boundaries of congressional power, 
those limits also point to follow-on inquiries required to fully apply 
the equal protection guarantee. By channeling congressional power 
in this way, judicial statements of constitutional principle play an 
                                                                                                                                       
 176. See generally, e.g. Kermit Roosevelt, III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law 
Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005) (discussing various doctrines); 
Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of Equal Protection, supra
note 16 (discussing enforcement power). 
 177. See, e.g., Eisgruber, infra note 340; Robin-Vergeer, infra note 340; see also infra
note 182. 
 178. See infra Part V(B). 
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additional role in uncovering the proper scope of the enforcement 
power beyond simply demarcating its outer limits.179
 This approach to the enforcement power does not abandon the 
congruence and proportionality test or the principle of judicial 
supremacy that underlies it. In particular, it does not contemplate a 
Morgan-style sharing of interpretive authority between Congress and 
the Court.180 It does, however, moderate the implications of judicial 
supremacy for congressional participation in the constitutional 
project. In particular, it acknowledges that, while the judiciary may 
be supreme within the realm of interpreting the Constitution, 
institutional or other constraints may prevent the Court from fully 
applying that meaning to concrete situations. It then argues that 
Congress should have the authority to fill those gaps in application. 
Significantly, however, congressional authority is cabined. First, this 
approach acknowledges a legal limit: enforcement legislation must 
respect whatever constitutional meaning the Court has been able to 
articulate. Second, even within the realm where Congress has the 
bare legal authority to act, this approach imposes an outer limit on 
congressional discretion. In particular, while this approach envisages 
broad congressional discretion to make the follow-on determinations 
courts identify as relevant to a full application of constitutional 
meaning, courts retain the authority to review those determinations 
to ensure their reasonableness.181
                                                                                                                                       
 179. Moreover, judicial decisions often leave these questions unanswered because 
institutional limitations make it difficult for courts to fully answer them. As will be 
explained, Congress has the power to answer these questions accurately and legitimately. 
 180. See supra notes 64-69. 
 181. See infra text accompanying note 343. The idea that courts retain the authority to 
review enforcement legislation for reasonableness unavoidably raises the question of 
whether the enforcement power is as extensive as the congressional power under Article I’s 
Necessary and Proper Clause. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 , 175-
80 (1980) (concluding that Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment is as 
broad as its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding that Congress needs only a rational basis to believe that a 
regulated activity, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce for its 
regulation to be necessary and proper to the vindication of its power to regulate interstate 
commerce). This more limited understanding of the enforcement power may be necessary 
to remain faithful to Boerne’s vision of judicial supremacy in the determination of 
constitutional meaning. Because the Court has been so active in demarcating the bounds of 
otherwise vague Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of equal protection and due process, 
fidelity to Boerne almost necessarily implies a meaningful limitation on congressional 
discretion to enforce that guarantee. Otherwise, judicial supremacy is simply a formal 
concept easily overcome by congressional legislation that purports to enforce that 
provision. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-32 (1997) (considering 
whether Congress had sufficient evidence of widespread violations of the constitutional 
rule against intentional religious discrimination to justify RFRA as legislation enforcing 
that rule); see also infra text accompanying note 314. In essence, taking Boerne seriously—
as this Article does—means restricting, at least to some degree, congressional discretion to 
use its enforcement power to enforce rights not precisely identified by the Court.  
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A.   Initial Objections 
 This approach raises both conceptual and practical objections. 
First, the distinction between equal protection “law,” derived from 
abstract legal analysis and judicial doctrine (such as the rational 
basis standard) which is based at least partly in considerations of 
institutional role and competence, calls to mind recent criticism 
about what Daryl Levinson has labeled “rights essentialism.”182 This 
critique argues that it fundamentally misapprehends the idea of law 
and is misleading and counterproductive to posit the existence of 
abstract, Platonic ideals of rights in contradistinction to the messy, 
contingent, imperfect results that obtain when courts enforce or 
implement those rights.183 Under the antiessentialist view, 
constitutional provisions consist simply of their judicial enforcement 
and ought to be thought of as such. 
 In addition to arguing that we confuse ourselves when we purport 
to recognize a distinction between rights and their implementation, 
this critique also notes the practical difficulty of untangling these two 
concepts in judicial doctrine.184 A trenchant criticism of this 
distinction argues that most of the Court’s constitutional decisions 
feature both analytical and pragmatic reasoning. It further argues 
                                                                                                                                       
 The Court’s Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence—most notably its inquiry 
whether a challenged federal regulation is sufficiently necessary and proper to carry out 
congressional regulation under the Interstate Commerce Clause—is not as rigidly insistent 
on ultimate judicial supremacy. Compare, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (majority opinion) 
(requiring only that Congress have a rational basis for believing that the regulated activity 
substantially affect interstate commerce), with id. at 52-57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(demanding more proof that the challenged regulation was in fact necessary and proper to 
the effectuation of Congress’s regulation of the interstate market in illicit drugs). But see
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-65 (1995) (rejecting the government’s argument 
that a federal prohibition on carrying a gun into a school zone is constitutional because of 
its interstate commerce effects, not because those effects do not exist but because such 
reasoning would be incompatible with judicially enforced rules of federalism). It would take 
this Article far afield to speculate about the reasons for this discontinuity. For current 
purposes the important point is that taking both Boerne and Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence as givens requires the conclusion that the scope of congressional discretion 
under the Enforcement Clause is simply narrower than its authority under the Commerce 
Clause. In particular, Boerne entails restrictions on Congress’s use of its discretion that do 
not exist as clearly in the Commerce Clause argument. But see United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (striking down a federal remedy for acts of violence committed 
against women and again rejecting the government’s defense of the statute as inconsistent 
with judicially-enforced rules of federalism). 
 182. Levinson, supra note 22, at 857. 
 183. See id. at 858; see also Brannon P. Denning, The New Doctrinalism in 
Constitutional Scholarship and District of Columbia v. Heller, 75 TENN. L. REV. 789, 796-
97 (2008) (noting this critique). 
 184. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 18222, at  923-24 (identifying a large number of 
constitutional provisions that  plausibly are underenforced); see also William M. Carter, 
Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents of 
Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1352 n.146 (2007) (noting the lack of lower court 
analysis of the distinction between institutional and analytical bases for Thirteenth 
Amendment decisions). 
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that much of the Court’s seemingly analytical reasoning turns in part 
on the Court’s concern for finding a judicially workable rule.185 Thus, 
not only do opinions resist easy classification on this basis, but in any 
given opinion, the two types of reasoning may be woven together in 
ways that are impossible to disentangle. 
 These objections arguably have even greater force in the equal 
protection context, given changes in equal protection doctrine over 
the last several decades. Most notably, over the last thirty years 
courts have expanded the scope of classifications that receive serious 
equal protection scrutiny, and, in doing so, have employed 
significantly more contextualized analysis.186 As a result, the simple, 
two-tiered review developed during the Warren Court, in which 
racial classifications received strict scrutiny that was invariably fatal 
while all others received toothless rational basis scrutiny, has been 
rendered far more complex. Today, equal protection doctrine has 
expanded to three tiers of review; moreover, each tier exhibits 
markedly different levels of judicial scrutiny and features exceptions 
from even those already vague levels. Distilling this contextualized, 
almost ad hoc body of case law into a set of principles grounded in 
the Constitution is no easy task. 
 Nevertheless, the assumptions underlying this Article require 
that we attempt it. In particular, this Article assumes the stability of 
Boerne’s distinction between constitutional interpretation and 
constitutional enforcement. This distinction was accepted across the 
Court’s ideological spectrum in Boerne, and, despite spirited dissents 
in subsequent enforcement power cases, neither wing of the current 
Court has fundamentally disagreed with the idea that the Court 
remains the authoritative source of constitutional meaning. Given 
the existence of Justice Brennan’s broader understanding of 
congressional power in Katzenbach v. Morgan187 as a competing 
model, the Justices’ continued, near unanimous embrace of the 
Boerne distinction reflects a consensus that is unlikely to break apart 
anytime soon.188 At the very least, any move back toward the 
Brennan position would likely be a gradual one. Thus, any realistic 
call for a rethinking of the enforcement power should begin with an 
understanding that the Court plays a unique role in determining 
constitutional meaning. Once one concedes that, then any conception 
of the enforcement power must distinguish between the power to 
interpret and the power to enforce.  
                                                                                                                                       
185. See Levinson, supra note 22, at 923-24 (citing a wide variety of constitutional 
provisions that arguably are underenforced given courts’ confessed institutional 
incompetence). 
 186. See, e.g., Araiza, The Section 5 Power, supra note 16, at 522-23. 
 187. See supra notes 64-69. 
 188. See supra note 77. 
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 That task may not be completely hopeless. Many of the Court’s 
equal protection opinions explicitly acknowledge that the judiciary’s 
institutional limitations cabin its ability to fully apply constitutional 
meaning. Such acknowledgements, by distinguishing between what 
the Court really knows about equal protection and what it can only 
dimly perceive or imperfectly apply, provide a conceptual opening for 
legislation to apply whatever equal protection law the Court can in 
fact state confidently. Moreover, some of the Court’s statements 
about underlying equal protection meaning clearly suggest a role for 
congressional legislation applying that meaning. For example, often 
those statements incorporate as part of equal protection law social 
constructs, such as animus, that are best instantiated and applied by 
more politically responsive bodies.189 Thus, to the extent the Court’s 
constitutional analysis requires such social judgments it invites 
congressional action making them. In sum, in at least some cases, 
equal protection law is especially likely to be under enforced, and 
Congress is especially suited to remedy that condition. 
 The next part of the Article considers which equal protection 
issues may be especially susceptible to an enforcement power 
analysis that turns on the degree to which the relevant judicial 
doctrine is analytical or institutionally based. The goal of this 
investigation is not to rigidly categorize every major doctrine either 
as one based on the Constitution or simply as a judicially workable 
decision rule. Such a categorization would miss the point: every
constitutional doctrine has at least some grounding in constitutional 
principle. Instead, this investigation aims to identify the doctrines 
that are sufficiently grounded in institutional concerns as to warrant 
the conclusion that they do not effectuate the constitutional rule with 
any level of precision.190
 Of course, the fact that the Court has in fact stated relatively little 
equal protection law in an area does not thereby give Congress 
                                                                                                                                       
 189. The superior capacity of legislatures to make such judgments can be inferred from 
Justice Scalia’s famous comment from his dissent in Romer v. Evans that “[t]he Court [had] 
mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Taking his accusation at its word, one is struck by the courts’ lack 
of competence to tell the difference between these two concepts. 
 190. One might very roughly analogize such a doctrine to a constitutional issue that is 
held to constitute a nonjusticiable political question. Part of the political question calculus 
involves considering whether judicially discoverable legal standards exist to decide the 
issue, and whether the issue is one that relies on determinations within the competence of 
courts. A decision that such standards do not exist supports the conclusion that the issue is 
a political question which has been committed to resolution by one of the other branches. 
These cases do not hold that Constitution is silent; rather, they hold that application of the 
constitutional rule requires nonlegal expertise. Similarly, an equal protection doctrine 
grounded more in institutional concerns than analytical ones suggests that full application 
of the constitutional rule requires the input of the political branches, even if equal 
protection is sufficiently judicially accessible as a concept that some judicial interpretation 
and application is possible. 
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unlimited latitude to legislate on that topic. Such an approach would 
essentially hand Congress a blank check anytime the Court could not 
conclusively determine the precise shape of the relevant 
constitutional rule. To avoid this result, this Article’s approach to 
congruence and proportionality requires that courts ask important 
questions about those judicial statements and the enforcement 
legislation in question. For example, even a limited statement from 
the Court might still preclude enforcement legislation that 
contradicts the principles underlying that statement. A limited 
statement might also suggest the follow-on determinations or 
inquiries that are relevant to a fuller application of the constitutional 
rule; to the extent the enforcement legislation is not based on those 
determinations it could not be defended as a fuller application of that 
statement. Finally, even if the enforcement statute did reflect 
congressional answers to those judicially indicated follow-on 
inquiries, a court might still judge those answers unreasonable.191
 In this approach, judicial doctrine plays two roles with regard to 
enforcement legislation. First, it sets the underlying constitutional 
rule, and in that way, constrains congressional power to move in a 
different direction. Second, doctrine reveals, with varying degrees of 
explicitness, the gaps between it and the underlying constitutional 
rule. These revelations channel congressional enforcement power by 
pointing toward the types of inquiries and determinations that are 
appropriate to enforcing the constitutional rule. They thus constrain 
congressional power, not by taking certain substantive choices off the 
table (as with the first role), but rather by setting forth the ways in 
which Congress can use its particular institutional authority and 
strengths to enforce the underlying rule.192 In this way the second 
                                                                                                                                       
 191. See infra text accompanying note 344 (suggesting the standard of review that 
should be applied to these determinations). 
 192. This dynamic may be analogized to a congressional delegation to an 
administrative agency to fill in the holes created by a broadly worded statute. In that 
situation the statute both sets forth the fundamental policy and directs the agency to fill in 
any gaps by considering the factors specified in the statute. The agency’s implementation 
must be consistent with whatever meaning can be gleaned from the statute, reflect a 
consideration of the factors Congress directed the agency to consider, and be reasonable. 
See Chevron, USA v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984); Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416-21 (1971). Analogously, in the enforcement context, 
the Court sets forth the constitutional rule, the enforcement of which the Constitution then 
“delegates” to Congress via Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 Of course the analogy cannot be pressed too far. Most notably, an agency is not a 
branch of government coequal to Congress or a federal court; by contrast, the two actors in 
the enforcement context are coequal. In Garrett, Justice Breyer faulted the majority for 
insisting that Congress demonstrate in the ADA a degree of fact finding and proof he found 
more appropriate for a court to demand from an agency. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But the larger analogy remains. In both 
cases the initial policy-making body (the Court in the Fourteenth Amendment context and 
Congress in the statutory one) sets forth the governing rule, often at a level of generality 
that is incapable of providing sufficiently precise rules of conduct. Thus, in both cases the 
2010]           RETHINKING CONGRESSIONAL POWER 491 
role can be seen as the logical next step in the enforcement power 
analysis after determining which substantive choices the Court’s 
doctrine precludes. As will be explained, this second role becomes 
quite important when, as with the statutes discussed in this Article, 
Congress acts in the shadow of judicial doctrine that itself says very 
little about what equal protection requires and thus precludes very 
few regulatory options. 
 This analysis points the way for the rest of this Article. The first 
step in the argument considers how much of the Court’s doctrine 
consists of true equal protection law. After deriving the content of 
that law, the next step considers the evidence a court should consider 
when determining whether the congressional legislation stays within 
the channels cut by that law. As will become clear, this latter step 
also speaks to the federalism concerns that properly limit 
congressional enforcement power.193 Finally, this Article applies this 
analysis to the new legislation discussed earlier. This part of the 
Article provides real world applications of this approach. It thus 
helps clarify the constitutional questions raised by these new 
statutes. It also illustrates a more general method of analysis that 
courts can use when considering future enforcement legislation. 
B.   The Limited Nature of Equal Protection Doctrine 
 Equal protection doctrine includes a spectrum of judicial 
pronouncements from those announcing broad, abstract legal 
principles to those explicitly resting on institutional competence 
                                                                                                                                       
power to enforce the rule is delegated (either through the Enforcement Clause or the 
statute) to a body capable of translating that broad command into workable rules of 
conduct. Finally, and most importantly for our purposes, in both cases the legality of those 
enforcement actions turns on the degree to which the enforcing body has both stayed 
within the bounds of the rule it is enforcing and instantiated it by resolving the follow-on 
inquiries mandated by that underlying rule. Compare, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 838 
(upholding an agency’s construction of a vague statute as long as it is reasonable), with 
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416-21 (requiring the agency to implement a statute by 
considering the factors the statute directs it to consider and acting reasonably in doing so).
Again, the key difference lies in the constitutional status of the enforcing entity (the 
agency, as opposed to Congress), which in turn affects the appropriate degree of deference 
the enforcing institution’s decisions should enjoy when performing these functions. See
infra text accompanying note 344. (discussing the appropriate standard of review of 
congressional performance of these functions).  
 Even after accounting for the appropriate amount of deference Congress should enjoy 
in this dynamic, this approach is nevertheless subject to the objection that the Thirty-
Ninth Congress anticipated Congress enjoying a more independent role in enforcing the 
Fourteenth Amendment. This objection pushes the argument in this Article up against 
Boerne’s vision of the judiciary’s supreme authority in determining constitutional meaning. 
Consistency with that vision—which this Article takes as given—requires some degree of 
congressional subservience in the task of interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, even if 
that subservience was not part of the Amendment’s original design. See supra note 181 
(discussing this idea in more detail); see also infra text accompanying notes 308-09.  
 193. See infra text accompanying notes 278-84. 
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concerns and abjuring any pretense to stating underlying 
constitutional principle. As scholars have noted, different types of 
statements often appear in the same opinion and even depend on 
each other.194 For that reason, unraveling the Court’s reasoning to 
reveal its analytical and institutional strands presents a difficult 
challenge. Nevertheless, the task is necessary if one is to craft an 
approach to the enforcement power that respects judicial supremacy 
while recognizing that courts sometimes do not fully state 
constitutional meaning. Fortunately, one can begin to credibly 
perform this work, thus allowing us to begin sketching out a 
reimagined enforcement power. This subpart considers what broad 
constitutional principles can be gleaned from the Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence. 
1.   The Scope of the Equal Protection Guarantee 
 Begin with some clear statements of equal protection’s basic 
meaning. Most fundamentally, case law indicates that the equal 
protection guarantee applies to everyone all of the time. As is well 
known, the Court has found equal protection violations in 
government classification schemes affecting a wide variety of groups 
and government action.195 Indeed, the Court has held, in a very brief 
per curiam opinion suggesting that the question was neither difficult 
nor novel, that discrimination can run afoul of equal protection even 
when it is not based on membership in a class.196 Given these results, 
as well as the Court’s repeated insistence that equal protection 
requires government to treat likes alike,197 it seems fair to say that 
one fundamental principle of equal protection law is that the equality 
guarantee applies to everyone and to every government action.198
                                                                                                                                       
 194. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 22, at 862. 
 195. See, e.g., Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (per curiam) 
(sewer hookups); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-76 (2003) (college admissions); Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976) (beer sales). 
 196. Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 565. 
 197. See Westen, infra note 198, at 567 n.103. These cases reflect the Court’s embrace 
of an equality rule focused ultimately on treating likes alike. This rule may be in tension 
with the class-based, stigma concepts advocated by many scholars as a better 
understanding of equality. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” 
Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 841-42 
(2003) (discussing the stigma concept). This Article takes the Court’s approach as a given, 
as its fundamental concern is how to relate antidiscrimination statutes to the underlying 
meaning of equal protection as provided by the Court. The Court’s recent approval of the 
class-of-one theory of equal protection reinforces its embrace of this approach. See Village 
of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 565. 
 198. Scholars have argued that equal protection is impossible to understand without a 
conception of substantive rights. See, e.g., Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 537, 565 (1982) (substantive rights “provide the standards by which people 
are rendered ‘alike’ or ‘unalike’ ”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 
16-1, at 991 (1978). They thus criticize as misconceived any idea that equal protection 
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 This result was not foreordained. The Court could have 
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to guarantee equality only 
with regard to a certain set of rights.199 Alternatively, it could have 
interpreted it to guarantee across-the-board equality, but only for 
certain groups or only against certain types of classifications.200 Or it 
could have interpreted it as a guarantee of equality only with regard 
to certain types of government action, for example, “protective” 
action.201 At the very least it could have simply refused to endorse the 
class-of-one theory, instead insisting that equal protection applied 
only to discrimination against individuals in their capacity as 
members of identifiable groups. The Court’s rejection of all these 
approaches in favor of its all-encompassing rule of “likes should be 
treated alike,” whatever the correctness of that rule as a historical 
matter,202 should be understood as creating part of the law of the 
Equal Protection Clause. This rule is not driven by institutional 
concerns. It appears to be, in any realistic sense, constitutional “law.” 
                                                                                                                                       
imposes a “presumption of equality” rule of the sort encapsulated by the “likes should be 
treated alike” formula. See Westen, 539 n.8 (identifying the “treating likes alike” rule as the 
fundamental formal rule of equality); see also id. at 542 (“The only claims that do not 
qualify as ‘rights’ are claims that ‘likes should be treated alike.’ ”) (emphasis omitted). 
Since this part of the Article aims only to describe the Court’s jurisprudence, it need not 
evaluate that claim’s underlying logic or correctness. However, even assuming the 
correctness of this critique, the results of the Court’s rational basis cases reveal at the very 
least that all persons enjoy a “substantive” equal protection right to nonarbitrary 
government treatment. Indeed, as explained below, the rational basis cases may suggest 
more extensive rights that come closer to the “likes should be treated alike” formula. But 
even if this latter claim fails, the cases where the Court finds equal protection violations 
under the rational basis standard without even a hint that the burdened group merits 
heightened scrutiny, as well as the Court’s endorsement of the “class-of-one” theory of 
equal protection, reveal an equal protection right that, whether substantive or purely 
equality-based, applies universally. 
 199. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 169-92 (1977) (arguing that 
the Fourteenth Amendment simply aimed at constitutionalizing the rights protected by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866). 
 200. E.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872) ( “We doubt very much whether 
any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, 
or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of [the Equal 
Protection Clause]. [The Clause] is so clearly a provision for that race . . . ..that a strong 
case would be necessary for its application to any other.”). 
 201. See, e.g., John Harrison,  Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 
YALE L.J. 1385, 1433-51 (1992) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause is fundamentally 
about the requirement that government provide equality in the protection for rights, rather 
than in the rights themselves). 
 202. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & E. Gary Spitko, Navigating Dangerous 
Constitutional Straits: A Prolegomenon on the Federal Marriage Amendment and the 
Disenfranchisement of Sexual Minorities, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 599, 623 (2005) (“The 
contemporary consensus that gender-based discrimination represents a fundamental 
injustice displaced the original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”). 
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2.   The Public Purpose Requirement 
 Equal protection law can also be understood as requiring that 
determinations of likeness or unalikeness be motivated by a 
legitimate public purpose. If nothing else about equal protection is 
established, it must nevertheless remain the case that unequal 
treatment cannot be justified by an illegitimate motive. As one 
commentator observed, quoting Charles Black’s seminal defense of 
Brown v. Board of Education:
[A]lthough the full meaning of the equal protection clause is not 
obvious, it is quite clear that equality does not exist when “a whole 
race or people finds itself confined within a system which is set up 
and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an inferior 
station.”203
 Discerning the existence of a public purpose may be difficult: it is 
always possible that a court may, in Justice Scalia’s words, 
“mistake[] a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.”204 Indeed, as scholars 
have noted, much constitutional doctrine in recent decades may 
reflect a preference for judicial scrutiny of the means, rather than 
ends, of government action.205 Part of this focus may reflect a 
discomfort with or felt inability to distinguish between varying 
degrees of the importance of the government purpose at stake.206
Thus, the thought goes, it is better to focus on the degree of fit 
between ends and means than determine whether a particular end is 
“legitimate,” “important,” or “compelling.” However, one can 
distinguish this purpose-weighting issue from the minimum 
requirement that the purpose pursued by government must be at 
least legitimate—i.e., public regarding. This requirement is deeply 
rooted in the Reconstruction generation’s concern with class 
legislation thought to be motivated solely by a desire to provide 
private benefits to powerful interests. Even more fundamentally, this 
concern traces back to Madison’s concern for controlling factions.207
As noted earlier, the requirement is so fundamental that it 
transcends any particular constitutional provision.208
                                                                                                                                       
 203. David Orentlicher, Discrimination Out of Dismissiveness: The Example of 
Infertility, 85 IND. L.J. 143, 147 (2009) (quoting Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the 
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960)). Scholars have noted that the 
requirement that government action be driven by concerns for the public good rather than 
oppression for its own sake is so basic as to transcend any particular constitutional 
provision. See supra note 131. 
 204. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 205. E.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 297 (1997). 
 206. See id. at 308. 
 207. See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE 
OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 29-32 (1993). 
 208. See supra note 132. 
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 Indeed, despite any reluctance courts may have had in 
distinguishing between legitimate, important and compelling 
interests, over the last quarter century the Supreme Court has not 
been averse to examining whether government action lacked any 
legitimate purpose at all. First, the cases finding government action 
to have failed the rational basis standard are best explained as 
turning on the illegitimacy of certain government purposes. These 
include both the residency date and duration cases209 and at least the 
first two cases of the Moreno/Cleburne/Romer trilogy.210 Second, at 
the other end of the standard of review spectrum, the cases applying 
strict scrutiny to government affirmative action explicitly refer to the 
Court’s suspicion that illegitimate purposes may be lurking when 
government considers race in its decisionmaking.211
 Both of these sets of cases are important for revealing how the 
Court thinks about true equal protection law. Strikedowns of 
government action under the rational basis standard are rare, and, 
more importantly, stand in tension with Carolene’s presumption of 
constitutionality and theory of why some classifications receive 
heightened review.212 These cases’ focus on illegitimate purpose thus 
suggests that the Court is cutting through the mediating doctrine of 
Carolene-based tiered review and resting its decisions on a true 
constitutional rule. For their part, the affirmative action cases also 
                                                                                                                                       
 209. See Bhagwat, supra note 205, at 312 n.54 (collecting cases). 
 210. See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 205, at 327 (concluding that it is “difficult to explain 
[Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer] as anything but cases examining the legitimacy of 
government purposes”). In Moreno and Cleburne, the Court pointed to direct evidence of an 
illegitimate animus directed at the burdened groups: respectively, legislative history 
attacking “hippie communes” and the city’s argument that it had denied the permit for the 
group home for mentally retarded persons based on constituents’ fear and dislike of the 
mentally retarded. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448-49 (1985); 
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). In Romer, the Court did not have such 
direct evidence of animus; thus, its inquiry focused more on the fit between Amendment 2 
and the legitimate purposes proffered by the state. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 
(1996). However, after concluding that there was an insufficiently tight fit between 
Amendment 2 and those legitimate ends, the Court concluded that only animus could have 
motivated Colorado citizens. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (reviewing Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer and concluding based on them 
that “[w]hen a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have 
applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the 
Equal Protection Clause”).  
 211. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (explaining 
that strict scrutiny is necessary in part to “smoke out” instances where race-conscious 
government action is motivated by notions of inferiority or “simple racial politics”); see also
Winkler, infra note 214, at 802-03 (discussing and quoting those cases); Bhagwat, supra
note 205, at 341 (“Perhaps the clearest example of a ‘limited purposes’ approach in the 
Court's jurisprudence can be found in its equal protection decisions regarding race, most 
notably in its recent affirmative action cases.”). 
 212. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (“The Constitution presumes 
that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be 
rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted 
no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.”) (citation omitted). 
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reveal a discomfort with Carolene. Indeed, in Croson, Justice 
O’Connor questions Carolene’s relevance to equal protection law and 
then gives only the weakest Carolene-based justification for according 
strict scrutiny to affirmative action plans.213 Here, too, the Court 
appears to be cutting through doctrine in order to rest its decision on 
true constitutional principle: in this case, the principle that racial 
classifications run too great a risk of impermissible motivation to 
receive anything but the strictest scrutiny.214 In the end, the Court’s 
conclusions in both of these areas eschew the political process theory 
that aims to approximate the constitutional rule via a judicially 
workable formula, in favor of resting on the constitutional 
requirement of a legitimate government purpose.  
3.   Minimum Rationality 
 The cases discussed above, while accounting for a large percentage 
of the “rational basis plus” cases, still leave at least one result 
unexplained. In Allegheny Pittsburgh v. County Commission of 
Webster County,215 the Court struck down as irrational a tax 
assessor’s valuation of the plaintiff’s properties based on acquisition 
value despite the state constitution’s rule that all property be 
assessed based on its market value.216 The Court concluded that the 
county assessor’s use of an acquisition value scheme, in defiance of 
the state constitution’s market value-based requirement, created 
unconstitutional inequality. 
 Allegheny Pittsburgh is a muddled opinion. It insists that a state 
has great discretion to adopt whatever assessment method it wishes, 
including an acquisition value scheme, despite the inequalities an 
acquisition value scheme would create.217 Therefore, it seems to rest 
on the fact that the county assessor’s action violated state law.218 As 
                                                                                                                                       
 213. Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96 (observing that African-Americans controlled five of 
the nine seats on the Richmond City Council that instituted the challenged affirmative 
action program). 
 214. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis 
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. Rev. 793, 802-03 (2006) (citing cases 
and commentary concluding that identification of illegitimate government purpose is the 
central justification for strict scrutiny); id. at 802 (“The motive theory of strict scrutiny has 
its most profound impact in equality cases.”). 
 215. 488 U.S. 336 (1989). 
 216. See id. at 343-45.  The assessor periodically adjusted the value of property that 
had not recently been sold, but those adjustments did not promise to bring their valuations 
in line with recently-sold property within what the Court considered a reasonable amount 
of time. See id. at 338. 
 217. Indeed, the Court confirmed this reading three years later when it upheld 
California’s acquisition value assessment scheme. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1,  
27-28 (1992). 
 218. This is the only analysis that explains the Court’s reliance on the quantitative 
inequality produced by the assessor’s decision. Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 344-45. If that 
quantitative inequality had independent constitutional significance apart from the 
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pointed out by Justice Thomas three years later, however, this 
rationale would apparently mean that the Equal Protection Clause is 
violated whenever a state official “irrationally” breaks state law and 
thereby treats a regulated party differently from those treated 
according to the state law rule.219 As Justice Thomas noted, this could 
not conceivably be correct. 
 This confusion perhaps reduces the import of Allegheny Pittsburgh
and justifies describing it as an outlier case. But piercing its doctrinal 
confusion reveals a solid, fundamental rule about equal protection: 
leaving aside any concern about animus, government classifications 
must be rational. Like the public purpose requirement, the 
rationality requirement seems so obvious as to be a triviality. But it 
seems trivial only because it is so fundamental. Government action 
that lacks any justification in a legitimate public goal, if not 
ultimately motivated by animus, has to be understood as an utterly 
arbitrary expression of a despot’s whim.220 This guarantee against 
arbitrariness applies with particular force to equal protection: by 
focusing on classification rather than substantive rights, equal 
protection requires government rationality if it is to have any 
meaning at all.  
4.   Strike Downs 
 Decisions striking down government action as unconstitutional 
provide another source of constitutional principles. In most cases, 
such decisions reflect principles that are precise enough or capable 
enough of judicial application to warrant courts exercising their 
power to nullify government action.  
 Two very different types of cases provide examples. The Court’s 
post-Brown, pre-affirmative action, race cases illustrate courts’ 
application of a constitutional principle against racial classification.221
                                                                                                                                       
assessor’s violation of the state constitutional assessment rule, then presumably the 
similar quantitative inequalities in Nordlinger would have led the Court to strike down the 
California assessment scheme. See Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 14-15 (distinguishing Allegheny 
County on this ground). 
 219. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 25-26 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
 220. A colorful and insightful example of such a whim is the fictional revolutionary in 
Woody Allen’s movie Bananas: after toppling the military dictator and gaining power, the 
revolutionary becomes irrational, ordering, among other things, that underwear should be 
worn on the outside.  
 221. See, e.g., Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395, 395 (1964) (per curiam) (city auditorium); 
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (per curiam)  (public facilities); Holmes v. City 
of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (public golf course), rev’g 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 
1955); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per 
curiam) (public beaches), aff'g 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955). These cases are picked rather 
than race cases in general because cases considering race conscious government action 
defended as benign or compensatory may raise at least slightly more ambiguity about the 
clarity and precision of the rule they announce. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (insisting that the strict scrutiny accorded affirmative 
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Whatever the limits of that rule, this principle is sufficiently precise 
and judicially workable to provide a rule of decision.222 A very different 
type of principle is visible in the Moreno/Cleburne/Romer trilogy. In 
those cases, the relevant constitutional principle—that government 
action must not reflect animus—is vague and difficult enough to apply 
that courts usually do not apply it directly to strike down government 
action. The result is that they usually uphold challenged government 
action alleged to violate this principle. The exceptions occur when, as 
in Moreno and Cleburne, the animus is so clearly visible that a court 
can uncover it as an empirical matter,223 or, as in Romer, the action is 
unexplainable on any other grounds but animus, thus revealing it by a 
process of elimination.  
 Courts are warranted in striking down government action when 
equal protection principles are either sufficiently precise, as in the 
race cases, or general but sometimes subject to judicial application on 
a case-by-case basis, as in the Moreno/Cleburne/Romer trilogy. Both 
types of cases reveal constitutional principles that vary only in their 
susceptibility to easy judicial application and, thus, their usefulness 
as actual rules determining the outcomes of cases. In turn, the level 
at which the relevant principle can be applied by courts determines 
the level at which a particular strikedown decision should be thought 
of as announcing a principle of constitutional law to which 
congressional action must conform.224
 To complicate matters, however, sometimes strikedowns do not 
reflect application of constitutional principles. Rather, there may be 
times when courts will strike down a government action based not on 
the application of a constitutional principle but on the application of 
a nonconstitutional judicial prophylactic rule. Probably the most 
prominent example of such a rule is the set of warnings Miranda v. 
Arizona required police to give criminal suspects as a way of 
safeguarding suspects’ rights against self-incrimination.225 Until 
Dickerson v. United States,226 it was thought by many that this 
                                                                                                                                       
action programs is not “fatal in fact”); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-28 
(2003) (performing strict scrutiny yet deferring to the university’s pedagogical 
determinations about the racial diversity necessary for effective instruction). 
 222. A longer discussion of this rule is provided in the next Part. See infra Part V 
(B)(5). 
 223. See Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537 (noting legislative history 
attacking “hippie communes”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 
448 (1985) (noting the city’s argument that its constituents disliked and feared the 
mentally retarded). 
 224. Thus, for example, an enforcement statute mandating that states require 
segregated restaurant facilities or explicitly authorizing the Cleburne Town Council to 
withhold the approval for the group house for the mentally retarded would not constitute 
appropriate enforcement legislation. 
 225. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 226. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
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requirement was not a matter of constitutional principle, but rather a 
judicially workable prophylactic measure designed to secure the 
underlying right in the most workable way for reviewing courts.227
 Such instances of judicial prophylaxis are rare—and for good 
reason—given the significant issues of judicial power that arise when 
courts strike down government action based on requirements that 
are not themselves constitutionally mandated.228 To the extent such 
judicial prophylactic rules exist, however, they teach us that some 
care is required before concluding that a judicial strikedown 
necessarily reflects a constitutional principle in action. Of course, a 
constitutional principle lurks somewhere in every such case. In 
Miranda, for example, even assuming that the required police 
warnings were not constitutionally required, that requirement was 
nevertheless grounded ultimately in the Constitution’s non-self-
incrimination right. Until Dickerson, however, one could have 
concluded that the result in Miranda was not proximately driven by 
that right but rather by the need for a judicially workable way of 
enforcing that underlying right. Dickerson resolved this issue—
rightly or wrongly—in favor of the constitutional status of the 
Miranda warnings themselves. However, the example of the pre-
Dickerson argument that those warnings were not constitutionally 
compelled means that even judicial strikedowns must be carefully 
examined for their constitutional rule content. 
5.   Other Equal Protection Law? Race and Fundamental Rights 
 Further investigation may reveal more equal protection law. First, 
as noted in the previous Section, the strong presumption against 
racial classifications of any kind may constitute true equal protection 
meaning. The affirmative action cases of the last twenty years have 
produced a consistent, if narrow, majority for the proposition that 
government use of race is always suspect.229 This proposition may 
rest on either the original understanding of the Equal Protection 
Clause,230 or it may rest on an application of the Clause’s underlying 
rule against irrational or nonpublic regarding classifications.231
Under either understanding, the Court’s current approach to race 
reflects a reasoning process unmediated by any institutionally-based 
constraints. In particular, the decision, now at least twenty years 
                                                                                                                                       
 227. Indeed, it still may be the case, to the extent that Dickerson noted Miranda did 
not preclude the legislative branch’s ability to offer other ways of protecting the right 
against self-incrimination. See id. at 440. 
 228. See id. at 444-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 229. But see supra note 221. 
 230. E.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA.
L. REV. 947 (1995). 
 231. See infra note 241 
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old,232 to subject affirmative action plans to strict scrutiny strongly 
suggests a rejection of a political process-based approach to racial 
classification that might be explained on Carolene-based institutional 
competence grounds.233 Instead, the Court’s acceptance in the race 
context of what Michael Klarman has called “a more openly 
normative theory of ‘relevance,’ which banishes certain criteria from 
governmental decisionmaking on the ground that they should be 
irrelevant”234 suggests that the Court is finding direct constitutional 
meaning in the presumptive rule against racial classifications.235
 Second, the fundamental rights strand of equal protection 
suggests that the Court has identified substantive values that are 
sufficiently important to require a presumption of equality in their 
distribution. Concededly, the Court’s choice of the rights thereby 
protected—voting, travel, and potentially some minimum 
education—can be explained in process-based terms, thus suggesting 
that their constitutional status flows from the likelihood of a political 
process breakdown rather than their independent constitutional 
stature. However, the Court’s explanations of why these rights are 
protected are not cast in these terms. This suggests at least the 
possibility that these rights in fact derive from the Court’s 
authoritative interpretation of the Constitution. 
 Ultimately, this Article does not need to consider the 
constitutional status of either the race classification principle or the 
fundamental rights strand. Its focus on new and likely upcoming civil 
rights legislation, which do not implicate those parts of the doctrine, 
allows us to bracket these difficult issues.236 Important work can be 
                                                                                                                                       
 232. The “at least” refers to the ambiguous constitutional status of affirmative action 
before City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). For examples of pre-
Croson opinions reflecting a lack of consensus on the Court on this issue, see United States 
v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  
 233. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (rejecting the 
idea that “the race of the benefited group is critical to the determination of which standard 
of review to apply”); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (calling into question whether political 
process theory is relevant for determining the appropriate level of scrutiny for racial 
classifications).  
 234. Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 213, 309 (1991). 
 235. This may also be the case with regard to gender. See infra text accompanying  
note 243. 
 236. Thus, for example, this Article does not address the constitutionality of the VRA, 
an issue the Court recently considered but left undecided in favor of reaching a narrower 
result. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). The VRA 
raises questions of how far Congress may go in combating violations of rights clearly 
established by Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 
301, 308-15 (1966) (noting the examples of violations of the Fifteenth Amendment that the 
original VRA attempted to combat). Attacks on the current VRA’s constitutionality argue 
that those violations have been sufficiently stamped out that the VRA’s provisions are no 
longer appropriate mechanisms for wiping them out. See, e.g., Holder at 2525-27 (Thomas, 
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done considering the constitutional status of the Court’s doctrine on 
these issues and, by extension, the discretion Congress should enjoy 
when enforcing those rights.237 This Article simply notes the issue 
and offers the brief discussions above as a jumping-off point for 
future examination. 
6.   Is Judicial Deference a Constitutional Principle? 
 At this point, equal protection law appears to run out. The broad 
rule requiring government to treat likes alike across all types and 
spheres of government action constitutes an invitation to the Court to 
review any legislative action classifying individuals—that is, almost 
any government action. Leaving aside the modern Court’s treatment 
of race and possibly gender,238 the breadth of the judicial authority 
conveyed by this interpretation has naturally led the Court to refrain 
from enforcing the full force of this rule and to craft doctrines that 
commanded lower courts to do similarly. The most famous of the 
Court’s formulas setting out its limited review of equal protection 
claims is, of course, its political process theory from Carolene 
Products. However, even before then the Court was refraining from 
second-guessing classification decisions that seemed reasonable to 
the Court via a doctrinal formula that allowed government the 
latitude to draw classification lines that were less than perfect.239
 Do these deference formulas reflect a limitation of the Equal 
Protection Clause itself or simply salutary judicial self-restraint in 
enforcing its full scope? In a world without congressional enforcement 
power this question makes no practical difference, since under either 
conception the reviewing court asks the same question—is the 
classification reasonable? However, it does matter when one 
considers that power. If reasonableness is the constitutional rule 
itself—i.e., if rationality is not merely the minimum requirement of 
equal protection but rather its full substance—then enforcement 
legislation targeting reasonable but nevertheless inaccurate 
classifications would presumably exceed congressional power. By 
contrast, if the reasonableness requirement is merely a judicial gloss 
on a constitutional principle that is in fact significantly more 
demanding, Congress may enjoy more latitude to enact aggressive 
enforcement legislation. 
                                                                                                                                       
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Such arguments present a conceptually 
different issue from the issue considered in this Article—congressional power to enforce (at 
the level of a precisely targeted statute) equal protection violations that judicial doctrine 
identifies only in the most general way. 
 237. Such work is clearly called for in the context of congressional authority to extend the 
VRA, given the Court’s recent criticism of the statute’s scope. See Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504. 
 238. See infra notes 243-44. 
 239. See generally Richard S. Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court, 
1873 - 1903, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 667 (1980). 
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 The evidence on this question is mixed. On the one hand, the 
Carolene-based structure of tiered scrutiny is generally understood as 
the Court’s attempt to create a judicially workable approach to 
constitutional review in the face of the questionable legitimacy of 
such review in the service of unenumerated, or in this case vague 
rights.240 In particular, Carolene’s rule reserving heightened equal 
protection scrutiny to legislation burdening discrete and insular 
minorities responds to the Court’s inability to discern precisely when 
government classifications fails the fundamental equal protection 
requirement that likes be treated alike. Its formula of basing equal 
protection review on the likelihood that the political process is 
responsive to the burdened group allows the Court to approximate 
the results an omniscient judge would reach applying the underlying 
equal protection requirement of treating likes alike and pursuing 
legitimate purposes241 while at the same time deferring to 
legislatures when their processes are deemed trustworthy.  
 Still, doubts remain. At the highest level of generality, one might 
argue that judicial deference comprises part of the underlying 
constitutional rule because the representative political structure the 
Constitution establishes ensures that groups will generally be 
treated fairly. On this understanding, judicial deference is not simply 
an instance of salutary self-restraint but instead fits within a broader 
structure in which most groups’ right to equal treatment is ensured 
by the political process the Constitution establishes. But this 
argument becomes circular because that very same political process 
now includes congressional power to enforce equal protection. If, 
then, a court adopts this rationale for judicial deference, it seems to 
follow that a group’s ability to convince Congress that states are 
treating it unfairly and thus to gain enactment of enforcement 
legislation should count as part of the underlying process justifying 
judicial deference. This results in a situation where, by hypothesis, 
reasonableness is all that is constitutionally required under equal 
protection, but where that conclusion derives in part from a political 
process that allows an open-ended congressional power to enforce 
equal protection. This approach thus leads us to Morgan’s most 
                                                                                                                                       
 240. E.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 713-14 
(1985). On the vagueness of the equal protection command, see supra note 198. 
 241. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505-06 (2005) (“The reasons for strict 
scrutiny are familiar. Racial classifications raise special fears that they are motivated by 
an invidious purpose. Thus, we have admonished time and again that, ‘[a]bsent searching 
judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way 
of determining . . . what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions  
of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.’ We therefore apply strict scrutiny to all racial 
classifications to ‘ ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that [government] is 
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.’ ”)  
(citation omitted). 
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generous reading of the enforcement power as a license to Congress 
to reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment, a reading rejected by the 
Court ever since Boerne.
 In recent decades, the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has 
evolved away from Carolene’s purely process-based approach and 
toward more judicial consideration of the substantive 
appropriateness of the classification. The best known example of this 
phenomenon is the Court’s adoption of a strong presumption against 
any racial classification. As scholars have noted, this decision is 
unexplainable in any convincing process-based terms. In addition, 
the Court’s gender jurisprudence—in particular, its stated 
willingness to accord more deferential scrutiny to gender 
classifications that compensate women for past discrimination or 
otherwise serve to provide equal opportunity to women242 —suggests 
a willingness to distinguish, as a substantive matter, between 
invidious and benign gender classifications.243 Finally, the modern 
doctrinal translation of Carolene’s “prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities” formula includes, in addition to the process-based 
factor of political powerlessness, a more substantive inquiry into 
whether the classification tool is generally relevant to a purpose 
government can legitimately pursue.244 Surely then, the pure process 
focus of the Court’s Carolene-based equal protection jurisprudence 
has eroded. 
 Nevertheless, for our purposes, that process focus remains in 
place. The Court has consistently (if concededly not unwaveringly)245
explained its decision to accord only rational basis review to a 
classification on its conclusion that the group at issue is presumed 
capable of protecting its interests in the political process. Its 
statements expressing confidence that the political process can be 
trusted to rectify improvident decisions therefore suggest, at most,246
that such classifications are likely to be rational because irrational 
ones will be washed out of the political process. They should not be 
                                                                                                                                       
 242. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996). 
 243. Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493-94 (1989) (stating that 
strict scrutiny is necessary to distinguish between illegitimate uses of race and truly 
benign racial classifications designed to remedy past discrimination). 
 244. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (noting 
that sex “frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society”); City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting that a 
characteristic’s relevance to an interest the state may legitimately pursue affects the 
outcome of suspect class analysis). See also Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1346 
(9th Cir. 1988) (interpreting Supreme Court jurisprudence to inquire as part of suspect 
class analysis whether a classification is grossly unfair), vacated and aff’d on other 
grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).  
 245. See, e.g., infra note 247. 
 246. See, e.g., supra note 212. 
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taken to mean that the Court is making a substantive judgment 
about those classifications.247
 Ultimately, it is probably impossible to determine with any 
certainty the Court’s understanding of the status of the 
reasonableness rule. The evidence, to the extent it exists, is mixed. 
For example, the Court’s explanations for the appropriateness of the 
rational basis standard cite concerns about federalism as well as 
separation of powers,248 suggesting that states’ freedom of action to 
classify stands against both federal judicial review and congressional 
enforcement power. But these terse statements are too thin to 
                                                                                                                                       
 247.  It is important to note that the Court has not been completely consistent in 
explaining the status of the rational basis standard. Most notably, in District of Columbia 
v. Heller, the Court stated in a footnote that the rational basis standard constitutes “the 
very substance of the constitutional guarantee” when the constitutional command is a 
prohibition on irrational laws. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817-18 n.27 
(2008) (“[R]ational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used when evaluating laws 
under constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws. In 
those cases, ‘rational basis’ is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the very substance of 
the constitutional guarantee.”) (internal citation omitted). The Court cited an equal 
protection case, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008), as 
an example of such a command, thereby leaving no doubt that it considered equal 
protection as a command that is fully satisfied by the rational basis test. Heller, 128 S. Ct., 
at 2817-18 n.27. 
 It is hard to know what to make of this statement, which rivals the most aggressive 
statements equating judicial doctrine with constitutional meaning. At base, it equates 
three conceptually distinct ideas: a constitutional command (here, equal protection), a 
judicial gloss on that command (here, the prohibition on irrational government action), and 
a judicial review standard (here, the rational basis standard). For our purposes, the first 
two of these items may be equivalent: the judicial gloss on equal protection, as an 
interpretation of the Constitution, may have the status of equal protection “law” as this 
Article defines the term. Thus, enforcement legislation must be consistent with the judicial 
interpretation of equal protection—i.e., it must be congruent and proportional to a 
requirement that classifications not be irrational. 
 However, the third concept—the judicial review standard—remains distinct. There is 
no reason to think that the rational basis standard captures the core equal protection 
command, whether that command is the textual requirement of “equal protection” or the 
“reasonableness/rationality” gloss on that command. If nothing else, the burden of proof the 
rational basis standard places on the plaintiff, a court’s freedom to hypothesize the 
government interest sought to be furthered, and the presumption that facts exist 
connecting that interest to the classification make clear that judicial review under that 
standard cannot constitute “the very substance” of the constitutional command.  
 Nor does the Court’s statement square with established judicial doctrine. Most 
notably, it is hard to understand the justification for heightened scrutiny accorded race and 
gender classifications (or, for that matter, unequal distributions of equal protection 
fundamental rights) if the rational basis standard constitutes “the very substance” of the 
equal protection guarantee. One might respond that such classifications are presumptively 
irrational. However, such a response confuses the constitutional command (a prohibition 
on irrational classifications that may effectively prohibit most racial or gender 
classifications) and the standard of review used to effectuate that command (in the race 
context, strict scrutiny). A race classification may be irrational in the former sense but still 
satisfy the relaxed requirements of the rational basis standard. For these reasons, the 
statement in Heller must be considered an outlier, and an illogical one at that, and should 
not stand in the way of the larger point. 
 248. E.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-42. 
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support a conclusion on a question as basic as this: even they can be 
read as focusing on federal courts as inappropriate overseers of state 
governments, without speaking to congressional authority. 
  One might argue that cases like Garrett and Kimel resolve this 
issue in favor of reasonableness as a constitutional principle. There, 
the Court gave skeptical scrutiny to the ADA and the ADEA because 
the discrimination they addressed needed only to be rational to be 
constitutional, and thus were not appropriate targets of aggressive 
congressional enforcement legislation. But these cases prove too 
much. Rather than elevating the reasonableness requirement to the 
level of constitutional principle, they instead elevated the particulars 
of the rational basis standard—a related, but ultimately quite 
distinct, concept. The rational basis standard brings with it a set of 
presumptions and assumptions that are not part of any 
reasonableness requirement. For example, the rational basis 
standard requires that courts accept any conceivable justification for 
the classification and places the burden of proof on the plaintiff to 
disprove the plausibility of all such justifications. As suggested by 
reasonableness review in other constitutional contexts, this 
presumption is not a necessary part of a standard that defers to any 
reasonable legislative action.249
 The Court’s failure to confront this issue squarely means that, at 
least as far as existing doctrine is concerned, we do not have a good 
answer to the question whether, as a theoretical matter, the Equal 
Protection Clause requires perfect classifications or only reasonable 
ones. This failure should not be surprising: the Court is in the 
business of deciding cases, not drawing finely wrought theoretical 
distinctions that usually have little or no impact on pending cases.250
But this distinction stops being theoretical when Congress uses its 
Section 5 power to enforce the equal protection rights of groups  
the Court has not recognized as suspect classes. In such cases, it 
matters whether the constitutional rule is merely reasonableness  
(in which case states’ imperfect classifications may not justify federal 
enforcement legislation) or, at least theoretically, perfection (in  
which case Congress might possess the authority to impose more 
exacting standards).  
 As will become clear in the next Part, this Article’s approach to the 
Section 5 power resolves this problem without answering this problem 
explicitly. A full explanation will have to wait: in brief, though, the 
                                                                                                                                       
 249. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752-89 (1997) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (performing reasonableness review under the liberty prong of the Due Process 
Clause without invoking the sorts of presumptions used in rational basis review).  
 250. The distinction does not affect most cases because even if equal protection does 
theoretically require perfection, the judicial self-restraint reflected in the rational basis 
standard means that imperfect but reasonable classifications will be upheld. 
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resolution lies in the Article’s proposed requirement that congressional 
enforcement legislation reflect a broad social consensus that the 
targeted classifications are fundamentally unfair. This requirement of 
a social consensus rests on its own justification, set forth later in the 
Article. As a collateral benefit, however, this requirement has the 
effect of finessing the question posed here, by allowing congressional 
enforcement legislation only when the states’ practices appear 
unreasonable in light of public opinion, broadly measured. Under this 
approach, then, even if we assume that the Equal Protection Clause 
requires perfection, the social consensus prerequisite for enforcement 
legislation will limit congressional action to situations where states 
can be said to be acting unreasonably. 
7.   The Way Forward 
 The new discrimination categories targeted by recent legislation 
challenge the Court’s current equal protection jurisprudence. Unless 
the Court is content with blocking application of this new legislation to 
the states, these new categories will require the Court to either adjust 
that jurisprudence or acknowledge how it relates to underlying 
constitutional meaning and thus to congressional enforcement power. 
This Article assumes that the Court, which has been moving toward a 
more ad hoc application of the equal protection guarantee,251 will not 
soon inaugurate an entirely new structure of equal protection doctrine 
that will be more suspicious of these new forms of discrimination and 
thus friendlier to congressional enforcement. It also assumes that the 
Justices may wish to avoid blocking the full enforcement of civil rights 
laws enacted by a politically united federal government enjoying 
significant popular support. Importantly, though, it also assumes that 
the Court is not willing to surrender its position as exclusive arbiter of 
constitutional meaning, as expressed in the congruence and 
proportionality standard.252 This Article therefore suggests how the 
Court may be able to work within that standard to give more room for 
civil rights legislation. 
                                                                                                                                       
 251. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
579-85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 252. It bears repeating that the Court’s insistence on its own ultimate authority to 
interpret the Constitution has been embraced by both sides of the ideological divide. In 
addition to the well-known and often remarked-on conservative bloc’s insistence on judicial 
supremacy in the federalism cases, it should be noted that no Justice dissented from 
Justice Kennedy’s statement of judicial authority in Boerne v. Flores, and that the more 
liberal Justices have insisted on judicially enforced constitutional limits on the President’s 
war-fighting powers. E.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). In other areas as well, 
members of the Court have insisted on the final constitutional say in dialogues that have 
gone on between Congress and the political branches. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 
656, 676-91 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (complaining that Congress had done all the 
Court had required it to make Internet regulation more precisely targeted, only to have the 
Court continue to strike down such regulation). 
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 The task, then, is to find a method that allows the Court to 
determine when equal protection enforcement legislation both stays 
within the constitutional limits described above and reflects 
Congress’s strengths in applying Court-announced equal protection 
law. This task requires the Court to examine its own opinions, both 
to determine their constitutional rule content and also to identify the 
subsequent determinations needed to apply that content to various 
factual contexts.  
 The next part of the Article takes up this task. It does so 
inductively, beginning with a consideration of the new legislation 
addressed in this Article. In particular, the Article considers what 
current equal protection doctrine reveals about the constitutional 
rules relevant to the discrimination these statutes address. It then 
considers what follow-on inquiries and questions may help apply 
those rules more fully. Based on that inquiry, it reaches conclusions 
about appropriate congressional enforcement power in each of these 
areas. From there the Article reasons upward, culminating in a 
general approach to the enforcement power. 
C.   Applying the New Approach 
 The next several subparts explain how this proposed approach to 
the enforcement power would apply to the sexual orientation, 
transgender, and genetics legislation described earlier. By 
demonstrating the viability of this approach, this analysis can point 
the way toward a more stable Enforcement Clause jurisprudence as 
courts confront new antidiscrimination legislation, the subjects of 
which we can only begin to imagine today.253
1.   New Legislation: The Common Issues 
 The legislation at issue presents a common challenge to the Court: 
it regulates discrimination in an area where the Court has failed to 
state precise constitutional meaning.254 These areas therefore require 
a congruence and proportionality analysis that recognizes the paucity 
of judicial statements of relevant constitutional meaning. Unless the 
Court takes advantage of cases testing this legislation against the 
Section 5 power to suddenly craft definitive constitutional rules on 
these topics, it will have to evaluate this legislation in the shadow of 
its own failure—and possibly its inability—to state the precise 
constitutional rule. 
 As explained above, the first step in this analysis must be the 
testing of such legislation against whatever relevant constitutional 
                                                                                                                                       
 253. See, e.g., ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND 
PERSONHOOD (2008) (discussing obesity discrimination). 
 254. See supra Part III(B). 
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rules the Court has been able to discern. In the case of the new 
legislation discussed in this Article, these rules reduce to the first 
three (the ubiquity of the equal protection guarantee, the requirement 
of a public purpose, and minimum rationality), plus whatever law can 
be discerned from cases striking down analogous discrimination.  
 This paucity should not be surprising: the Equal Protection 
Clause, and the comprehensive equality principle that it has been 
taken to mean, is known for its vacuity and indeterminacy. Indeed, it 
is exactly in response to these characteristics that courts have 
developed mediating doctrines, such as Carolene’s political process 
theory, to enable meaningful judicial review that is not completely ad 
hoc. Therefore, it should not be surprising that those same rules fail 
to impose significant restraints on congressional action.  
 Given this identification of the relevant constitutional rules, one 
might then conclude that this Article envisions no real constraints on 
the enforcement power. However, the constitutional requirements 
described above do impose meaningful limits on congressional power. 
These limits do not come in the form of hard and fast lines. Clearly, 
the requirement to treat likes alike in pursuit of a public purpose 
does not itself cabin congressional enforcement authority to the 
degree that, say, the presumption against racial classifications does. 
However, these requirements do point toward the inquiries and 
determinations Congress should have the power to make when 
enacting enforcement legislation. In other words, the task of ensuring 
that state governments classify appropriately and in pursuit of 
legitimate interests channels congressional action by suggesting the 
types of questions Congress would need to answer to justify enacting 
enforcement legislation.  
 Using this approach, the following three Sections discuss the 
analysis necessary for the Court to uphold the given piece of legislation 
under the enforcement power. After discussing each piece of legislation 
separately, the Article then considers the lessons drawn. It then 
concludes by integrating those lessons into an overall approach to the 
congruence and proportionality standard that is both appropriately 
hospitable to civil rights legislation while also respectful of the judicial 
supremacy that lies at the heart of that standard. 
2.   Sexual Orientation 
 As suggested by the cases described earlier,255 American law and 
society exhibit conflicted views about sexual orientation. The cases 
divide starkly between those that fail to perceive any rational basis 
for sexual orientation discrimination and those that have no 
                                                                                                                                       
 255. See supra  Part III(B)(1). 
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difficulty doing so. While these results are at least theoretically 
consistent as simply the divergent products of the same rational 
basis test,256 their tones are sharply inconsistent. The opinions 
striking down the government action imply that sexual orientation is 
self-evidently irrelevant. They give almost no consideration to the 
possibility that a rational basis might justify the government action, 
a striking feature given the deference and presumptions inherent in 
the rational basis standard. By contrast, cases upholding sexual 
orientation discrimination reflect the significant deference and 
presumptions characteristic of conventional rational basis review.257
 Considering these cases as a whole, it is hard to avoid the sense 
that they reflect American public opinion more generally. Just as 
that opinion is evolving toward something of a consensus that sexual 
orientation discrimination in education, employment, market 
transactions, or day-to-day interactions with government is 
inappropriate,258 so too courts have generally found that in such 
contexts sexual orientation discrimination is unconstitutional. This 
consensus translates into judicial doctrine via conclusions that such 
discrimination is either irrational or motivated by illegitimate 
animus.259 By contrast, courts give significant deference to legislative 
conclusions in the areas of family and parenting,260 where American 
public opinion remains deeply ambivalent.261
 If the Supreme Court’s response to enforcement legislation 
targeting sexual orientation followed the lower courts’ lead, then its 
                                                                                                                                       
 256. The state-court same-sex marriage cases stand apart, as a number of state 
supreme courts have considered sexual orientation a suspect or quasi-suspect class.  See
supra note 121. Given the higher stakes of federal constitutional status as a suspect class,   
it is unlikely sexual orientation will be elevated to the status of suspect class in the near 
future. See infra note 271. 
 257. These cases tend to be concentrated in the areas of prison administration, the 
military, and family and parental matters. Judicial review of prison and military issues is 
marked by an especially high degree of deference deriving from their special institutional 
contexts. E.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (establishing a generally deferential 
review of prison regulations that restrict inmate rights); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 
503, 507 (1986) (deferential judicial review of a Free Exercise claim in the military context). 
Thus, the deferential judicial review of sexual orientation discrimination in those areas may 
flow more from the institutional context than the general acceptability of sexual orientation 
discrimination. However, in family and parental issues—not coincidentally, areas where 
empirical proof is sharply contested or nonexistent and where legislative decisions are 
especially likely to rely on values and a priori definitions—courts exhibit significant deference 
to legislative findings and the conclusions legislatures draw from them. 
 258. For one poll on these issues, see Posting of Andrew Gelman to FiveThirtyEight: Politics 
Done Right, http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/06/gay-rights-are-popular-in-many.html (June 
13, 2009, 20:05 EST). 
 259. See supra note 122. 
 260. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children and Family Serv., 358 F.3d 804, 
825 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 261. See supra note 258. 
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analysis would also be highly context-specific.262 However, following 
the lower courts’ lead would create a paradox, given the Court’s 
current approach to congruence and proportionality. On the one 
hand, legislation such as ENDA would find support in precedent 
suggesting that it is rarely constitutional for government to 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in market 
transactions. However, as noted above, that precedent employs a 
standard of review—rational basis—that presumes that most sexual 
orientation classifications are in fact constitutional.263
 These two characteristics of lower courts’ sexual orientation 
jurisprudence suggest the trouble the Court would encounter if it 
relied on its post-Boerne approach to congruence and proportionality 
to decide the constitutionality of a statute like ENDA. Use of the 
existing approach, with lower court precedent constituting at least 
some of the raw data,264 would create a dilemma for the Court. Those 
courts have often found such discrimination to be unconstitutional, 
but have done so based on a doctrinal test that normally suggests the 
absence of a significant constitutional problem.265 Thus the two 
components of these rulings point toward different answers to a key 
congruence and proportionality inquiry—the presence of a significant 
constitutional problem. As this analysis demonstrates, the precedent 
striking down such discrimination suggests the presence of such a 
problem, but the standard of review employed suggests the opposite.  
 This problem arises because of the special nature of judicial 
review of enforcement clause legislation. If the issue was simply the 
constitutionality of a particular act of sexual orientation 
discrimination, then the Court could resolve this problem as it did in 
Cleburne and, even more relevantly, Romer. In those cases the Court 
employed a more muscular version of rational basis review to ferret 
out particular instances where sexual orientation discrimination was 
either truly irrational or motivated by invidious purposes. Use of this 
more aggressive rational basis review allowed the Court to sift, on a 
case-by-case, action-by-action level between plausible uses of the 
classification tool and uses that were either irrational or invidious.  
 However, when the Court reviews enforcement legislation it 
usually confronts a broad rule of conduct applicable to an entire class 
of government actors, rather than a statute enacted by a particular 
                                                                                                                                       
 262. Of course, federal action in the military context would not raise an Enforcement 
Clause issue, given plenary federal control over the armed forces. 
 263. Interestingly, these results appear far less explainable as the result of classic 
rational basis standards, which should generally lead courts to uphold government action. 
They are more explainable as the result of review against a true constitutional principle of 
reasonableness, shorn of the presumptions and anti-plaintiff hurdles that mark rational 
basis review. 
 264. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20. 
 265. See supra notes 122-24. 
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legislature or an action performed by a particular government 
official. Unlike these latter actions, an enforcement statute, unless it 
is unusually narrow in scope, presumably impacts an entire class of 
government actors, such as employers or managers of government-
run public accommodations. In turn, the wholesale character of the 
enforcement statute requires the Court to make a more general 
determination about the constitutional problem the statute attempts 
to remedy.266 Thus, if the Court believes that the congruence and 
proportionality of a statute depends on the Court’s determination of 
the seriousness of the problem it confronts, it will have to make that 
determination at a wholesale level and not at the level of a particular 
action that, as in Cleburne or Romer, can be labeled irrational or 
invidious.267 This creates the dilemma caused by the disjunction 
between the more contextualized rational basis review employed by 
lower courts to test sexual orientation discrimination and the 
standard’s general pro-government bias.268   
 Thus the dilemma remains. The Court can resolve it only by 
revamping its underlying sexual orientation jurisprudence or 
reconceptualizing congruence and proportionality review. A general 
reevaluation of the Court’s approach to sexual orientation, while 
welcome, appears unlikely. If social consensus means anything to the 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, then the ambivalent public 
attitude toward sexual orientation augurs poorly for the Court 
granting suspect class status for gays and lesbians, especially given 
the implications that move would have for federal constitutional 
                                                                                                                                       
 266. Indeed, in Tennessee v. Lane, the Court disagreed about the breadth with which 
the Court should review the constitutionality of the ADA’s public accommodation 
provisions. Justice Stevens’s majority opinion reviewed, and upheld, those provisions as 
narrowly applied to access to courthouses. 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004). Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, dissenting, protested this narrowly drawn review, arguing that those provisions 
should stand or fall together. Id. at 540-41 (Rehnquist, C.J, dissenting). 
 267. This is true even if the Court were to adopt Justice Stevens’s approach in Lane,
since even that as-applied approach nevertheless required the Court to consider the ADA 
as applied to the entire class of situations where disabled individuals sought access to 
courts. Id.
 268. Concededly, an important difference between Garrett and possible judicial review 
of ENDA is the existence of lower court cases striking down instances of employment 
discrimination against gays and lesbians as failing the rational basis test. E.g., Glover v. 
Williamsburg Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1998); Weaver 
v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998); Jantz v. Muci, 759  F. Supp. 1543 
(D. Kan. 1991). A decision upholding ENDA could simply rely on those cases for the 
proposition that sexual orientation employment discrimination is simply irrational, thus 
making ENDA’s restrictions congruent and proportional to that underlying rule. But such 
an analysis would amount to a significant change in equal protection law: it would amount 
to a holding that a particular classification tool is largely prohibited even though it 
ostensibly receives the level of review that is reserved for situations where the political 
process can be trusted to function properly. Such a  nuanced approach to equal protection 
may be welcome, but its context sensitivity would be in significant tension with current 
doctrine’s primary focus on the classification tool itself and not the context in which 
government is acting. 
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claims for same-sex marriage rights. As the Court explained in 
Cleburne, suspect class status is a blunt tool that makes it difficult 
for the Court to defer to political decisions when such deference may 
be warranted as a matter of institutional competence, or simply 
politically savvy. In the case of sexual orientation, the continued 
public ambivalence about sexual orientation in the areas of marriage 
and family will probably push the Court away from announcing a 
rule requiring across-the-board heightened scrutiny.269
 Thus, a Section 5 challenge to ENDA may force the Court to refocus 
the congruence and proportionality inquiry. In particular, an 
appropriate review of ENDA may require the Court to decouple its 
congruence and proportionality review from rigid conclusions drawn 
from the general level of scrutiny courts apply to sexual orientation 
discrimination. The Court would need to accord to enforcement 
legislation targeting sexual orientation the same sort of context-specific 
review that lower courts already effectively accord when considering 
constitutional challenges to sexual orientation discrimination.  
 Even leaving aside the fact that it would more closely track the 
results reached by lower courts, such a nuanced review of enforcement 
legislation logically follows from Congress’s superior institutional 
ability to draw lines between different factual contexts involving 
sexual orientation discrimination. As questionable as all such 
discrimination ought to be, the fact remains that Congress, and 
legislatures generally, possess a superior ability to draw lines that 
would be arbitrary if drawn by courts. Thus, while courts are arguably 
doctrinally inconsistent when they defer to legislative discrimination 
against gays and lesbians in family and parenting matters while 
quickly dismissing such discrimination in other contexts, Congress, 
unconstrained by the need for formal consistency, should have the 
authority to guarantee equality in some contexts while not acting with 
regard to others. As an institution that explicitly aims to reflect public 
opinion, Congress surely has at least as much institutional 
justification as courts to draw lines between different social contexts, 
such as employment and marriage. Thus, the Court should give 
Congress latitude to determine what equal protection’s command of 
                                                                                                                                       
 269. A number of state courts have recently held sexual orientation to be a suspect 
class under their state constitutions. See supra note 121. However, it is not clear what 
impact these state court decisions would have on the federal constitutional issue. By 
contrast, a decision that sexual orientation constituted a suspect class under the federal 
constitution would immediately cast doubt on the decisions of a number of states to 
prohibit same-sex marriage. A Supreme Court that may want to let this issue play out 
longer in the political process might well refuse to pretermit state-by-state development by 
imposing across-the-board heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation. Heightened scrutiny 
might also pretermit political developments with regard to the military’s exclusion of 
acknowledged gays and lesbians. But see Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 527-28 
(1986) (upholding the military’s imposition of restrictions on religious practice in the name 
of deference to military judgments). 
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reasonableness in fact requires in a particular context for sexual 
orientation discrimination. It would be truly ironic if the Court denied 
that sort of flexibility to Congress while asserting it for itself by 
applying the rational basis standard flexibly. 
 This analysis is not particularly new; commentators and judges 
have long remarked on Congress’s superior ability to draw lines that 
would seem inappropriately arbitrary if drawn by courts.270 What is
new, however, is the challenge posed by ENDA. ENDA confronts the 
Court with a statute that both outlaws discrimination that the courts 
have also been suspicious of, while also favoring a group that is 
subject to other discrimination that the public has not yet come to 
fully condemn. By tackling a less controversial subset of sexual 
orientation discrimination, ENDA would respond to a social problem 
in a way that is more nuanced than courts can explicitly embrace in 
light of the formal rigidity of equal protection’s tiered structure. 
There should be no reason for the congruence and proportionality 
standard to stand in the way of upholding such nuanced legislation 
simply because courts are institutionally unable to formally 
categorize social issues with the same flexibility as Congress. 
 Of course, judicial deference to congressional line drawing cannot 
turn simply on congressional ability to draw any set of lines. Rather 
such deference should turn on Congress’s ability to draw lines in 
pursuit of constitutional principles declared by the Court. In the case 
of ENDA, those principles do in fact provide guidance channeling 
Congress’s institutional capabilities. In particular, the constitutional 
requirement that legislation serve a public purpose, while itself so 
general as to be of little value as a limit on congressional power, 
points toward follow-on questions that Congress ought to have the 
authority to answer. The public purpose requirement furnishes a 
criterion against which a court can judge whether ENDA truly 
enforces equal protection by reflecting congressional expertise in 
applying a broad equal protection principle crafted by the Court. 
 What sorts of evidence or inquiries should channel congressional 
power to apply the public purpose requirement? Surely court 
precedents—both their results and their analyses—should play some 
role. Even if such precedents cannot demarcate the constitutional 
rule with precision, they nevertheless represent the most explicit 
attempts made by any institution to uncover constitutional meaning. 
In the case of ENDA, the fact that so much sexual orientation 
discrimination has been struck down surely suggests the presence of 
a constitutional problem that Congress ought to have significant 
latitude to remedy. Perhaps ironically, the argument for this latitude 
                                                                                                                                       
 270. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 
U. Cin. L. Rev. 199 (1971). 
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is strengthened by the fact that most of these strikedowns have been 
based on application of the rational basis test. If much sexual 
orientation discrimination fails even this most deferential test then 
presumably it presents a serious constitutional issue. Of course, some 
sexual orientation discrimination satisfies the rational basis 
standard. Again, though, the distinction between the discrimination 
that survives judicial scrutiny and that which fails it should channel 
congressional power. To the extent that discrimination in market 
transactions—employment and provision of basic services—is 
especially likely to be struck down as unconstitutional, ENDA should 
have an easier time satisfying congruence and proportionality 
review, properly conceived. 
 More particularly, to the extent judicial precedent found these 
classifications to be motivated solely by animus, the core nature of 
such violations ought to strengthen the case for congressional 
enforcement authority. As noted earlier, a basic command of equal 
protection is that government not single out groups for a reason 
unrelated to the public interest.271 The difficulty of applying that 
seemingly simple formula eventually led the Court to the political 
process approach of Carolene Products, which cited an open political 
process as a justification for courts to forego searching scrutiny of 
most classification decisions. However, cases in which courts 
concluded that a governmental classification was motivated by 
animus reveal violations of equal protection’s core command that 
government act in pursuit of the general good. To the extent lower 
courts have made such conclusions about sexual orientation 
discrimination, such conclusions raise the likelihood that in 
prohibiting such discrimination Congress was in fact enforcing the 
constitutional command. 
 Factfinding, and Congress’s factfinding power, should matter as 
well. As Justice Breyer argued in Garrett, in a challenge to 
Enforcement Clause legislation there is no good reason for the Court 
to refuse to consider evidence of broader social phenomena, such as 
evidence of conduct by private parties, to the extent it tends to prove 
unconstitutional conduct by states.272 This is true even if such facts 
would not be relevant to a direct constitutional challenge to a 
particular state action. Indeed, the different relevance such broader 
evidence should have simply defines the difference between a direct 
                                                                                                                                       
 271. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal 
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 463 (2000) 
(“Long before equal protection doctrine had developed categories of suspect classifications 
or oriented itself toward the protection of specific groups, it had settled on the conclusion 
that state decisions must be justifiable by reference to public reasons, so that government 
action that flows merely from ‘antipathy’ or ‘animus’ is unconstitutional, whether or not it 
is subject to rational basis review.”). 
 272. See supra text accompanying notes 169-72. 
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challenge to a particular state action and a challenge to an 
enforcement statute regulating an entire class of activity. Along with 
this broader conception of evidence should come respect for 
congressional factfinding ability. To the extent broader social facts 
are relevant to the underlying issue, there is every reason for the 
Court to respect congressional expertise to find such facts. 
 Social reality should matter as well. Sometimes animus can be 
found as an empirical matter—as, for example, in Cleburne, where 
the Court had evidence of the local government acting at the behest 
of constituents’ explicit dislike of the mentally retarded.273 However, 
more often animus is simply a label for a social judgment that certain 
reasons for acting are discreditable. John Hart Ely’s analysis in 
Democracy and Distrust illustrates the point.274 In Democracy and 
Distrust Ely mounted probably the most sophisticated attempt ever 
to construct a value-neutral, purely process-based understanding of 
equal protection. His analysis culminated with a conclusion that 
equal protection protects groups against others’ refusal to deal with 
them—refusing, in his words, to allow them entry into the “pluralists’ 
bazaar” of interest group politics—for reasons that were 
“discreditable.”275 The qualifier at the end—that the reason for the 
exclusion had to be normatively undesirable—was necessary to 
rescue his theory from the obvious objection that many groups—
criminals, for example—are not well treated in the political process, 
and for good reason.276 However, as scholars have concluded, Ely was 
never able to explain how those reasons could be evaluated for 
discreditability, short of the normative inquiries he was trying to 
avoid.277
 Enforcement Clause doctrine need not suffer from this same 
difficulty. The value judgments political branches can legitimately 
make about the fundamental fairness or arbitrariness of a 
classification should help establish the normative status of that 
classification, which can then inform judicial judgments about the 
scope of congressional enforcement power in that area. The 
judgments political branches and citizens themselves make about the 
appropriateness of a given classification reflect the social reality that 
gives content to the otherwise nearly empty ideas of “equal 
protection,” “treating likes alike,” and “public purpose.”  
                                                                                                                                       
 273. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447-50 (1985). 
 274. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
 275. Id. at 152.  
 276. Id. at 153-54.  
 277. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 739-40 
(1985) (discussing the inability of the “prejudice” prong of the Carolene formula to rescue 
the theory from the need for value judgments); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence 
of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1072-73 (1980). 
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 However, an important caveat is in order. The grant to Congress 
of authority to perceive social reality and on that basis enact 
enforcement legislation treads close to Justice Brennan’s vision in 
Morgan of congressional power to interpret the equal protection 
guarantee. Thus, it may be appropriate for courts to perform careful, 
if ultimately deferential, review of enforcement legislation relying on 
this theory.278 Such review would seek to determine if the legislation 
in fact comports with the social consensus regarding the particular 
type of discrimination the statute targets. It would examine relevant 
equality decisions state legislatures and other political actors have 
made. The goal would be to determine whether other representative 
bodies have concluded that the discrimination targeted by the federal 
law is so fundamentally unfair that it violates the equality principle 
that is now housed in the Equal Protection Clause.279
 Decisions by other broad-ranging social groups—e.g., corporations, 
unions, educational institutions—would also be relevant.280 The point 
of this inquiry would not be to determine if these actors had 
concluded that the discrimination at issue violated equal protection. 
Certainly, there is no logic to courts examining whether private 
actors have made a determination irrelevant to their normal 
operations. But even as applied to state and local governments, 
which are subject to equal protection, the inquiry should not be so 
limited. Rather, the inquiry should aim to determine whether a social 
consensus exists that certain discrimination is fundamentally unfair. 
It is consensus on that issue, not on a doctrinal analysis about how a 
court would apply the Equal Protection Clause, which provides the 
social understanding of discrimination supporting enforcement 
legislation. A contrary view commits the same mistake the Court 
                                                                                                                                       
 278. Of course, enforcement legislation relying on other theories may be subject to 
different tests. For example, the VRA would appropriately be tested against the Court’s 
determination that racial discrimination violates a true constitutional rule—indeed an 
explicit one, given the language of the Fifteenth Amendment. Judicial review of that 
statute would not need to consider social perceptions of racial discrimination, given that 
the statute targeted discrimination explicitly prohibited by the Constitution. 
 279. See, e.g., Michael A. Woods, The Propriety of  Local Government Protections of 
Gays and Lesbians From Discriminatory Employment Practices, 52 EMORY L.J. 515, 551 
(2003) (arguing that enactment of state and local nondiscrimination protections created a 
consensus allowing the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and suggesting that the 
same process could lead to the enactment of ENDA). A similar process is sometimes 
employed to determine the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, in light of its recognition of  
evolving social standards. E.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821-23 (1988) 
(plurality opinion) (finding the evolving practices of states probative in determining the 
constitutionality of executing a prisoner for a crime committed while he was a child); id. at 
848 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing with this methodology); id. at 864-65 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the plurality’s methodology as well). 
 280. See id. at 830-32 (plurality opinion) (considering the views of bar and professional 
organizations as relevant to the Eighth Amendment issue); see also id. at 852 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring in judgment) (noting that the Court has consulted juries’ practices in 
resolving Eighth Amendment issues). 
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made in Garrett—namely, confusing judicial doctrine with 
statements of actual constitutional meaning. Given this broader 
understanding of what determinations should support Congress’s 
decision to legislate, it makes sense to include the views of 
nongovernmental actors when undertaking this investigation.281
 So understood, this principle furnishes real limits on 
congressional power. Most notably, it prevents Congress from 
deciding, in isolation, contrary to state government practice and 
apparent social consensus, that a certain classification practice is so 
unfair as to warrant congressional enforcement legislation. Such a 
statute would lack support from the relevant sources, and thus would 
be of doubtful constitutionality. At the same time, by counting among 
the relevant sources both federal and state judicial opinions, this 
approach would not leave Congress powerless to protect the rights of 
unpopular minorities, the groups that are usually thought to be the 
prime beneficiaries of the equal protection guarantee. Including 
countermajoritarian court decisions as a component of the social 
consensus that Congress can recognize and enforce ensures that 
Congress is not constrained from protecting rights that the Carolene
principle itself would recognize as worthy of protection.  
 As a practical matter, this approach would likely result in a 
situation where Congress could not act until at least some degree of 
consensus had emerged that an equal protection problem exists. In 
one sense this is a modest statement of the enforcement power, 
turning as it does largely on the perceptions and conclusions of actors 
other than Congress. But in a normally functioning political process 
Congress would presumably not act alone in recognizing and 
enforcing an equal protection right. Indeed, it would be an unusual 
situation where no state or local government, no court, and no 
significant private opinion had expressed concern about a particular 
issue, but Congress thought it sufficiently important to warrant use 
of its Section 5 power. In a federal system governing a liberal civil 
society one might expect advocates for a particular right to press 
their case on a number of fronts, state and federal, legislative and 
judicial, public and private. Thus, to the extent Congress acts in 
response to constituent pressure, it would be expected that such 
pressure would have resulted in other levels of government, and 
other social groups, responding in a similar way. 
 As applied to ENDA, this approach would require a court to 
examine, in addition to judicial precedent, the evidence of sexual 
orientation discrimination, generally and particularly in 
employment, both by private and government employers. Such 
evidence would help establish the significance of the problem in a 
                                                                                                                                       
281. See Thompson, 487 U.S. 815. 
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fuller and more precise way than the current approach, exemplified 
by Garrett, which simply examines whether state employers had 
engaged in this discrimination, and indeed, whether that state 
employer discrimination would be judged unconstitutional by a 
court.282 At the same time, this proposed approach would require a 
court to consider the prevalence of analogous protections in state and 
local law and the nondiscrimination policies of institutions such as 
corporations, unions, and universities.283 As explained above, this 
latter information would help a court determine American society’s 
attitude toward such discrimination.  
 Obviously, this approach raises difficult issues. What if a body of 
precedent consistently found state employer sexual orientation 
discrimination unconstitutional, but social practice did not reveal as 
clear a social consensus against it? Presumably precedent would 
trump to the degree those strikedowns suggest a constitutional rule 
against the practice. Nevertheless, the question would require candor 
and an explicit weighing process, presumably conducted with a 
thumb on the scale in favor of congressional power.284 It is easy to 
imagine other combinations of the factors that matter in this 
analysis: the constitutional rule content of any applicable precedent, 
its precise applicability, and the strength of the social consensus on 
the issue. It is impossible to prejudge any set of facts, except at a very 
general level. Still, this Article argues that this approach is workable 
and avoids the artificiality and ultimate unworkability of Garrett’s 
insistence that enforcement legislation be congruent and proportional 
not to the Constitution but to the Court’s own doctrine. 
3.   The Transgendered 
 Discrimination protection for transgendered people would present 
its own unique challenge to the Court’s Section 5 jurisprudence. As 
                                                                                                                                       
 282. Cf. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (taking the more 
narrow approach). 
 283. The appropriate role to be given religious institutions’ views presents an 
interesting issue. Certainly, religious institutions are important actors in American life. On 
the other hand, significant Establishment Clause problems might arise were the Court to 
explicitly consider the position of religious organizations on matters of secular policy. Cf.
Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (striking down on Establishment Clause 
grounds a state law giving churches power to veto grants of liquor licenses in their 
immediate vicinity). As a very rough first cut at an answer, it might be appropriate to 
distinguish between the views of religious institutions and their adherents, with only the 
latter counting in the calculus and only in their capacities as citizens. On the other hand, 
the nature of the social consensus inquiry here—in particular, its goal of simply uncovering 
the normative understandings of the American people on a given issue, as expressed in 
part through the views of civil society groups—might obviate any Establishment Clause-
based concerns with considering the views of religious organizations. This question 
requires significantly more consideration, however. 
 284. See infra text accompanying note 344 (suggesting an appropriate standard of review). 
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explained earlier in the Article,285 transgender discrimination 
doctrine is marked by disagreement over the phenomenon itself. 
Under standard application of the congruence and proportionality 
standard, judicial review of such a statute would require the Court to 
resolve the naming issue as part of its identification of the right 
Congress sought to protect. In turn, the Court’s decision on that issue 
would go a long way toward determining the outcome of the 
enforcement power analysis.286
 Congress should have significant authority to resolve the naming 
issue, which is a paradigmatic example of the social fact finding 
Justice Breyer discussed in his Garrett dissent. In that opinion 
Justice Breyer argued that Congress was better suited than the 
Court to determine the existence of irrational, animus-based 
disability discrimination.287 Justice Breyer relied on Congress’s 
presumed institutional expertise to argue that the Court should defer 
to its determination that disability discrimination presented a 
significant constitutional problem.288
 As applied to transgender discrimination, the institutional 
competence argument tilts even more strongly in Congress’s favor. In 
this context the issue is even more basic than it was in Garrett, as the 
question to be answered goes to the very social categorization of the 
status at issue. Is transgender discrimination “really” discrimination 
based on gender performance, as transgender plaintiffs often argue? 
Or is it a separate category of discrimination, as courts have often 
concluded? These questions raise issues of social understanding, not 
legal logic. Their answers, like all answers to questions about group 
identity and difference, depend on social context and value choices, 
rather than abstract legal logic. As Laurence Tribe noted almost thirty 
years ago, “[o]ne cannot speak of ‘groups’ as though society were 
objectively subdivided along lines that are just there to be discerned. 
Instead, people draw lines, attribute differences, as a way of ordering 
social existence—of deciding who may occupy what place, play what 
role, engage in what activity.”289
 Consider, for example, a federal statute that defined sex 
discrimination in Title VII to include gender identity.290 This statute 
                                                                                                                                       
 285. See supra Part III(B)(3). 
 286. See, e.g., Hendricks, infra note 290, at 214-15 (concluding that if the Court 
identified transgender discrimination as a subset of sex discrimination then a federal 
statute targeting the practice would stand a higher chance of surviving congruence and 
proportionality review). 
 287. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 384-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 288. See id.
 289. Tribe, supra note 277, at 1074 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). 
 290. At least one scholar has proposed this approach to the issue of transgender 
discrimination. See generally Jennifer S. Hendricks, Instead of ENDA, A Course Correction 
for Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 209 (2008). 
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would reflect a congressional conclusion that gender stereotyping as 
reflected in transgender discrimination constituted the same social 
phenomena as simple discrimination on the basis of biological sex. 
This equation of types of discrimination is not strictly based on logic 
or empirical investigation into which types of discrimination are 
“really” similar. For example, one could simply draw the line at 
biological gender, and decide that people have a right to be free of 
discrimination “based on sex” as long as every person acts according 
to mainstream expectations of how men and women should act and 
appear. No amount of empirical investigation could threaten the 
foundation of this rule, unless new facts cause society to make the 
normative choice of altering the relevant grouping. Similarly, no 
amount of formal logic short of a circular argument turning on a
priori definitions could prove that transgendered persons suffering 
discrimination because of their gender performance are not victims of 
sex discrimination.291
 The socially constructed nature of groups suggests that Congress 
should have a significant role in naming the discrimination 
experienced by transgendered persons.292 As Justice Breyer noted in 
Garrett, Congress’s electoral legitimacy provides it with the authority 
to identify social understanding in a way that courts can do only 
hesitantly.293 The case of transgender discrimination involves a 
fundamental question of social reality: the categorization of a species 
of discrimination. Transgendered plaintiffs force courts, legislatures 
and society to confront the question: what exactly is transgender 
discrimination? Is it akin to discrimination based on gender, 
disability, or sexual orientation, or is it a type of discrimination that 
is sui generis? Congress should enjoy significant authority to answer 
this question by including the transgendered in an existing protected 
category such as gender or disability or by creating a new  
protected category. 
 However, deference is not abdication. Any enforcement legislation, 
just like any legislation generally, must be reasonable. For example, 
hypothesize an enforcement statute that protects the transgendered by 
defining “race” in Title VII to include transgendered status. This 
statute would presumably raise judicial concern if that definition 
justified for transgender plaintiffs the same strict prohibitions the 
enforcement power authorizes Congress to impose to combat racial 
discrimination. The problem would arise because the grouping 
                                                                                                                                       
 291. See infra note 301 (concluding that congressional overturning of the Court’s 
decision that pregnancy discrimination did not violate Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination 
reflected a dialogue between Congress and the Court over the social meaning of  
sex discrimination). 
 292. See supra note 289. 
 293. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 384-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Congress codified would clash so severely with our general social 
understanding of which groups are relevantly similar that this 
hypothetical statute could not be upheld as an expression of Congress’s 
superior perception of social reality. This hypothetical statute suggests 
that limitations should exist on congressional discretion to discern and 
give effect to such perceptions. Such limitations mark the outer 
boundaries of the deference courts should give to Congress, and thus 
help demarcate the line between congressional enforcement of 
judicially announced constitutional rules (e.g., that racial 
discrimination is a special concern of the Constitution) and 
congressional interpretation of the Constitution itself.  
 How should a court police those outer boundaries in the context of 
transgender discrimination? Begin with the Supreme Court’s own 
jurisprudence. The Court has already travelled a significant distance 
toward embracing the view that requirements of certain types of 
gender performance can be understood as sex discrimination. In Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,294 the Court concluded (in a Title VII case) 
that Ann Hopkins suffered sex discrimination when her employer 
failed to promote her due to her failure to maintain a stereotypically 
feminine appearance.295 Hopkins’s equation of gender performance 
with sex would support a congressional decision taking the next step 
and equating transgender discrimination with gender performance 
discrimination.296 Hopkins itself did not reach this issue, and, indeed, 
most (though not all) lower courts who have confronted it have failed 
to take that step. However, Hopkins should be understood as having 
engaged in the social analysis of what it means to discriminate 
“because of sex” in modern American society. Its answer to that 
question—that sex discrimination includes discrimination based on 
failure to maintain mainstream notions of how men and women act—
is consistent with a congressional determination that transgender 
discrimination is a species of sex discrimination. Such a 
congressional determination would represent a step beyond the 
                                                                                                                                       
 294. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 295. Id. at 258. Courts are beginning to conclude that the Hopkins gender-performance 
analysis of sex discrimination originating in judicial interpretations of Title VII also 
applies as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment law. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 
566 (6th Cir. 2004); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d 
Cir. 2004); cf. Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. Civ.02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 
WL 2008954, at *8, *8 n.12 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004) (concluding that the issue is still an 
open one). 
 296. Note that this is not the approach contemplated by those who wish to include 
protections for the transgendered in ENDA. See, e.g., Hendricks, supra note 290 (arguing 
for transgendered protection via amendment to Title VII rather than via ENDA). The point 
of this discussion is simply to illustrate how court opinions can influence the range of 
choices Congress can reasonably make when engaging in the sort of group identifying 
process that would be required should Congress choose to provide protections to  
the transgendered. 
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analysis in Hopkins. However, it follows from the Court’s analysis, as 
recognized by the lower court opinions applying Hopkins to cases of 
transgender discrimination.297
 Judicial precedent is not the only source the Court should consult 
when considering the constitutionality of a statute restricting 
transgender discrimination. Indeed, as discussed above the very task 
of naming or categorizing a particular discriminatory practice 
implicates the sort of social value judgments for which legislatures are 
better suited than courts. Thus, in considering ENDA or any statute 
that has the effect of categorizing or naming transgender 
discrimination, the Court should also examine how society 
characterizes transgendered status. Undoubtedly, such an inquiry is 
tricky for courts, which are ill-suited for this task. However, they 
should be able to perform this task if they accord the appropriate level 
of deference to Congress and uphold any reasonable legislative answer 
to the naming question. Moreover, it should never be forgotten that in 
the absence of enforcement legislation courts perform this same 
determination without any guidance from Congress.298
 In the case of a statute that names transgender discrimination, 
courts should recognize the close social tie between sexual orientation 
discrimination and transgender discrimination. Regardless of 
whatever opposition may exist to embracing such a relationship,299
                                                                                                                                       
 297. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of 
Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th 
Cir. 2000); Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215-16 (1st Cir. 2000); 
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relevant to that authority because it provides evidence that Congress would be acting 
reasonably in determining that sex discrimination includes discrimination on account of 
gender performance. See infra text accompanying note 344 (suggesting a reasonableness 
standard of review). With Hopkins’s relevance so understood, what is notable about lower 
court interpretations of that case is not that that courts have not been unanimous in 
extending it to include transgender discrimination, but that some courts have.  
 298. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (deciding that Mexican-
Americans constituted a cognizable social group in Texas); id. at 478 (“Throughout our 
history differences in race and color have defined easily identifiable groups . . . . But 
community prejudices are not static, and from time to time other differences from the 
community norm may define other groups which need the same protection. Whether such a 
group exists within a community is a question of fact.”); see also id. at 479 (noting that “one 
method” by which the existence of a separate class may be determined is “by showing the 
attitude of the community”). 
 299. See, e.g., Shannon Minter, Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights? Getting Real 
About Transgender Inclusion in the Gay Rights Movement, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
589 (2000). 
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the fact remains that the two communities, and the discrimination 
they experience, are closely linked in the public mind. If confirmation 
is needed beyond the close historical connections between the two 
groups and the very term “LGBT” to denote the overall group, one 
need only cite the fact that activists have tussled hard over whether 
ENDA should include protection for the transgendered. The fact that 
sexual orientation discrimination and transgender discrimination 
remain so closely connected that proponents have struggled to keep 
the latter in the bill despite warnings that it would destroy chances 
for passage reflects, if nothing else, the close connection many in the 
group itself feel toward a unified identity. That close identification, 
both in the public’s mind and in the minds of group members, 
demonstrates the reasonableness of grouping them together.  
 For our purpose, what matters is not so much whether ENDA 
should include protection for the transgendered, or even whether gay, 
transgendered, and other people connect the groups as a coherent 
social unit. As suggested by lower courts and by transgender 
advocates themselves, alternative understandings of transgender 
identity exist. Rather, what matters here is that courts should take 
these social perceptions into account when deciding the 
appropriateness of Congress’s grouping decision.300 Those perceptions 
may be conflicting; indeed, this is hardly surprising given the 
ambivalence courts themselves have shown on this issue. This 
ambivalence simply suggests that a variety of naming approaches 
should be open to Congress as reasonable alternatives. 
 Judicial review of any congressional choice should also examine 
the sources set forth in the previous section’s discussion of ENDA. 
Thus, the actions of state and local governments and significant 
private institutions should be relevant. As applied to enforcement 
legislation dealing with transgender discrimination, those actions 
should be examined in particular for their decisions about the 
naming issue. Those decisions are relevant because they can shed 
light on social attitudes toward transgender identity.301
 Much of this argument is similar to the one made in the 
discussion of ENDA. However, a congressional response to 
                                                                                                                                       
 300. Of course, the grouping decision matters not just as a matter of legislative 
drafting or form, but also because it links the groups when the Court performs its 
enforcement power analysis. It would be utterly empty for the Court to defer to Congress’s 
decision to include gender identity discrimination as part of sex discrimination, but then to 
analyze the enforcement power validity of such a statute as applied to the transgendered, 
with the result that the Court would fail to use its more generous enforcement power 
approach from Hibbs in favor of a more skeptical approach tailored to a statute targeting 
transgender discrimination.  
 301. See, e.g., Hendricks, supra note 290, at 211-12 (arguing that Congress’s 
recognition of pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination reflected a societal 
understanding of the meaning of sex equality). 
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transgender discrimination adds a level of complexity to the analysis, 
given the ambiguity about the very concept of transgender identity. 
That ambiguity argues in favor of congressional authority, given the 
fundamentally normative nature of the question and its 
imperviousness to judicially accessible tools to resolve it. If, instead, 
the Court purported to decide conclusively the true essence of 
transgender identity, it would be arrogating to itself exclusive 
responsibility for naming social phenomena whose social meanings 
are heavily contested. To make matters worse, that naming would 
likely heavily influence how skeptically the Court examines the 
legislation under review.302 If the Court were to make such a high-
stakes decision for which it is fundamentally ill-suited, especially in 
the face of a contrary congressional determination, it would deny 
Congress the power to participate in the project of enforcing 
constitutional rights at exactly the point where congressional input 
would be most legitimate and helpful. Properly understood, the 
congruence and proportionality standard does not require such a 
counterintuitive result. 
4.   Genetics 
 Genetic discrimination protection presents two conceptual 
challenges of its own. They combine to make GINA a complex case for 
congressional enforcement authority. The issues raised by GINA—(1) 
whether Congress’s enforcement power prevents it from addressing 
speculative harms and (2) whether genetic discrimination raises a 
serious constitutional problem—build upon the discussion of sexual 
orientation and transgender status. Thus GINA reveals important 
lessons about the appropriate scope of the enforcement power. 
 First, genetic discrimination is apparently still quite rare. 
Anecdotal evidence of employers acting based on genetic information 
exists but is sketchy.303 The apparent rarity of genetic discrimination 
directly challenges the way the current Court applies the requirement 
that enforcement legislation address a serious constitutional issue. In 
its post-Boerne cases the Court has applied this element of the test by 
searching for litigation that resulted in a finding of unconstitutional 
discrimination.304 Given this approach, the novelty of genetic 
discrimination cuts against GINA’s constitutionality. Indeed, one 
                                                                                                                                       
 302. See, e.g., Hendricks, supra note 290, at 214-15 (arguing that grouping transgender 
discrimination as gender discrimination would make it more likely that the Court would 
uphold the statute as congruent and proportional enforcement power). 
 303. See supra Part III(B)(2). 
 304. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729-32 (2003); Bd. of 
Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-72 (2001); id. at 374-76 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (noting the lack of constitutional challenges to disability discrimination and 
concluding that that absence suggests that the ADA did not address a serious 
constitutional problem); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83-88 (2000). 
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commentator cites this hurdle as a major reason for questioning 
GINA’s constitutionality as enforcement legislation.305
 This issue illustrates in sharp tones the institutional differences 
between Congress and courts. By definition, courts look backward: 
their purpose is to correct existing harms, or, at most, forestall 
imminent ones.306 Their remedial power, even to issue injunctive and 
other forward-looking relief, is triggered by the proof of such harms. 
By contrast, Congress, and legislatures generally, have a much 
broader brief: to remedy past harms but also to prevent future ones. 
It is no criticism of legislative action that it seeks to deter a problem 
that has not yet occurred; indeed, such action is often praised as 
forward looking.307
 The first question, then, is whether Congress’s enforcement power 
is different from its other powers in that it requires Congress to stay 
its hand until such harms occur. In theory there is no reason to 
believe it is. As a matter of original meaning, it appears as though 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was generally understood to 
grant Congress the same type of plenary power as the Necessary and 
Proper Clause of Article I.308 Of course Boerne makes clear that the 
Court’s authoritative interpretation of the Constitution is supreme 
and cannot be second-guessed by Congress. Taking Boerne seriously 
may entail some restrictions on congressional discretion regarding 
how to use its enforcement power.309 But judicial interpretive 
supremacy does not mean that a lack of court cases dealing with a 
certain type of discrimination—or even a lack of empirical examples 
entirely—means that the Constitution is silent as to that issue. It 
bears repeating that Section 5 authorizes Congress to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and not the Court’s own institutionally 
limited understanding of it, including its track record of finding 
constitutional violations. 
                                                                                                                                       
 305. See Roberts, supra note 31, at 484. Professor Roberts does argue that GINA is 
constitutional under the Commerce Power, with all the remedial constraints that grant of 
authority carries with it. Id. at 484-85. 
 306. This concern animates, among other doctrines, the Court’s standing, mootness  
and ripeness doctrines. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 54 (Aspen Publishers 2006) (explaining the rationale for the rule against 
advisory opinions). 
 307. Indeed, opponents of GINA did not fault the bill simply because it acted before any 
discrimination was established, but rather because, they claimed, the possibility of future 
discrimination arising was too speculative to justify its costs. See Roberts, supra note 31, at 
468-70. 
 308. See Gary Lawson and Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE  L.J. 267, 311-12 n.189 
(1993). But see supra note 181 (suggesting that modern doctrine yields a divergence 
between the scope of congressional powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause and the 
Enforcement Clause). 
 309. See supra note 181. 
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 In fact, it is quite possible that the Court would agree with this 
analysis, at least in theory. In Kimel, the Court conceded that 
constitutional problems might exist that have thus far eluded the 
Court.310 Kimel thus suggests that the Court would be willing to 
concede, at least in theory, that discrimination that had not yet 
appeared might nevertheless present such a serious threat as to 
warrant enforcement legislation.311
 The real difficulty would come when the Court considered the 
level of proof the Court would demand from Congress that such a 
threat existed. Kimel’s dismissal Congress’s record of state-sponsored 
age discrimination set the stage for its rejection, one year later in 
Garrett, of a far more extensive record of state-sponsored disability 
discrimination.312 Troublingly for GINA, both age and disability 
discrimination had been extensively litigated in the courts, including 
the Supreme Court; moreover, both types of discrimination were 
recognized as extensively present in American society more 
generally. Yet in both cases the Court’s review of the congressional 
record was highly skeptical. The lack of any appreciable genetic 
discrimination litigation, and indeed, the conceded lack of a record of 
such discrimination in American society generally, suggests that, 
however receptive in theory the Court might be to a congressional 
finding of an imminent constitutional threat, its factual review would 
be highly skeptical. 
 But how skeptical should that review be? Simple rationality 
review of a predictive judgment by Congress may not be appropriate. 
Such deferential review would effectively convert the congruence and 
proportionality standard into a formality that is automatically 
satisfied whenever Congress makes the requisite predictive 
judgment. It is difficult to square such deference with the judicial 
interpretive supremacy to which the Court has adhered since 
Boerne.313 Such deference to a purely predictive judgment, 
unsupported by any actual instances of the conduct, would 
presumably allow Congress to write any enforcement legislation it 
wished, on any topic, as long as the statute included a finding that 
the discrimination targeted, while not currently extant, posed a risk. 
 However, harsh scrutiny of the type performed in Garrett may not 
be appropriate, either. After all, predictive judgments underlie nearly 
every policy decision Congress makes; indeed, it is not an 
                                                                                                                                       
 310. See 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (finding Congress’s lack of evidence of state-sponsored 
discrimination to confirm its lack of authority to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity in 
the ADEA). 
 311. But see Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 375-76 (2001) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 312. See id. at app. C (Breyer, J., dissenting).
 313. See supra note 181. 
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exaggeration to say that such predictions are Congress’s stock in 
trade. When the issue arose in the context of the interstate commerce 
power, even the post-Lopez Court did not hesitate to credit a 
congressional prediction that the local possession of a good under 
strict state law restrictions on its transfer presented the risk of the 
item leaking into interstate commerce in substantial quantities.314
The difference between this deference and the relatively stricter 
review of congressional predictive judgments in the enforcement 
power context may ultimately lie in the fact that the Court is 
responsible for much—indeed, most—of the lawmaking in the 
Fourteenth Amendment context. If that lawmaking is to be supreme, 
at least in so far as it announces actual constitutional principles, 
then the types of predictive judgments present in GINA must be 
subject to review that is at least somewhat stricter than when 
Congress makes analogous predictions when legislating under Article 
I. Balanced against that judicial supremacy is the congressional 
capacity for making these kinds of judgments. A rough attempt at 
honoring both of these principles leads to the conclusion that 
something more than mere rationality review, but less than 
skeptical, Garrett-style review, ought to be appropriate when 
Congress bases an enforcement law on a purely predictive judgment. 
 But even this difficult, nuanced review does not end the story. Even 
assuming that the Court credits Congress’s predictions that genetic 
discrimination may come to pass, there remains an additional 
question: whether such discrimination raises a serious constitutional 
problem. This is a distinct question, which requires both a distinct 
congressional reasoning process and proof proffer, and a distinct type 
of judicial review. Here, Congress must take off its empirical predictor 
hat and instead utilize its capacity to make value judgments about 
fundamental fairness. Just as with ENDA, here too Congress must 
determine whether a consensus exists condemning the (predicted) 
genetic discrimination as fundamentally unfair and thus violative of a 
core equal protection principle announced by the Court. 
 But how is Congress to make this determination, given the still 
hypothetical nature of the discrimination? At first glance, one might 
be tempted to reject GINA’s constitutionality at this point, on the 
simple ground that this final determination would require Congress 
to “pile inference upon inference”315 in a way that undermines any 
real limit on congressional power. But if Congress’s initial predictive 
determination survives meaningful judicial review then this objection 
loses much of its force. 
                                                                                                                                       
 314. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23-33 (2005); id. at 35-41 (Scalia, J., concurring); see 
also supra note 181. 
 315. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
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 Still, the fact remains that the Court would be left reviewing a 
determination about the fundamental unfairness of a type of 
discrimination that had not yet occurred. On reflection, though, there 
is no reason Congress should not be able make such judgments in the 
absence of actual examples, given that the issue requires a normative 
rather than an empirical judgment. It may be appropriate for courts to 
make such judgments only on the basis of a set of empirical facts 
presented by litigants; by contrast, however, legislatures’ focus on 
broad social facts means that much legislative debate and decision—
even about value choices—involves predictions. In fact, GINA’s 
legislative history reveals policymakers’ concern that discrimination 
based on what is perhaps the most immutable characteristic possible—
our genes—is antithetical to basic constitutional principles.316
 This is not to say that standard congruence and proportionality 
analysis would be easy in a case like GINA. For example, to the 
extent that such discrimination is still merely potential, how can a 
court accurately calibrate the size of the constitutional problem to 
which the statute must be proportional?317 While a legislature might 
be able to judge the invidiousness of such a classification in the 
abstract, can a court be expected to do so when reviewing an 
enforcement statute targeting so-far nonexistent discrimination? 
Such difficult questions will undoubtedly confront the Court if and 
when it deals with an enforcement power challenge to GINA. This 
Article does not purport to provide a comprehensive answer to them 
or to the others that will undoubtedly arise. It simply presents the 
basics of the issue and explains how a proper conception of the 
congruence and proportionality standard does not require the 
automatic rejection of GINA. 
 This analysis of GINA can be illuminated by way of contrast with 
an enforcement power analysis of hypothetical legislation restricting 
obesity discrimination. Scholars have noted the prevalence of obesity 
discrimination and raised questions about its legitimacy.318
Nevertheless, no such federal legislation exists or is pending, and as 
of now, most obesity discrimination is not prohibited by federal law, 
including the ADA.319 Part of the reason for courts’ refusal to 
interpret the ADA to include obesity lies in the relatively technical 
difficulty of determining the cause of obesity. This constitutes a 
hurdle for ADA coverage given the requirement that the impairment 
                                                                                                                                       
 316. See Roberts, supra note 305 at 41-45. 
 317. This issue is discussed more generally in the following Part. See infra Part V(D). 
 318. E.g., KIRKLAND, supra note 253; Jane Byeff Korn, Too Fat (Ariz. Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-27, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1428935. 
 319. See Korn, supra note 318, at 24-53 (noting that the ADA defines disability as, in 
relevant part, a “physiological disorder,” and explaining that most obese ADA plaintiffs are 
unable to satisfy this requirement). 
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be “physiological,”320 which may be difficult to determine in  
particular cases. 
 More fundamentally, however, scholars have speculated that part 
of the reason for the obesity exclusion lies in public perceptions that 
obesity reflects a moral failing (an occurrence caused by a lack of self-
control over lifestyle choices) rather than an accident of birth or 
circumstance.321 Thus, obesity presents the opposite situation from 
genetics, where the social understanding of genetic discrimination 
focuses on the lack of individual responsibility for one’s genetic 
makeup.322 As a result, genetic discrimination appears to the public 
to constitute arbitrary discrimination, while obesity discrimination 
reflects a legitimate favoring of morally worthy individuals over 
those less worthy.323 This understanding is reflected in the legal 
landscape, which features widespread state law protections against 
genetics discrimination but essentially no protections against  
obesity discrimination.324
 Given such a social and legal landscape, under this Article’s 
analysis federal restriction on states’ latitude to engage in obesity 
discrimination would probably not constitute appropriate 
enforcement legislation. Such (hypothetical) legislation would face a 
landscape in which Congress had essentially acted alone, taking a 
view inconsistent with that of American society generally,325 and as 
expressed most particularly by the absence of state law protections.326
Given that equal protection law on obesity amounts to nothing more 
than the most general prohibitions on arbitrary classifications, this 
lack of social consensus about the unfairness of obesity 
discrimination would probably doom federal legislation as a matter of 
the enforcement power, at least until social attitudes changed.327
Congressional fact findings could conceivably change this result. 
However, the weight of the social consensus against condemning 
obesity discrimination means that those facts would have to be 
compelling: either Congress would have to uncover instances of 
                                                                                                                                       
 320. See id.
 321. E.g., id. at 29 (suggesting that the rejection of obesity as a disability “may be a 
reflection of non-medical, societal views of obesity.”). 
 322. See Roberts, supra note 305 at 41-45. 
 323. See Korn, supra note 318, at 12-16, 21, 30 (noting and discussing social 
perceptions of obesity). 
 324. See Roberts, supra note 305, at 6-7 (noting the widespread prevalence of state 
restrictions on genetics discrimination). 
 325. See Korn, supra note 326.  
 326. See Korn, supra note 318. 
 327. Of course, other federal powers, most notably the commerce power, may authorize 
such legislation. As noted earlier, however, the Commerce power has important limitations 
with regard to remedies. See supra note 40. 
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discrimination that a court itself would consider unconstitutional,328
or it would have to prove that social condemnation of obesity was 
objectively irrational.329
 More importantly, though, note the lessons taught by this 
comparison between genetics and obesity. First, the current existence 
of discrimination is not determinative of congressional authority. 
Indeed, under this analysis GINA would have an easier time being 
upheld as compared with a restriction on obesity discrimination, 
despite the lack of genetic discrimination330 and prevalence of obesity 
discrimination.331 This is a counterintuitive result, given the stress 
modern enforcement power cases have laid on congressional fact 
finding.332 But requiring Congress to find current relevant 
discrimination inappropriately ignores Congress’s authority to act 
preemptively, to forestall discrimination that has not yet occurred. 
There is no reason in law or logic to deny Congress this preemptive 
authority when enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment when it 
possesses it while utilizing its Article I powers. To be sure, denying it 
this authority has the effect of restricting its enforcement power, a 
fact that might be considered favorably given the need to prevent 
that power from overwhelming both judicial supremacy and an 
appropriate realm of state sovereignty. However, the distinction 
between preemptive and corrective power is unprincipled, given 
Congress’s authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment rather 
than the Court’s institutionally-limited reading of that provision and 
the general appropriateness of purely forward-looking legislation. 
 By contrast, this Article’s approach to genetic and obesity 
discrimination illustrates principled limits on congressional 
enforcement power. Fundamentally, the difference between genetics 
discrimination and obesity discrimination lies in the difference 
between arbitrary and nonarbitrary classification.333 In these two 
contexts, judicial doctrine does not precisely decide the arbitrariness 
                                                                                                                                       
 328. This high standard, reminiscent of the Court’s own stringent review in Garrett, is 
necessary because in the face of no precise equal protection rule condemning the 
discrimination and a social consensus validating it, Congress would need to show that, in 
essence, an equal protection rule did in fact exist at the level of specificity necessary for a 
court to conclude that Congress had uncovered unconstitutional conduct. 
 329. See supra Part V(B)(3) (explaining the constitutional requirement that 
government classifications exhibit at least minimum rationality). 
 330. See Roberts, supra note 305, at 30 (noting the lack of discrimination). 
 331. See Korn, supra note 318, at 17-23. 
 332. This prevalence extends across cases that both strike down and uphold 
enforcement legislation. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-
72 (2001) (noting the lack of relevant examples of disability discrimination); Nev. Dep’t of 
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728-29 (2003) (concluding that the heightened scrutiny 
accorded gender discrimination made it easier for Congress to demonstrate the existence of 
unconstitutional discrimination the FMLA sought to combat). 
 333. Cf., e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (noting the 
inherent likelihood that racial classifications are arbitrary). 
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issue. However, examination of the social understanding of these 
phenomena yield very different results. In turn, these different social 
understandings suggest different answers to the question of federal 
enforcement power. Thus, this Article’s approach does contemplate 
real limits on congressional authority. But it does so in a way that 
properly respects Congress’s political legitimacy and moral authority 
to speak for the nation. 
D.   A Word About Statutory Breadth 
 The approach proposed in this Article requires that we consider a 
specific question that has not been yet fully addressed: the question 
of how broad enforcement legislation can be. It is one thing for 
Congress to possess the power to answer the questions left 
unanswered by the Court’s equal protection doctrine, and for the 
Court to review those answers under a real, but nevertheless 
deferential, standard.334 But since the very idea of congruence and 
proportionality requires some sort of relationship between an 
enforcement statute and the relevant underlying constitutional 
guarantee, the proper test must be more precise. In particular, it 
must provide a method for determining how broadly Congress can 
legislate in a given situation. 
 The Court’s current approach relies heavily on judicial doctrine to 
determine the appropriate breadth of enforcement legislation. In 
Kimel, for example, the Court concluded that the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act failed the congruence and proportionality test 
because its provisions were overly broad when compared with the 
slight constitutional protection provided by the Court’s age 
discrimination doctrine.335 Kimel’s conclusion (and the similar 
conclusions reached in other post-Boerne cases) simply makes more 
precise the general implication of the Court’s doctrine-centric 
approach to congruence and proportionality: the ultimate result is 
that enforcement legislation protecting nonsuspect classes must be 
very narrowly drawn if it is to have any hope of surviving.336
 This Article’s approach to the statutory breadth issue similarly 
flows from its more general approach to the enforcement power. It 
starts from the insight that Congress can often instantiate a true 
constitutional rule more precisely than can the Court, with all its 
institutional limitations. This implementation of constitutional 
principle entails both identifying situations where constitutional 
principles, such as the public purpose requirement, are likely being 
                                                                                                                                       
 334. See supra text accompanying note 278; infra text accompanying note 344. 
 335. Kimel v. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86-88 (2000). 
 336. Cf. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 162-63 (2006) (upholding the ADA to 
the extent it provides a cause of action for actual constitutional violations). 
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violated, and also determining the most appropriate remedies for 
such violations. To take ENDA as an example, this approach 
recognizes congressional power to identify both the social context 
(here, employment) where sexual orientation discrimination is likely 
to violate the constitutional rule and the appropriateness of remedies 
to prevent and deter such violations. The power over remedies 
derives from congressional control over the means of effectuating the 
powers it possesses. Once a court reviews and upholds a 
congressional determination that discrimination in a particular 
context violates a court-announced constitutional principle, its 
decisions on remedies should be largely left to it, unless those 
remedies themselves contravene the Constitution.337
VI.   TOWARD A NEW APPROACH TO CONGRUENCE AND 
PROPORTIONALITY
 ENDA, transgender protection, and GINA pose different challenges 
to current enforcement power doctrine. Each of these challenges calls 
forth its own unique responses, as described in Part V. However, those 
answers share certain characteristics. This final Part considers how 
those common characteristics form the basis of a new approach to 
congruence and proportionality, one that respects both judicial 
supremacy and the unique institutional capacities that justify a 
significant congressional role in the protection of equality rights.338
 Most fundamentally, this Article’s analysis turns on the proper 
understanding of what courts do when they decide equal protection 
cases. Equal protection decisions, like all constitutional decisions, are 
ultimately rooted in the Constitution and interpreted through 
whatever tools the court chooses to employ—original meaning, text, 
moral philosophy, and so on. However, a careful reading reveals that 
a substantial part of judicial reasoning takes the form of a search for 
decision rules amenable to judicial application. Whatever we might 
think about the theoretical soundness of distinguishing between such 
decision rules and true constitutional law principles, a fair reading of 
the cases suggests that constitutional decisions, especially equal 
protection decisions, include both.339
                                                                                                                                       
 337. In this sense the enforcement power may well resemble congressional power 
under Article I. Cf. supra note 181; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 76 (1824) (noting 
that the decision how to use the power to regulate interstate commerce is solely rested in 
Congress, with the political process furnishing the sole check). 
 338. It also gives due regard to federalism via the requirement that normative 
judgments made by Congress be supported by a broad social consensus that presumably 
would be reflected in state and local law. 
 339. This is also undoubtedly true with regard to other Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
Indeed, it bears remembering that Carolene’s explanation of a political process-based 
approach to judicial review occurred in a due process case. Moreover, other constitutional 
rights incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment—most notably the exclusionary rule 
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 This conclusion matters because a doctrine that is partially 
composed of decision rules should be thought of as leaving a space 
open for congressional action under the enforcement clause. Section 5 
gives Congress the authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In determining what that amendment means one may appropriately 
look first to judicial decisions, especially in light of the Boerne Court’s 
insistence that the Supreme Court is the supreme and authoritative 
arbiter of constitutional meaning. However, when that arbiter itself 
confesses an inability to give a comprehensive account of that 
meaning a space is opened for congressional action that may differ 
from the Court’s statements or even holdings. 
 Of course, a judicial decision is never exclusively based on pure 
decision rules. Therefore, the challenge for enforcement power is to 
identify the constitutional principles that the Court has in fact 
identified that are relevant to a particular enforcement statute. 
Following Boerne, those principles do indeed cabin congressional 
enforcement power. However, to the extent the principles relevant to 
a particular enforcement statute are vague, they serve less to cabin 
congressional enforcement power than to channel it by suggesting 
the follow-on inquiries that Congress may be especially adept at 
answering, given its unique institutional capacities. 
 This summary outlines an approach to the congruence and 
proportionality standard that seeks to harmonize judicial supremacy 
with congressional authority. Of course, difficult issues remain in its 
application. The Article’s focus on three instances of current or 
potential enforcement legislation illustrates different issues that may 
arise when applying this standard. In all three instances, judicial 
doctrine falls short of conclusively stating a constitutional principle 
at a precise enough level to decide the case. In the case of ENDA, 
courts’ use of the rational basis standard fails to reflect the actual 
constitutional issue sexual orientation discrimination poses in a 
given context. Transgender discrimination doctrine is even less 
precise, as it has so far failed to answer even the preliminary 
question of how to name the phenomenon at issue. Finally, GINA 
confronts a complete lack of doctrine, given the absence not just of 
                                                                                                                                       
and the police warnings set forth in Miranda v. Arizona—have also been thought at 
various times to reflect judicially created enforcement mechanisms for the underlying 
constitutional right, rather than statements of constitutional principle. E.g., compare 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), with id. at 444 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The 
question of how this Article’s approach to congressional enforcement power applies to 
nonequal protection rights is not addressed here. Of course, one cannot have one 
enforcement power doctrine for equal protection and another for every other right. 
However, given this Article’s argument that equal protection is unique in its paucity of 
determinate judicially accessible meaning, it is appropriate to focus on equal protection 
when applying this proposal. Acceptance of this proposal would require serious work in 
applying it to congressional enforcement of other Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
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genetic discrimination litigation, but even of significant historical 
examples of genetic discrimination. 
 Congress can resolve each of these issues by using its distinct 
institutional capabilities and authority while remaining consistent 
with the constitutional principles stated by the Court. ENDA 
implicates Congress’s ability to draw lines that separate some species 
of sexual orientation discrimination from others, unencumbered by 
the formal rigidity of the rational basis standard. Congressional 
authority to do this rests on its ability to make normative judgments 
about whether a broad consensus condemns as fundamentally unfair 
sexual orientation discrimination in a particular social context, for 
example, employment. Such congressional judgments are uniquely 
legitimate, given Congress’s status as the national representative of 
the people. That same status authorizes Congress to categorize 
transgender discrimination based on how American society perceives 
the group’s identity, as one defined by gender, sexual orientation, or 
its own sui generis character. Finally, Congress should be able to rely 
on its factfinding capabilities to determine that a particular type of 
discrimination, while not currently extant, poses a real risk of 
fundamentally unfair discrimination warranting deterrence via an 
enforcement statute. 
 Each of these determinations stays within the channels cut by 
judicial statements of equal protection principles. Thus, they remain 
consistent with Boerne’s notion of judicial supremacy. Without doubt, 
this Article’s conception of judicial supremacy is narrower than that 
implied by the Court’s post-Boerne jurisprudence, which appeared to 
identify all judicial doctrine as enjoying supreme status. But it is 
consistent with Boerne itself, which struck down a congressional 
attempt to reinstate a rule the Court had rejected as fundamentally 
incompatible with a basic constitutional principle.340 In this Article’s 
terms, Boerne asserted the supremacy of a true constitutional 
principle. Thus, Boerne, the only significant modern enforcement 
power case to enjoy broad support on the Court,341 is compatible with 
this Article’s analysis. 
                                                                                                                                       
 340. See Employment  Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (allowing exemptions 
from generally-applicable laws that clashed with one’s religious beliefs would allow each 
citizen to become “a law unto himself”) (quotation omitted). Concededly, the status of the 
Smith rule—and thus, the constitutionality of RFRA—was and is heavily contested. 
Compare, e.g., Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings: A Defense of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 589 (1996),  with Christopher L. 
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is 
Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994). However, what is important for current 
purposes is that the Court identified the Smith rule as such, with the result that it was 
defective in light of Boerne’s embrace of judicial supremacy.  
 341. In United States v. Virginia, a unanimous Court recognized that the Enforcement 
Clause gave Congress the power to enact statutes that provided remedies for actual 
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because that case implicated the remedial facet 
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 Concededly, this more limited understanding of judicial 
supremacy—“interpretive,” rather than “doctrinal,” supremacy—
imposes only modest restrictions on congressional power. But those 
restrictions may have more bite than might be supposed at first 
glance. For example, to the extent the Court’s race jurisprudence is 
properly understood as resting primarily on true constitutional 
principle, this approach may limit congressional attempts to allow or 
mandate more affirmative action or general race consciousness than 
what the Court itself has allowed. Other instances where the Court 
can be fairly read as having established true constitutional principles 
would similarly impose significant limits on congressional 
enforcement discretion.342 In all cases the key question will be the 
Court’s own conclusion about the extent to which its own doctrine 
states constitutional principles or constitutes a judicial decision rule 
that, at best, merely approximates such principles.343
 Moreover, even where the Court’s doctrine reflects constitutional 
principle only at the most general level, thus presumably allowing 
Congress the greatest amount of enforcement power leeway, 
congressional discretion is still subject to limits. In such cases, 
Congress is not free to enact its own constitutional understandings 
and insert them into the lacunae left by the Court. Thus, this 
proposed approach is not a veiled form of popular constitutionalism. 
Rather, in such cases Congress should have the discretion to answer 
the questions and make the determinations that the Court-
announced constitutional principles require in order for those 
principles to be fully and effectively applied. Those questions usually 
take the form of empirical and normative judgments about the 
presence and the invidiousness of classifications. In the case of 
transgender discrimination, they also take the form of identifying 
and categorizing the group that is targeted for protection. These 
types of decisions play to Congress’s strength as the representative 
organ of the American people, a status that gives it the expertise to 
make the requisite empirical judgments and the legitimacy to speak 
for the nation when making normative judgments. 
 Still, the very generality of the supreme, court-announced 
principles cabining and channeling congressional action requires real 
judicial review if this approach is not to degenerate into a veiled 
prescription for unbridled congressional power. The Court should 
examine only the reasonableness of the congressional choice, but 
should do so without the evidentiary and other presumptions that 
                                                                                                                                       
of the enforcement power in the purest way possible, it does not play a major role in this 
Article’s analysis. 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996). 
 342. See, e.g., id. at 532-33 (1996) (indicating that gender classifications that deprive 
women of opportunity are presumptively unconstitutional). 
 343. The Court remains the final arbiter of the status of its own doctrine. 
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mark standard rational basis review. Perhaps the best model is 
Justice Souter’s reasonableness review under substantive due 
process in Washington v. Glucksberg.344 His approach to substantive 
due process review recognizes that interests exist on both sides of the 
issue and attempts to judge whether the legislature made a 
reasonable choice when it limited the individual right in pursuit of 
the public interest. It thus fits enforcement power review, where 
judicial supremacy and states’ legitimate prerogatives must be 
accommodated to a nontrivial congressional role in enforcing the 
rights authoritatively announced by the Court. Just as Justice 
Souter’s due process review balanced government interests and 
individual rights to ensure that the legislature’s choice fell within a 
band of reasonable choices, giving due regard to the interests on both 
sides, so too a court here should balance the choices Congress made 
to protect individual rights against the states’ autonomy interests. 
For empirical determinations the ultimate question reduces to a 
simple one of whether Congress acted pursuant to sufficient evidence 
to warrant the conclusion that the statute was an appropriate 
intrusion into state autonomy. For normative judgments, the 
question should be whether Congress was reasonable in concluding 
that a social consensus had arisen condemning the discrimination as 
fundamentally unfair. 
 Concededly, these inquiries are subjective. But, as Justice Scalia 
has pointed out, the underlying congruence and proportionality test 
is similarly subjective in requiring the Court to compare the size of 
the constitutional problem targeted by Congress with the breadth of 
the statutory remedy.345 Any approach to the enforcement power that 
seeks to harmonize judicial interpretive supremacy with appropriate 
respect for congressional power will encounter this subjectivity.346
 Despite this ambiguity, it is crucial to attempt such a 
harmonization. Judicial interpretive supremacy is critical to 
preserving the fundamental principles of equal protection law. 
Indeed, the hopes of the 39th Congress to constitutionalize the 
principles animating Reconstruction would be frustrated were 
Congress able to second guess the Court when the latter announced a 
true constitutional principle. In Morgan, Justice Brennan attempted 
to harmonize judicial supremacy with congressional interpretive 
                                                                                                                                       
 344. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752-59 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring  
in judgment).  
 345. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 555-56 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 346. Indeed, Justice Scalia’s response to his objection to the current doctrine’s 
subjectivity—to allow essentially any congressional enforcement legislation pertaining to 
racial discrimination but with regard to other groups nothing but legislation establishing 
pure remedies—essentially concedes the inherent subjectivity of any approach that seeks 
to find a position between complete deference to Congress and strict limits on its authority. 
See id.
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power by suggesting that Congress had power to expand but not 
contract constitutional rights.347 This approach, the famous “one-way 
ratchet,” has been criticized as unworkable and unprincipled.348 More 
generally, the countermajoritarian nature of courts risks being 
nullified if, at some point, the courts do not have the final say on the 
constitutionality of government actions, at least with regard to 
justiciable cases. In a time of national security anxiety and latent 
unease about the nation’s increasing diversity, it is crucial to 
maintain the ultimate authority of a countermajoritarian 
constitutional court. 
 It is equally crucial to give Congress its due. Because of its unique 
institutional role, Congress is uniquely suited to make both the 
empirical and normative judgments that often have to be made to 
give full life to the equal protection principles the Court announces. 
Privileging judicial doctrine as supreme law without inquiring into 
its status as constitutional principle denigrates congressional 
expertise, legitimacy, and moral authority to make the difficult 
judgments that are required to animate equal protection’s stirring, 
but vague promise. Congress’s institutional advantages will become 
more and more important over the coming years, as increasingly 
diverse, pluralistic, and rights-conscious groups make demands for 
recognition of equality claims that are far removed from those we are 
accustomed to dealing with. Courts will, of course, have to do their 
best in answering these claims, to the extent they arise in the context 
of normal constitutional litigation. But to the extent Congress shows 
itself receptive to such claims, the legislation it enacts will naturally 
reflect that institution’s particular talents and expertise.  
 It would be both ironic and tragic if such increased consciousness 
of equality on the part of the nation’s most representative 
governmental institution were thwarted by the Court’s unwillingness 
to share, even to this modest degree, in the project of constitutional 
construction. This Article has proposed a way of avoiding that result 
while still respecting Boerne’s consensus that the Court is the final 
arbiter of constitutional meaning. The hope is that this proposal can 
generate a new consensus on the Court, building on Boerne’s first 
principles. Such a consensus may yet avoid the collision between the 
Court and, on the other side, Congress and the American people it 
represents, that will inevitably follow from continued adherence to 
the current path of enforcement power doctrine.  
                                                                                                                                       
 347. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).  
 348. See Robin-Vergeer, supra note 340,  at 696-97 n.438 (citing critiques and defenses 
of the ratchet theory). 
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